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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

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CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SCIENCE.

I.

There is no Conflict Between Science and Revelation.

IT cannot be denied that there dwells in many sincere minds a lurking suspicion, amounting in some persons almost to a painful conviction, that antagonism exists between certain dogmas of revelation and the results of scientific investigation. Mr. Huxley, Dr. Draper, and other acknowledged leaders of modern thought, have done their utmost to confirm these sinister impressions and to widen the breach between the teachers of religion and those of physical science. They will tell you that the study of nature leads us away from God and ultimately results in the denial of His existence. They maintain that there is and must be an irrepressible conflict between these two great branches of knowledge; that they cannot coexist; and that, in the long run, theology must surrender to her younger and more progressive rival.

They affect to believe that the champions of Christianity, conscious of the unequal conflict, view with alarm the rapid strides of the natural sciences, and do all in their power to discourage the study of them altogether. You will be told, dear reader, by this modern school of thought, that the more you are attached to the teachings of Christian faith, the more will your judgment be warped

—your intellect stunted, and the more you will be retarded in the pursuit of scientific investigation. They will try to persuade you that, in exploring the regions of science, you will be in constant danger of falling foul of some ecclesiastical ukase warning you away from the poisoned tree of knowledge, just as our primitive parents were forbidden to eat the fruit of a certain tree in Paradise. They will tell you that your path is likely to be intercepted by some Pope's bull, which may metaphorically gore you to death. They will, in a word, contend that, to enjoy full freedom in searching the secrets of the physical world, you must emancipate yourself from the intellectual restraints imposed on you by the Christian religion.

Such are the statements deliberately made in our times against Christian revelation. But though they are uttered by bearded men, we call them childish declamations. We call them also ungrateful assertions, since they are spoken by men who are indebted to Christianity for the very discoveries they have made. Many a Christian Moses has wandered for years through the wilderness of investigation, and died almost in sight of the promised land of scientific discovery. And his successors, guided by the path that he had opened, and who might otherwise have died unknown after vain wanderings, entered the coveted territory and enjoyed its fruits. Even Mr. Tyndall avows that "the nineteenth century strikes its roots into the centuries gone by and draws nutriment from them."[1]

The truth is, that how much soever scientists and theologians may quarrel among themselves, there will never be any collision, but the most perfect harmony will ever exist between science and religion, as we shall endeavor to demonstrate in the following pages.

There are, indeed, and there ever will remain, truths of religion difficult to be reconciled with facts of science. If the ideas of time and space and the relation of soul to body are beyond our comprehension, we cannot be expected with our unaided reason to explain away the apparent incongruities that we find between the unseen and the visible kingdom of the universe. But difficulties do not necessarily involve doubts, still less denials. If we hold the two ends of a chain, we know that the connection is complete, though some of the links may be concealed from us.

Science and religion, like Martha and Mary, are sisters, because they are daughters of the same Father. They are both ministering to the same Lord, though in a different way. Science, like Martha, is busy about material things; Religion, like Mary, is kneeling at the feet of her Lord.

The Christian religion teaches nothing but what has been revealed by Almighty God, or what is necessarily derived from revela-

[1] On the Study of Physics.

tion. God is truth. All truth comes from Him. He is the Author of all scientific truth, as He is the Author of all revealed truth. "The God who dictated the Bible," as Archbishop Ryan has happily said, "is the God who wrote the illuminated manuscript of the skies." You might as well expect that one ray of the sun would dim the light of another, as that any truth of revelation can be opposed to any truth of science. No truth of natural science can ever be opposed to any truth of revelation; nor can any truth of the natural order be at variance with any truth of the supernatural order. Truth differs from truth only as star differs from star,—each gives out the same pure light that reaches our vision across the expanse of the firmament.

Legitimate inquiries into the laws of nature are, therefore, no more impeded by the dogmas of faith than our bodily movements are obstructed by the laws of physics. Nay, more, we have the highest ecclesiastical authority for declaring that "not only can faith and reason never be opposed to each other, but that they mutually aid each other; for right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith and, enlightened by its light, cultivates the science of things divine, while faith frees and guards reason from errors and furnishes it with manifold knowledge."[1]

Revelation teaches us that this material world had a beginning; that it shall have an end; and that God created it to manifest His wisdom and power, and for man's use and benefit. Hence, so far from warping our judgment, stunting our intellect, or retarding us in the prosecution of scientific truth, Christian revelation will be like the sun lighting up our course in the path of science, like a landmark directing us onward in the road of truth, like a beacon-light cautioning us to avoid the quicksands upon which false science has often been shipwrecked.

Science, on the other hand, when studied with humility, reveals to us the intimate relations of the forces of nature with one another, the unity of the laws governing them, and their subordination to a controlling Mind.

In contemplating the universe and tracing the effect to the Cause, we are filled with the sentiments of the Royal Prophet: "The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands."[2] No man can view St. Peter's dome without admiring the genius of Michael Angelo; neither can the thoughtful student contemplate the dome of heaven without associating in his mind the great Architect of nature. In beholding the vast firmament with its countless stars moving through boundless space, he is filled with a sense of God's immensity; for wherever creation is, there also is the Creator.

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[1] Vatican Council.

[2] Ps. xviii. 2.

If, from the top of a distant tower, we view a number of trains running in different directions, all arriving on schedule time at their respective stations, we admire the skill of the engineers, although they themselves are beyond the reach of our vision. And what are the numberless orbs of the universe, both stellar and planetary, but vast engines rushing through space with a velocity immeasurably greater than that of the fastest railroad car? Though often crossing one another, they never deviate from their course, never collide, nor are they ever precipitated through the abyss of space. Should we not admire the Divine Intelligence that controls these engines and that leads them with unvarying precision to their appointed destination?

The great luminary of day suggests to us the splendor of that uncreated "Light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world."[1] Its rays, illuming our planet and penetrating its hidden recesses, are a fitting type to us of the all-seeing eye of God, of whom the Royal Prophet again says: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy face? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into hell, thou art present."[2]

The earth, yielding its fruits with prolific bounty, proclaims God's merciful providence in supplying man's wants and comforts.

The beauty of the landscape is a mirror dimly reflecting the infinite loveliness of God; for the author must possess in an eminent degree the perfections exhibited in his works. Solomon, who was a close student of nature, was thus impressed.[3] He says, if men are delighted with the beauty of the visible creation, "Let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first Author of beauty made all these things. . . . For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby."[4] And St. Paul declares that they who will not recognize the power and divinity of God by the contemplation of the works of creation, are inexcusable.[5]

When the thoughtful student reflects that he is a mere atom amid the illimitable space and countless orbs that surround him, he is overawed by a sense of his nothingness; and when he considers how little he has learned after all his labor, in comparison with the treasures of knowledge that still lie hidden in nature's bosom, he will exclaim with the great Newton: "Whatever the world may think of my learning, I feel like a little child on the seashore

[1] John i. 9.
[2] Ps. cxxxviii. 7, 8.
[3] III. Kings iv. 33.
[4] Wisdom xiii. 3, 5.
[5] Rom. i.

gathering a smooth pebble here and a shell there, while the ocean of eternity lies unexplored before me."

But when he considers the intellectual faculties with which he is endowed and the preëminent place he holds in creation, conscious of his dignity, he is filled with gratitude to God, as was David when he said: "What is man that thou art mindful of him! . . . . Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honor, and hast set him over the works of thy hands."[1]

In a word, every object in creation speaks to him of the wisdom and power of God. He

> "Finds tongues in trees, books in running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in everything."[2]

He rises from nature to nature's God.

The more deeply the student of nature penetrates into her secrets, the more does he admire the wisdom of the Creator. "Small draughts of philosophy," says Bacon, "lead to atheism; but larger ones bring back to God."

It would, therefore, be a great mistake to suppose that the agnostic and unbelieving scientists of the nineteenth century are made such by physical studies. They were already imbued with those ideas when they began their labors, and every phenomenon which they discovered was shaped to suit their preconceived theories.

II.

The Church is the True Friend and Promoter of Science.

Now, since reason and revelation aid each other in leading us to God, the Author of both, it is manifest that the Catholic Church, so far from being opposed to the cultivation of reason, encourages and fosters science of every kind. The more secrets science will elicit from nature's bosom, the more the Church will rejoice; because she knows that no new revelation of nature will ever utter the words: "There is no God!" Rather will they whisper to the eager investigator, "He made us, and not we ourselves."

Each new discovery of science is a trophy with which religion loves to adorn her altars. She hails every fresh invention as another voice adding its harmonious notes to that grand choir which is ever singing the praises of the God of nature.

At no period of the Church's history did she wield greater authority than from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. She exercised not only spiritual, but also temporal power; and she had great influence with the princes of Christendom. Now, this is the

[1] Ps. viii. 5, 6, 7.

[2] "As You Like It."

very period of the rise and development of the universities in Europe. During these four centuries, nineteen universities were opened in France, thirteen in Italy, six in Great Britain and Ireland, two in Spain, and one in Belgium. At no time did the human intellect revel in greater freedom. No question of speculative science escaped the inquisitive search of men of thought. Successful explorations were made in every field of science and art. The weapons of heathendom were employed in fighting the battles of truth. The principles of Aristotle, the greatest of ancient dialecticians, were used as handmaids to religion and, in the words of Cardinal Newman, "With the jaw-bone of an ass, with the skeleton of pagan Greece, St. Thomas, the Samson of the schools, put to flight his thousand Philistines."[1]

It is an incontrovertible fact that it is only in countries enjoying the blessings of Christian civilization that science has made any perceptible progress. And the writers who for the last two thousand years have been most conspicuous in every department of physical knowledge, were, with few exceptions, believers in Christian revelation. If we search for light among the followers of Lucretius, Confucius, or Mohammed, we shall find little to reward us for our pains.

In astronomy and geology, mechanics and mathematics, in chemistry, physiology, and navigation, Christian scholars hold a preëminent place. It is to Copernicus, a priest and canon, that the world is indebted for the discovery of the planetary revolutions around the sun.

It is to the learning and patronage of Pope Gregory XIII. that we owe the reformation of the calendar and the computations which determine with nice accuracy the length of the solar year. Galileo, Kepler, and Secchi, Sir Isaac Newton and Lord Bacon, Leibnitz, Lavoisier, Euler, Cuvier, and Descartes, are recognized as leaders in the field of science. They were, moreover, firm believers in revelation, while most of them combined strong religious convictions with scientific erudition. In the study of nature they do not fail to record with devout praise their admiration for the power and providence of the Creator.

The first circumnavigation of the globe, the discovery of the American continent, the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope, as well as the most accurate geographical survey of the earth's surface, are events for which we are indebted to Christian navigators and explorers, all actuated by an indomitable spirit of enterprise, and most of them inspired with the higher motive of zeal for the propagation of the Gospel. Marco Polo, Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, Magellan, and Vasco da Gama, were men of strong religious faith, who

[1] The Idea of a University, Sec. viii.

embarked on their perilous voyages with the benediction of the Church upon them.

Our own country is largely indebted to Catholic priests, who were the pioneers, not only of religion and civilization, but also of science. In one hand they bore the torch of faith, and in the other the torch of religion. They not only carried the Gospel to the aboriginal tribes of North America, but they explored our rivers, lakes, and mountains; and the charts that they sent to Europe over two hundred years ago are still admired as models of topographical accuracy.

With these facts before us it is difficult to suppress a feeling of indignation when we are told that Christianity is a bar to scientific investigation. These maligners of Christianity owe it to the Christian religion that they are able to revile her. Separate them from the universities and schools founded by Christian patronage; withdraw them from Christian traditions and literature, and they would die of intellectual stagnation.

There is no branch of art in which the disciples of Christianity have not excelled. Was not Michael Angelo a devout son of the Church? And who surpassed him in sculpture and architecture? To him we are indebted for St. Peter's basilica, the grandest church ever erected to God by the hand of man. Byron found that

> "Power, glory, strength, and beauty,—all are aisled
> In this eternal ark of worship undefiled."

And were not Raphael and Domenichino, Fra Angelico and Leonardo da Vinci, members of the Church? And are they not the recognized masters in the exquisite art of painting? Mozart and Haydn, Beethoven and Palestrina were Christian men, and were patronized by Popes and bishops. And are they not acknowledged leaders in the rich and harmonious strains of music? Their masses are as unrivalled in musical composition as our cathedrals are in architecture.

The apparent conflict between the deductions of science and the doctrines of Christian faith is clearly accounted for in the following Decree of the Vatican Council: "There never can be any real discrepancy between reason and faith, since the same God who reveals mysteries has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind; and God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth. *The false appearance of such a contradiction is mainly due either to the dogmas of faith not having been clearly understood and expounded according to the mind of the Church, or to the inventions of opinion having been taken for the verdict of reason.*"

If these explanations are kept in view, they will serve to demon-

strate that the apparent conflict between science and revelation has no foundation upon which to rest.

1. It is often erroneously assumed that the Scriptures propound doctrines which they never professed to teach. The sacred volume was not intended by its Divine Author to give us a scientific treatise on astronomy, or cosmogony, or geology, or even a complete series of chronology or genealogy. These matters are incidentally introduced to illustrate a higher subject. The purpose of the Scriptures is to recount God's supernatural relations with mankind, His providential government of the world, and man's moral obligations to his Creator.

When, for instance, the Sacred text declares that the sun stood still in the heavens,[1] it simply gives expression to the miraculous prolongation of the day: and this in popular language such as even now with our improved knowledge of astronomy we employ, for we speak of the rising and the setting of the sun as if, according to the Ptolemaic system, we still believed that he revolves around the earth. The Church has no mission to teach astronomy. One may be as bad an astronomer as John Jasper and yet be a good Christian.

Again, the results of geological investigation, by which it is ascertained that ages must have elapsed between the formation of matter and the creation of man, would seem to conflict with the book of Genesis, which states that all vegetable and animal life was created within the space of six days. But the Church, as is well known, has never defined the meaning to be attached to these *days* of Genesis. We are at liberty, as far as the Church is concerned, and if the deductions of science are incontrovertible, we are compelled to ascribe an indefinite period of years to each day. The context itself insinuates that the day cannot be restricted to twenty-four hours, since for the first three days there was no sun to measure their duration; and in the second chapter of Genesis the word day is manifestly used to express an indefinite period of time employed in the creation of the material universe.

The Mosaic narrative simply records the creation of matter out of nothing, and the order in which life, both animal and human, came into existence. The chronological order of Moses is borne out by the researches of geologists, who have discovered that vegetable fossils are anterior to animal remains, and that those of the lower animals are more ancient than any human skeletons ever found. Our knowledge, moreover, of the laws governing the vegetable and animal kingdoms confirms this arrangement, since vegetable life derives its subsistence from inorganic matter, ani-

[1] Josue x. 15.

mal life is nourished by the vegetable kingdom, and man himself is sustained by the nutriment he derives from both.

The discovery of human fossils, and of other geological and historical monuments, is sometimes boldly assumed to stamp the human family with a far greater antiquity than appears to be warranted by Scripture genealogies. To this I reply that the Scripture gives no precise data regarding the time intervening between Adam and our Lord. We have only conjectures resting on genealogies. The enumeration of Adam's lineal descendants is not claimed to be consecutive and complete. It is not denied that links may be missing in the chain of generation. There is also a marked discrepancy between the different versions of the Bible in computing the age of man. The Vulgate reckons four thousand years; the Septuagint, five thousand; and the Hebrew, six thousand years from Adam to our Saviour. Some Catholic writers, without any reproof from the Church, are disposed to extend the period to over eight thousand years.

On the other hand, some of the ablest scientists have refuted the fabulous ages ascribed by certain writers to the human family. The Egyptian hieroglyphics and the cuneiform inscriptions of western Asia, were triumphantly quoted as demanding for man an antiquity immeasurably more remote than is warranted by Scripture history.

But the patient investigations of Champollion, Rawlinson, and others, prove that Egypt furnishes no authentic record of human government and human life as ancient as is claimed for it by the adversaries of the Bible. The studies of Layard in Assyrian archæology and the researches of Legge in ancient Chinese history, concur in dissipating the cloud of legendary fable surrounding the dynasties of these nations.

The presumptive evidence furnished by human fossils is now ruled out of court by the best students of anthropology. When we consider the untiring industry of man and his indomitable tendency to leave a record of his deeds behind him, and since we fail to find any authentic traces of him in pre-Adamite times, we are supplied with an indirect though eloquent confirmation of the substantial correctness of the Mosaic chronology.

Is it not a remarkable fact, which shows the special supervision of God over His Church, that, in her long history, she has never formally interpreted a single text of Scripture which was afterward contradicted by any authenticated discovery of science? Nor were occasions wanting when, in the apparent interests of faith, she was tempted to give a false decision. For centuries the opinion obtained, seemingly supported by Scripture, that the earth was level. St. Boniface, the Apostle of Germany in the eighth century, com-

plained to the Holy See that an Irish priest named Virgilius had taught that the earth was spherical, as science now demonstrates it to be. But the Holy See prudently abstained from rendering any decision on the subject.

2. Whenever any supposed scientific discovery conflicts with an acknowledged truth of Revelation, we may rest assured that the alleged scientific facts have no reality, but are groundless assumptions and mere hypotheses with not even the merit of originality.

For instance, the Scripture declaration affirming the unity of the human species, was for a long time controverted by many scientists. They denied that all men could have sprung from the same stock; first, because the human family is characterized by so many types and colors; secondly, because they speak a variety of tongues having apparently no relation with one another; thirdly, because scientists believed it impossible, for want of adequate means of transportation, that America and other newly discovered countries could have been peopled from any other nation.

But subsequent researches have shown the fallacy of their reasoning and confirmed the truth of the Biblical narrative. It is now admitted that climate, food, and habits of life have a marked influence on the color and physical formation of man. Philologists compute the number of languages and dialects spoken throughout the world to be over three thousand. They tell us that there are common principles governing the constitution of languages, which justify the opinion, if they do not conclusively demonstrate, that all languages can be traced to a single source.

It is now obvious to every one acquainted with geography how easily the aboriginal inhabitants of America could have passed over from Asia by the Behring Strait. A like solution applies to other inhabited places more recently discovered.

"Nothing is more strange," observes a recent writer, "than the incessant reproduction of old thoughts under the guise of new and advanced opinions. It would seem as if the human mind, with all its restless activity, were destined to revolve in an endless circle. . . . . Professor Tyndall, addressing the world from the throne of modern science, repeats the thoughts of Democritus and Epicurus as the last guesses of the scientific mind."[1]

In fact, there is no class of men so dogmatic and so impatient of contradiction as certain modern scientists; and "this dogmatism is the more intolerable, as the so-called 'demonstrations' of one age have sometimes been the butt and ridicule of succeeding generations."[2] Not content with cultivating their own field, they invade the region of theology and politics. They speak as if they had an exclusive diploma to treat of everything in heaven above, on the

[1] Blackwood's Magazine, November, 1874. [2] Creation's Testimony, C. v. p. 118.

earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth; and from their infallible judgment there must be no appeal. Mr. Tyndall recently wrote some very angry letters against Mr. Gladstone. The veteran statesman is denounced by the professor as a hoary rhetorician and a desperate gamester, because he presumed to advocate Home Rule for Ireland.

The position of the Catholic Church in reference to modern scientists may be thus briefly summarized: The Church fosters and encourages every department of science. But just because she is the friend of true science she is opposed to all false pretensions to science. There is as much difference between true and false science as there is between authority and despotism, liberty and license. When she hears a man advancing some crude theory at variance with the received doctrines of revelation,—with the existence of God, for example, or His superintending providence or His wisdom or His sanctity; when she hears him advocating some hypothesis opposed to the unity of the human species, to the spirituality and the immortality of the soul, to the future destiny of man, and to those other great doctrines that involve at once the dignity and moral responsibility of the human race, she knows that his assumptions must be false, because she knows that God's revelation must be true. She stands between such a man and the Divine Oracle of which she is the custodian; and when she sees him raise his profane hands and attempt to touch the temple of faith, she cries out, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther!"

Will you not agree with us that she is right in raising her voice against groundless theories that desecrate the truth and poison its very source? How can we consent to forsake the sacred fountain at which our forefathers slaked their thirst for centuries, to run after some mirage that these modern philosophers have conjured up before our imagination? If God's revelation is at the mercy of every sciolist, what, then, becomes of those great and consoling truths underlying our social fabric? They are no more than shifting sands beneath our feet.

The pathway of time is strewn with the wreck of many an imposing scientific theory that once found favor in the opinion of men. And such will ever be the fate of those wild speculations and unfounded assumptions that impugn the truth of Revelation. They may float for a time on the human mind like huge icebergs drifting along the ocean's current, chilling the atmosphere and carrying destruction in their path. But like the false theories before them, they are destined to melt away beneath the effulgent rays of reason and revelation, while "the truth of the Lord remaineth forever."[1]

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[1] Ps. cxvi. 2.

WHY TASTES DIFFER.

TASTES are not matters for controversy: *De gustibus non est disputandum!* In its ordinary sense the proverb is unquestionable. What we feel to be sweet is sweet to us, however much we may be blamed, despised or envied for feeling it to be so. If a man really prefers Etty to Rafael, or Rigoletto to Lohengrin, no amount of reasoning or objurgation can make him do more than feign the contrary. Our feelings make themselves known to us by their own self-evidence, and, as they are ultimate, and can therefore neither be proved nor disproved, so neither can they be directly and immediately altered. But though our tastes, as facts, are not matters for discussion, much remains to be said about the "how" and the "why" of them.

How ugly and ridiculous those fashions often seem to us which ten or twenty years ago we all admired! Yet we are the same men and can in most cases be sure that our altered feelings are due rather to changes which have taken place about us—changes in our environment—rather than in ourselves. These waves of feeling are also very transient. Bygone fashions of dress, more or less modified, often come again into vogue. The distension of the "hoop" was repeated in the "crinoline," nor would it be unsafe to predict that "Madonna bands" will ere long reappear and smooth down many a fair but now ruffled forehead. The same phenomena may be noted in every department of human activity which is governed by taste. The ceaseless architectural changes which followed the introduction of the pointed arch, exhibited the same spirit of dissatisfaction with the recent facts to which our changes in costume are due. Again and again we have also had architectural revivals and reversions. When pointed architecture had worn itself out in the ornate beauties of the "perpendicular" and "flamboyant" styles, men turned eagerly to the reproduction of Greek and Roman architecture. When this in turn grew stale, we had that patient and industrious restoration of the pointed or "Gothic" style which has sown broadcast over our land buildings of much, though very unequal, merit, followed by others which show us how a new appreciation of the "Renaissance" has now arisen.

Accompanying and aiding the "Gothic" revival was the "romantic" school of literature, which coexisted with a widespread feeling of contempt for that era of powder and pigtails, the eighteenth century. But "romanticism" is now out of favor. And if

the differences of sentiment which in modern times, amongst ourselves and our neighbors, seem difficult to account for, how much more must be the differences of taste which have existed, or exist, between men of widely different cultures, races and epochs! How comes it that the lip-distortion of the Botacudos, or the head-flattening of Peruvians, could possess charms for any human beings? How is it that the Fuegian, reeking with the hot blubber he has greedily devoured, should be sickened with disgust at a dish of cold meat? Greek art seems to have supplied us with eternal models of human beauty, but they are not models for the Mongol; and while some of us may admire a pair of pouting lips, the fullest lips which European beauties could exhibit, would seem as wanting in fullness to the ordinary Negro as would Venus Kallipyge to the Hottentot.

What is the rational lesson of such divergences? May it not be said that all loveliness is but in the fancy of him who admireth, and that all positive, absolute, objective beauty is but a dream? The doctrine of evolution may appear sufficient by itself to confirm this view triumphantly. To those who may say that human organization is probably an inheritance from non-human ancestors, it may appear to follow as a matter of course that human feelings, as they are supposed to be similar in kind to those of animals, can but minister in us, as they do in them, to individual or tribal preferences of instinct, appetite or desire. We claim, however, to have shown already[1] that, though each of us is, as consciousness tells us, truly one being, we have, in spite of our animal nature, another side of our being—whencesoever and however derived—which is more than animal, which is able to apprehend abstract ideas, which can apprehend true things as true, good things as good, and we believe also beautiful things as beautiful. Here some of our readers may be tempted to stop, dreading to encounter a mere restatement of some old view about that well-worn subject, "the beautiful." We venture, however, to think that there are certain considerations, which appeal to experience and common sense rather than to any lofty transcendentalism, which are capable of application to very homely matters as well as to others less familiar, and which, because viewed from a new standpoint, may not be devoid of interest as well as novelty. For writers who have hitherto treated this question have mostly belonged to one or two opposite schools. One set, strongly impressed by conviction of the lofty nature of man's intellect, have followed the high *a priori* road, paying little heed to the phenomena of our lower sensitive faculties. The other set, convinced that all our psychical phenomena are ulti-

[1] See "A Limit to Evolution," American Catholic Quarterly Review, April, 1883.

mately referable to sensation, have tried to explain all our perceptions by the aid of our lower faculties only, ignoring what could not be thus accounted for. But our contention has ever been, that, while man has an intellectual side to his being—a priceless quality in which no brute shares—yet, as being truly an animal, he possesses animal feelings, instincts and passions, with all the consequences and limitations thence arising.

Much of the difficulty and confusion which has attended the study of man's apprehensions of beauty has, we believe, been due to non-appreciation of our duplicity in unity—unity of person, duplicity of nature—and of the complex and various commingling of effects which thence result.

Now, as we men participate in the nature and vital powers of the lower animals, so animals participate in the nature and vital powers of plants. Almost all the actions of animals are unconsciously directed either towards their own conservation or towards the propagation of their kind, and these also are the unconscious ends of the vital activities of plants. The beautiful forms which foliage leaves exhibit, and the symmetry of the branches which sustain them, may generally be traced to their need of obtaining, under the various conditions to which different species are subjected, as much sunlight and air as they can, that they may be able the better to breathe and grow. The various tints of flowers, their simple or complex shapes, their perfume and their nectar, serve to attract such different insect visitors as are needful to enable them to set their seed. No one pretends that these phenomena of plant-life are accompanied by any distinct feelings. Animals, however, evidently possess sensations, and also appetites and instinctive preferences, which they seek to gratify. The plumage of the humming-bird and the song of the nightingale are said to be due to the competition of countless generations of suitors rivalling each other in brilliance of tint or melody of tone. However this may be, and fully granting that such qualities do exercise a sexual charm, no one pretends that beasts and birds are conscious of such beauties, as beauties, however potent may be the powers of attraction such characters exercise over them. The feelings, instincts and appetites of animals generally lead to acts which are "good" for them as individuals, or "good" for their race, and some of the characters just referred to would generally be allowed to be "beautiful." But animals perform such acts no more on account of any perception they have of their "goodness" than of their "beauty," but simply through a blind impulse which would be an end in itself if irrational creatures had any conscious end or aim at all.

As Darwin has shown us, the instincts of animals are not absolutely invariable, and they are, within narrow limits, modifiable

by circumstances. Such modifications may be seen in the nest-building of captive birds, and in the actions of woodpeckers which have migrated to regions where there is no wood to peck.[1]

Acquired instincts and preferences may also be sometimes inherited. This is manifest from the different actions of the different breeds of domestic dogs. They are various, and have been variously acquired; but they are, nevertheless, inherited.

Now, man, considered merely as regards the animal side of his being, must be, as we all know he is, impelled fundamentally by the same actions as are the brutes. However "good" for the species or the race such actions may be, and whatever the "beauty" they may elicit or be accompanied by, they are commonly performed without advertence to such qualities.

We cannot doubt that our lower feelings and preferences may, like those of other animals, slightly vary, and that such slighter variations may be inherited. However much we may wish to "let the ape and tiger die," we must ever continue to share in the conditions necessary for animal life. We must feel the remote effects of the instinctive impulses of the brute ancestors of our corporeal frame, and experience various tendencies and solicitations founded upon those which are common to the animals which most nearly resemble us in structure. So much must be conceded respecting the influences which most conflict with the notion that there can be any absolute, objective beauty or goodness in man or in the irrational world over which he presides.

Let us now turn to the consideration of the higher aspect of our being. Every one must concede that somehow or other we have now got the idea of "beauty," whether or not it refers to something more than individual taste. However obtained, we have come to possess that abstract idea, and abstract ideas are admitted to be parts of man's intellectual possessions—peculiar to him as compared with other animals which admittedly do not possess them. A brief consideration of the other two cognate ideas, "goodness" and "truth" (which have been before referred to as belonging to our intellectual nature), may serve to throw some light on the problem whether beauty can be known to us as existing objectively—that is, independently of the mere tastes which individuals or communities may possess.

That "truth" at least exists as a real quality of statements and beliefs, must be admitted by all who have not some eccentric theory to maintain. John Stuart Mill distinctly affirms that the recognition of the truth of any judgment we make, "is not only an essential part, but the essential part of it as a judgment." "Leave

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[1] Such a woodpecker is found on the plains of La Plata.

that out," he tells us, "and it remains a mere play of thought in which no judgment is passed." But it is impossible for any consistent follower of science to doubt that truth is not a mere quality recognized as belonging to a judgment by him who emits it, but has a real relation to external things. Were this not the case, it is plain that science could make no progress. We do not base scientific inductions and deductions on our knowledge of beliefs, but of facts; and, without a foundation of facts, beliefs are worthless. "Truth" is the agreement of "thought" with "things—of the world of beliefs" with the world of "external existences." "Truth," therefore, cannot be merely that which "each man troweth," but must be "that which a man troweth when he troweth in conformity with real external coexistences and sequences, and with the causes and conditions of the world about him." Thus, "truth" is and must be both subjective and objective. It is subjective when regarded as the quality of his own thought by him who thinks it. It is objective when regarded as the quality of the thought of any one else.

But can truth be attributed to things themselves apart from and independently of all and every human mind? All persons who feel convinced of the reasonableness of Theism, must affirm that it can be so attributed. For if we may conceive of what, for lack of a better name, we may call intelligent purpose as underlying nature, then each object in so far as it corresponds with such purpose may with justice be spoken of as "true." It is another, though widely different, conformity between thought and things—namely, their conformity with the thought which is Divine. The independence and objectivity of "truth" should be especially manifested at a period in which, to our eternal honor, the unconditional pursuit of truth is more eagerly engaged in than it ever was before, and when a profound reverence for truth is ardently professed by the leading men of each department of science, and is certainly on their lips no idle boast. There is one characteristic of truth which it will be worth our while to note: It essentially expresses the idea of a relation between two distinct things. Nothing is or can be true in itself, but only in relation to something else with which it conforms. Truth is thus one kind of conformity. The essence of all truth is "likeness." But what is "conformity" or "likeness"? We can only reply that such words express an ultimate idea which can neither be defined nor explained. The terms "likeness" and "unlikeness" express so simple a perception that reasoning or exposition would be thrown away on any one who could not understand them. It is plain that everything cannot be explained. However we may reason, we must at last come to what, as simple and ultimate, carries its own meaning and evidence with it. On such ideas all reasoning

reposes, and the idea of "likeness," which is the essence of "truth," is one of such.

Let us next consider the "goodness" of things we call "good." The words are often used to denote a relation of correspondence between some object or action and its proper or intended end. When we call either a knife, a gun, a horse or a coat "good," we mean that it is well adapted to serve the purposes for which it was intended. We may use it similarly with respect to a race-horse, a baker, a judge, or a bishop. Nevertheless, a little consideration serves to show that this use of the term does not bring us to the foundation of the idea of "goodness." For "conformity to an end" will not make an action thoroughly "good" unless the end aimed at is itself good and agreeable to duty—unless by conforming to it we "follow the right order." But, we may ask, "why should we conform to duty?" Why should we follow the right order? To this there is no answer possible but that "it is right to do so." It may perhaps be replied, "the right order should be followed because it is our interest to follow it." But any one who should so reply must either mean that "it is always right to follow our interest because it is our *interest*," which would be to abandon the idea of duty altogether; or else mean that "we should follow our interest not because it is our interest, but because it is *right*," and so affirm the very ethical principle which he set out with the intention of denying. If we know with certainty that any definite line of action is "right," the proposition which declares it to be right must either be self-evident or must be deduced from other propositions as to what is right, one of which at least must be self-evident. Otherwise, it would be impossible for us to infer that anything is right, since all processes of proof must stop somewhere. As Mr. Arthur Balfour has pointed out,[1] it is then simply indisputable that the basis of every ethical maxim must itself be ethical. It thus becomes clear that the idea of "goodness" is, like that of likeness (the essence of "truth"), something ultimate, absolute, and incapable of analysis. Objects which duly serve the end for which they are intended are fitly spoken of as being "good," for they are good in a certain way and in a subordinate degree, and may thus be so termed by analogy with true and real goodness.

Is it possible for us to form any conception of objective goodness altogether apart from human actions or human thoughts—except so far as they may recognize it? Some religious persons will probably say that the "goodness" of anything depends upon the will of God—that that is right which He commands because

[1] See "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt," p. 337. Macmillan. 1879.

He commands it. But in our perceptions of duty and moral obligation we recognize that it addresses conscience with an essentially absolute and unconditional imperativeness. No good man could consent to perform an ungrateful action, seen by him to be such, even in obedience to the behest of an omnipotent being. We must approve and admire Mill's declaration, that he would rather incur eternal torment than call a bad god "good," however much we may distrust our own power of enduring even a temporal martyrdom. But if "goodness" cannot be dependent even on the will of God, if the commands of conscience are absolute and supreme, if it is impossible even to conceive an evasion of its universal and unconditional authority, then the ethical principle must be rooted, as it were, within the inmost heart, in the very foundation, so to speak, of the great whole of existence which it pervades. The principles of the moral law must be at least as extensive and enduring as are those starry heavens which shared with it the profound reverence of Kant.

The absolute, necessary and universal character of the moral law is expressed by that dictum of theologians which declares that it pertains not to God's "will," but to His "essence." The phrase may seem obscure, or even unmeaning, to some persons to whom it may be new, but we must confess that we have met with no other expression which so well conveys to us the profoundest possible conception of the fundamental and supreme character of the ethical principle. The goodness of actions is evidently twofold: They may be "good" in themselves as actions, and "good" as being done with a good intention by those who perform them. Thus "goodness," like "truth," must be both subjective and objective. It is subjective when regarded as a quality of the mind of any one entertaining a good intention. It is objective regarded as that quality of an object or action whereby it conforms, in its degree, to the eternal law of right which manifests itself to our intellect as inherent in the universe since it is inherent in us.

"Goodness," like "truth," essentially implies a relation. As nothing can be true save by its conformity, or likeness, to something else, so nothing within our powers of observation or imagination can be "good" save by its harmony with an eternal law by concordance with which it "follows the right order."

Thus everything which exists, in so far as it exists and so follows the law of its being, must be more or less "good." If by defect it deviates from a higher good, it thereby becomes a more or less good thing of an inferior order—as a marble statue broken into fragments ceases to be good as a statue, and becomes so many pieces of marble good in their degree and apt for various inferior ends.

Armed with these reflections about "truth" and "goodness," let us next consider the objectivity of "beauty." As before said, we actually possess the ideas of "beauty" and the "beautiful," whatever may be the mode in which we have come by them. Unlike the lower animals, we are not only attracted by what is charming, but we can recognize both the fact of being charmed and the qualities which charm us. Putting aside for the moment objects which attract some persons and repel others, or which are admired here and there according to the fashion of the day, let us consider some objects to which almost all normally constituted members of civilized communities would agree in ascribing some beauty and charm. Taking visible beauty as a starting point, the objects which manifest it to us are sea, land and sky as viewed by night and day, the animal and vegetable products of the earth, man and his works. The aspects of these objects change for us according to circumstances, amongst which must be reckoned the emotions or ideas which may happen to dominate in us at the time. Nevertheless, we think it must be admitted that whatever of these things strikes us as pre-eminently beautiful is regarded by us as approaching perfection of its kind. Such an object must certainly not convey to us a notion of discord, deficiency or redundance amongst its parts or attributes.

Beauty as apprehended by the ear is eminently a harmony, and is the more beautiful according as that harmony approaches perfection. The beauty of even simple notes of sweetness is, we now know, due to "*timbre*"—which is a special and, as it were, minute kind of harmony. The same thing may be said of the charm of certain human voices, though we may also have an additional charm from the perfection with which they exhibit some shade of character, or give expression to some dominant emotion. The senses of taste and smell may give us very pleasant impressions, which so far may be said to possess a certain kind of beauty; but it is only when objects convey to us the notion of a more or less harmonious and perfect blending of savors and of odors, or of these combined, that they ordinarily arouse in us a perception of the kind. The sense of touch, combined with feelings of muscular effort and tension, may inform us of various beauties which are ordinarily apprehended by the eye; and this is emphatically the case with the blind. Feelings such as those of a most excellently polished surface, or of a perfection of delicate softness—like that of the fur of the chinchilla—may give rise to qualitative perceptions which we express by the terms "beautifully smooth" or "beautifully soft."

But apart from sensuous perceptions, the intellect very keenly apprehends beauty of character and action—moral beauty. As to such beauty it will not be disputed, but that those acts and char-

acters in which it is most apparent are deemed by us to most nearly approximate to our notions of perfection. The same may be said of the intellectual beauty of a discourse, a poem or a problem. Whichever of such things may strike us as being the most beautiful, is that which most nearly agrees with our idea and ideal of perfection according to its kind. We have used the terms "idea" and "ideal" advisedly, for objects we admire seldom entirely satisfy us. We can conceive of an ideal beauty beyond them. Our perceptions of beauty, though aroused by the impressions of external objects, are not contained within them, but, like the rest of our higher apprehensions, are the result of our intellectual faculty which attains through sensitivity that which is altogether beyond sensitivity—like the ideas of being, possibility, necessity and cause.

From the foregoing brief review of the objects which excite our admiration, it results that our intellectual apprehension of beauty may to a certain extent be explained as a perception of ideal perfection realized, or of an approximation thereto. But this explanation may be deemed by some persons as not altogether satisfactory and final, because just as it may be asked: "What is the goodness of following the right order?" so also it may be asked: "What is the beauty of perfection?" But to this question there is, we believe, no reply but that perfection is beautiful, and if this be so then it must be admitted that the idea of "beauty," like each of the ideas of "the good" and "the true," is an ultimate idea which is capable of apprehension, but not of analysis.

Beauty also, like goodness and truth, must be both subjective and objective. It is subjective, regarded as a quality perceived by our own mind; and objective, regarded as an intrinsic quality whereby anything approximates to perfection according to its kind and degree of being.

But there is one great difference whereby "beauty" differs from both "truth" and "goodness." The latter qualities are, as we have seen, predicates of objects only on account of relations they bear to something else, but "beauty" is essentially intrinsic and relates, at least primarily, to a thing considered in and by itself, and the relations it implies are internal relations.

When anything is said to be beautiful on account of its fitness to serve some end, the word is, as we have seen, but used analogically, since what is thereby really denoted is not beauty, but utility or analogical goodness of a certain kind.

The beauty of a race-horse differs from that of a perfect horse of the strongest and most massive build, as that of a spaniel differs from a dog of the St. Bernard breed. The qualities which accompany such different kinds of beauty may be, and often are, related to utility. It is not, however, their utility, but the perfection with

which they respectively correspond with an ideal of a certain kind, which makes them beautiful. Nevertheless, an object may have a certain relative beauty in that it augments, or is augmented by, the beauty of some other object. Thus a picturesque castle may derive additional beauty from its situation on some mountain side or summit. Or a mountain may derive an added beauty from the castle which clings to its steep sides or is artistically perched upon its crest.

Can we form any conception of objective beauty altogether apart from human feelings? If the beauty of any being is the same thing as its perfection, then, evidently, those who are convinced that, upholding and pervading the universe (even if that universe be eternal), there is and must be an Eternal Cause—or Power the author of all objects which exist, their powers and therefore their perfections—must affirm the existence of such supreme perfection or beauty. The Author of all perfection cannot be deemed to be Himself imperfect. Of such a Being perfection, and therefore beauty, must not only be eminently the attribute, but that Being must be the prototype of all beauty. "Beauty," like "goodness," must be of His essence, and the "truth" of all things, as we have seen, also depends on His essence and power. Thus power, beauty, truth and goodness are most closely inter-related. For that which is most good must be perfect of its kind, and therefore true; that which is perfect must be good and must also be true, as responding to the end of its being; and that which is true must be perfect in the way just mentioned, and therefore also good. Yet beauty, goodness and truth are not identical. They are, at the least, three aspects of one ineffable whole, and form, so to speak, a sort of trinity in unity, whereof "power" may be regarded as fundamental, while "the good" and "the true," as each essentially implying an extrinsic relation, may be said, as it were, to proceed from "beauty" being the attribute of the whole with its ineffable internal relations.

All the various perfections, all the beauties material, intellectual and moral of the whole creation, and whatever man most admires or aspires after, as well as what he is least capable of appreciating the beauty of, must, like all that is good and all that is true in the universe, be reflected and derived from the Prototype of all perfection and of all goodness. The beauty of objects must also vary in degree, according as the perfection to which they severally approximate resembles, by a more or less immeasurably distant analogy, the perfection of their First Cause. Since, again, everything which exists more or less approaches a perfection of some kind or order of existence, everything which exists must have a beauty of its kind and in its degree, just as it must be more or less good. But if

everything is thus more or less beautiful, wherein does ugliness consist?

Evidently it can have no positive existence, and can be but a defect and negation—as "coldness" is but a deficiency of "warmth." Therefore, nothing can be simply ugly in itself, but only in relation to something else, and it may be very ugly in relation to something else. For as one thing may, as we have seen, gain beauty by augmenting the beauty of another object, so a thing which is even perfect of its kind, and therefore beautiful in its degree, may be relatively ugly through the injury it inflicts or the destruction it occasions to the beauty of something of a nobler and higher kind which it, by its existence, deforms from perfection or tends to destroy. Thus, a perfectly developed cancerous growth has and must have a beauty of its own very inferior order—a beauty which the biologist and pathologist can appreciate. It is none the less relatively hideous as marring the beauty of a human body, and it may be even deforming the moral beauty of a mind.

We are blinded to the real objective beauty of many objects by the fact that they are essentially hurtful to us. To take an extreme case, no man led out to die, however serene in mind, could be expected to appreciate the perfection of the instrument prepared for his execution, however perfect of its kind that instrument might be. But his want of appreciation would not make its objective perfection any the less.

We are often also blinded to the beauty of natural objects, or of their modes of action, by reason of our inveterate tendency to anthropomorphism; that is, to regard things exclusively from a human point of view. We often feel disgust or horror at objects and actions, or even regard them with a sort of fierce reprobation, because of an unconscious association of them with analogous imaginary human actions.

But the feelings which arise in us, the sentiments inspired by the aspect of such things, are essentially human, and human only. In themselves objects so abhorred have a beauty of their own, such as we elsewhere readily recognize, though such qualities are disguised from us in them by our human prejudices. It is surely quite conceivable that a pure spirit, uninfluenced by human sensibility, would recognize such beauty, and might, so to speak, smile at the childishness of the notion that there could be anything unlovely in what to us men causes feelings of repulsion. Anthropomorphism necessarily attends all our conceptions. We cannot help regarding things with human eyes and prejudices. But our reason should make us aware of this, and teach us to make due allowance for it in our estimate of all things, however high or however low.

Let us now try and see what light the foregoing considerations

may throw upon the questions of the existence and origin of differences of taste and changes in the appreciation of the beautiful. To like, and feel attracted towards, objects is one thing, but to perceive their beauty is another and a very different thing. The perception of beauty and perfection is an act of the higher and purely intellectual side of our nature. Feelings of attraction and repulsion, likes and dislikes (apart from acts of judgment), belong to the lower or sensitive side of our nature—the side we share with the brutes about us.

The faculty of apprehending beauty is a power which may be greatly increased by culture. Brutes have, as before said, no perception of it, however much they may be attracted by it, and the faculty is rudimentary or dormant in the lowest savages and very young children. For the beauty of a *nocturne* by Chopin, or a landscape by Turner, the average boor has, as we say, "no ears or eyes." The picturesqueness and majesty of such cathedrals as those of Lincoln or Bourges may indeed strike the imagination of the ignorant; but only those versed in architecture can appreciate their true beauty and their approximation to one kind of architectural perfection. It is the same with the contemplation of natural objects. Though some uncultivated minds are strongly impressed by their charms, education is generally needed for their due appreciation. We have an example of such need in that admiration for the beauty of a serpent which a full knowledge of its organization may give rise to, dissipating the natural but irrational distaste or horror which may before have been felt for it. Among the many processes of evolution which take place around us, few are more noteworthy than that evolution of perceptions of beauty which, generally unnoticed, is continually taking place. Progress in culture also calls forth more and more agreement as to perceptions of the kind both as regards the region of art and the domain of nature. Admiration for the beauty of rugged mountain masses is a modern development of taste. But in addition to the æsthetic beauties now discovered to exist in scenes which before were deemed savage and horrible, the advance of science has given to the geologist the power of perceiving harmonies previously undreamed of. Thus the study of nature gradually makes known to us new fields of beauty which ignorance had before hidden from our gaze. The evolution of the cosmos progressively reveals to us ever new ideals, and doubtless forms and modes of beauty which no man now suspects the existence of, yet lie hidden and will only be made known to those who shall come after us.

All these forms of perception belong, as we have said, to the higher side of our being. We must next glance at the tastes and preferences of our animal nature and the conditions which modify

and change them. To begin with an unquestionable fact: We may all have our likings and dislikings for certain feelings, and be attracted or repelled by the odor, savor, contact, sound, or aspect of many things, without having a distinct perception of any real beauty in them. Such preferences or aversions, such feelings of attraction or repulsion, may be due in us, as in brutes, to the action of heredity (inherited tendencies), to the association of feelings experienced in early life, or to the action upon us of our environment and the contagiousness of custom. This association has very naturally induced in mankind, as in some other animals, that horror of serpents, just referred to, the bite of which still causes annually so many thousand deaths in India alone. It is also, to say the least, probable that this distaste may be inherited in us, as is so often the case with the congenital aversions of the lower animals. There are persons (some such have been known to us) whose reason has been quite unable to overcome aversions of the kind which they have felt from their earliest infancy. The action of our environment—the general feeling of the family, the tribe, or the nation—notoriously gives rise to likes and dislikes altogether distinct from intellectual apprehensions of beauty, whether moral or physical. Thus may be explained the preferences which exist for various bodily deformities amongst different peoples, such as Botacudos, Peruvians, Chinese, and even ourselves. Such aberrations are the effects of custom, and are felt as welcome and agreeable by different tribes, just as a tall hat and a correctly cut coat are agreeable in the eyes of English people of a certain social position, as harmonizing with what is expected and producing a sense of fitness, although no one would pretend that it is due to a perception of the realization of a high ideal of beauty by the hat or coat so approved of.

But no doubt some persons really think they see beauty in what to more cultured minds is distasteful, while others are blind to the perfections which are evident to those more qualified to judge. There seems thus to be an absence of certainty as to the beautiful, not merely through an occasional defect of power to appreciate it, but also through a tendency to appreciate the beauty of some objects far too highly. Thus there sometimes seems to be an active and positive tendency to error, as well as an occasional passive inability to perceive. How can these divergent erroneous tendencies be accounted for?

The solution of this difficulty appears to us to lie in a correct appreciation of the essential unity of the human personality—a unity of which consciousness and common sense combine to assure us, instant by instant. No sane man doubts that he is the same person who is, at the same time, both appreciating the charm of an eloquent discourse and also feeling a pain in some limb or a

current of air disagreeably affecting him. We must ever recollect that the being of each of us, though consisting of two natures, is a perfect unity. It follows from this that, in our every vital energy, both natures are present, and act and react on each other in a variety of ways—our animality limiting and soliciting our intellect, and our intellect overflowing, as it were, and more or less transforming the feelings of our animal nature.

Even the most abstract conceptions cannot be present to our minds, without being accompanied by some symbol actually perceived by the senses or revived by the memory of the imagination —even though that symbol be but a written or spoken word or a voiceless gesture. On the other hand, a dim, intellectual consciousness of our existence and of such ideas as being, truth and causation (however little such ideas may be reflected on and recog nized), accompanies the mere exercise of our faculty of sensuous cognition, and even such merely animal acts as those of eating and drinking.

Thus, as even our purest and most exalted perceptions of beauty must be ministered to and accompanied by feelings and sense-perceptions which are indispensable to all the intellectual acts of our complex unity, so our mere feelings of liking and attraction are the feelings of an essentially intellectual being, and are, therefore, more or less consciously possessed by us. This accompaniment of intellectual consciousness causes them to possess a certain resemblance to intellectual perceptions of beauty, because it enables such mere feelings to be reflected upon and intellectually recognized.

These considerations, we think, suffice to account for all the varieties of tastes and feelings which exist amongst mankind, and to show that their existence in no way conflicts with that of a real, objective beauty in the cosmos as a whole and in every part of it. They account for the mixing up, with our intellectual perceptions of beauty, of sensuous likings which may be keenly or but slightly felt, but which mar the distinctness of each such intellectual perception, as a perception of abstract beauty. They also account for the mixing up of a tendency to find more beauty than they merit in things which give us sensuous impressions delightful to our feelings, and which attract our lower nature, however little we may allow them to be of any high order of beauty when our judgment is fully exercised in their regard.

Those persons who may be inclined to wonder unduly at the undoubted fact that so many men should be attracted by, and feel a preference for, objects and actions which are repulsive to the æsthete or to those zealous for moral perfection, should recollect that everything has a beauty of its kind and in its degree.

As men always seek *a* good, though not by any means the highest good, so whatever attracts them, attracts them by a beauty of some kind, though by yielding to its attraction they may be diverted from seeking some far nobler and higher beauty.

It is impossible to deny that even the lowest "goods" are "good" in their degree, or that the lower forms of beauty are beautiful after their inferior kind. A murderer who cuts a throat commits, of course, a most wicked act, but all the positive elements of that, save his defective will, are "good." "Good" is the sharpness of the well-tempered knife, "good" is the vigor of the muscular arms which do the deed, and "good" are the arterial contractions which force outwards the lethal stream. So, also, there is a real, however inferior, absolute beauty in the objects which attract our most animal appetites, and in the actions to which even the lowest natures amongst us are thereby induced; though, like the cancerous growths before referred to, they may be, relatively, revolting and hideous, on account of the deflections from nobler beauties of feeling and of will which such attractions may induce and occasion. We should be as unwise as unjust did we deny to Circe and Aphrodite, to Dionysius and Adonis, their beauty and their charms; but our unwisdom and injustice would be much greater did we not recognize the nobler attractions of Athene and Artemis, Phœbus and Zeuspater. More unjust still should we be if we did not own the ethical inferiority of the whole Greek and Roman Pantheon, compared with those later ideals of the "Heavenly Sophia" and the "Divine Logos," which prepared men's minds for that supreme conception of human perfection and absolute goodness to which the ages have made us heir. However divergent may be men's theological beliefs, all must admit that the Founder of Christianity proclaimed, far more fully than did the noblest of the antecedent seers of Israel, the Fatherhood of a God—at once the type and exemplar of all goodness and of all beauty.

That man should be able to turn away from his very chosen ideal and follow what even in his own eyes is immeasurably less lovely, is the sad penalty of his unique privilege of freedom. That he should be able to diverge from what he himself clearly perceives to be "the right order," far more widely than brutes do which, nevertheless, have no perception of the kind, is the penalty of his possessing intellect combined in one personality with an unequivocally animal nature. As he is free to direct his activity along elevated ways which are necessarily inaccessible to the brute creation, so, also, it is his very possession of intellect which enables him to direct his imagination and his actions into more devious paths than the feelings of brutes would lead them to enter upon.

To sum up shortly what we have here endeavored to express:

We think it may be confidently affirmed, that such a being as man, replete with animal feelings and desires, and dim, unconscious memories of ancestral brute experiences, but with an intellect endowed with a perception of truth, goodness, and beauty, would hardly fail to show, in his tastes and perceptions, just those mingled and more or less discordant and varying mental phenomena which we find mankind do exhibit. We find, in fact, just those facts and conditions of thought and feeling which the theory of evolution would lead us to expect. We find what that theory would lead us to anticipate when it is applied, not only to explain the genesis of our animal nature, but also the perfecting and development of that intellectual nature of ours which, ages before the twilight of history, first made its unnoticed and mysterious appearance in the world. Underlying or accompanying the multifarious and conflicting changes of taste and feeling due to heredity, association and environment, we find that progressively clearing perceptions of true beauty have been gained, the manifestation of beauty in fields where it was before invisible having again and again taken place for us through the progressive development of our faculties by culture. But these perceptions ever tend to be obscured, and are almost always more or less disguised for us by the effects of our animal organization and prehuman antecedents.

This, then, is why tastes differ. They differ because we human, intellectual animals vary as to the peculiar influences we have received from parents, family and tribe, from the diverse associations of feelings to which we have been severally exposed, and from the action upon us of the tastes and feelings of our friends and fellow tribesmen. As to such matters of mere feeling, there will probably ever be a wide divergence of tastes.

On the other hand, we agree largely as to our intellectual perceptions of beauty, and we tend to agree more and more, because of our possession of an intellectual nature, which is fundamentally one and the same in all men, and has the power of perceiving, more or less imperfectly, objective "beauty" as well as "truth" and "goodness." Education will enable us, and above all religious education, to emerge, by more and more successful struggles, from the obscuring influences of animality towards as clear a vision of these highest qualities as may be possible for the future of our race in this world, and for ourselves individually in that life in a world to come which the Church sets before us, and about which even unbelievers, though they may with truth say they have necessarily no power to imagine it, yet must admit that reason by no means forbids their entertaining a fruitful hope.

SOME PECULIARITIES OF THE SYRIAC OFFICE.

Officium Feriale juxta ritum Ecclesiæ Syrorum Maronitarum, Innocentii X., Pont. Max., jussu editum, denuo typis excussum regnante Pio VIII. Editio Tertia.[1] Romæ, ex typographia Sac. Cong. de Propaganda Fide, 1830.

Idem . . . . denuo typis excussum regnante Pio IX. Pont. Opt. Max. Editio Quinta. Ibid., iisdem typis, 1863.

Officium Feriale, juxta ritum Ecclesiæ (Antiochenæ) Syrorum, S. Congreg. de Propaganda Fide jussu editum. Romæ, 1853 (iisdem typis).

Breviarium Chaldaicum in usum nationis Chaldaicæ a Josepho Guriel. Secundo Editum. Romæ: Typis Sac. Congr. de Prop. Fide, 1865.

IT is not necessary here, nor is it our intention, to go into a full explanation of the liturgical elements and structure of the Breviary used by the clergy of the Syrian Church.[2] Its substance comes down to us from the earliest times, and bears ample witness to the great body of Catholic truth handed down from the Apostles to their successors. And, strange to say, nowhere is the testimony stronger than on those distinctive points in which it has pleased the modern heresies of Europe to reject, as opposed to the Bible, the Apostolic teaching of primitive Christianity. Among these are the infallibility of the Church, the Sacraments of the Eucharist and Penance, the honor paid to the Cross, to the Mother of God, to the Saints and their relics, prayers for the faithful departed, etc. So true is this that when a considerable portion of the Syrian Church abandoned the heresy of Eutyches and became once more orthodox, they were able to retain their Breviary unchanged, merely wiping out a few, very few, stains of Eutychian error, and these for the most part not doctrinal statements, but loose or ill-defined expressions and references to miscalled Doctors and Saints, who had lived and died outside of Catholic communion.

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[1] The first edition was printed in Rome about the middle of the 17th century (between 1650 and 1655). The second edition was printed in the same place in 1787. Of the fourth we have never seen a copy. The first was used by Castell in the Dictionary to his Polyglot Bible. That it had no vowel points is evident from the way in which he explains the imaginary word *gumio* "fons, puteus," and quotes Off. Mar., p. 473. The true reading (as may be seen in the edition of 1863, p. 459, line 16) is *men gau majo*, "from the midst of the waters" (of baptism). The edition of 1830 is used by Payne Smith in his Thesaurus, of which about two-thirds has been published, seven letters yet remaining to complete the alphabet.

[2] This has been done already in the pages of the REVIEW. See vol. iii. (1878), pp. 327–354.

The Eutychian heresy did not gain much of a foothold among Syrian Christians until about forty years after the Council of Chalcedon. Xenaias, Bishop of Mabug (or Hierapolis), who was consecrated in 488, propagated his false doctrine for more than thirty years quite successfully by imperial favor and under cover of defending the Catholic faith against Nestorianism. His wicked work was continued so skilfully by James (or Jacob) Baradæus that he fastened his own name upon the adherents of the new doctrine and perverted many in Mesopotamia and eastern Syria. He was, for some thirty-seven years, Bishop of Edessa, or rather, as his admirer, Barhebræus, acknowledges, a Bishop without a See, commissioned by no lawful authority, but sent by his fellow-heretics of Constantinople to be general superintendent of the Eutychians in Syria, Mesopotamia and the adjacent countries, and having probably his headquarters in Edessa.[1] The unholy work of Xenaias and Baradæus was completed during the desolation of Mohammedan rule, which made it impossible for the Holy See to exert its influence over that distant Church. The return of many of these heretics to Catholic unity began at the time of the Council of Florence under Eugene IV., in 1438. The first step having been once taken, their numbers began to grow, and the gradual accession of converts has continued to the present. The first-fruits of conversion from Nestorianism were gathered a century later, about the time of the Council of Trent; and the illustrious John Sulaka, who was consecrated by Pope Julius III., and who heads the list of recent Patriarchs in communion with Rome, attested the sincerity of his faith by martyrdom.[2] Two of his predecessors[3] are mentioned as having written to Innocent IV. and Benedict XI., respectively, to solicit communion, but with what result is not stated. Their professions of faith may not have been satisfactory, or perhaps they were not sincere, and wished to retain Nestorian error while in communion with Rome. This was the case with some of their successors, as Elias V. in the days of Gregory XIII., and Hurmez (Hormisdas) in 1781 under Pius VI.[4]

The liturgical books of the Jacobites, as has been already said, were without any difficulty restored to their original purity. Those of the Nestorians needed sharper revision. They had been scattered over such a large territory, Syria, Chaldea, even China and India, that many errors, changes and even wide differences must

[1] This roving commission is disguised under the high-sounding title of Œcumenical Archbishop (*mitropulito Tibeloyo*). Barhebræi Chronicon Ecclesiasticum. Ediderunt et illustrarunt. . . . J. B. Abbeloos et Thomas I. Lamy. Lovanii, 1872. Vol. i., col. 216.

[2] See his life in Assemani Bibliotheca Orientalis, Romæ, 1719. Tom. i., p. 523.

[3] Machica in 1247 and Iabalaha in 1304. See Guriel, in *Chronotaxis Patriarch. Chaldæor.* Rom., 1860, p. 188.

[4] Guriel, *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 210.

have crept into both Mass and Divine office, especially when we consider that, at one time, these heretics were seized with a mania for composing new liturgical books.[1] Add to this, that the distinctive teaching of Nestorius, by attributing to Christ our Lord a twofold personality, does away with the mystery of the Incarnation, and destroys the title on which rests the veneration due to the superhuman dignity of His blessed Mother. And when one considers how largely her *cultus* enters into the devotional portion of the Liturgy, it is readily seen what ample room there must have been for wholesome remedy and reformation in the books of the Nestorians. Yet the innate force of general tradition and the deep roots that devotion to the Blessed Virgin had taken in the minds of all, were a safeguard against wholesale corruption of the original texts, and the innocent multitude was not entirely led astray by the cunning or malice of their leaders. We have seen Nestorian hymns in praise of the Blessed Virgin, which any Catholic reader (unless he knew their origin) would find it hard to attribute to any pen but that of an orthodox poet.

How precious is the testimony given by these separated Churches in the liturgy they carried out with them when taking leave of the Universal Church and have retained, though sunk in schism, heresy and the darkest ignorance, for the last fourteen hundred years, or, say the eleven centuries that elapsed between Nestorius and Luther. Its value consists in this, that it is an echo loud and clear, of what the Universal Church believed and how she felt and spoke, while all her children were yet of one mind; before intellectual pride and headstrong will had led any of them to deny their mother, abandon her house, and set up altar against altar. Besides, prayer has an intrinsic value of its own. It is no formal teaching or expounding of doctrine. It is the natural effusion of the soul's devotion, when out of the fulness of the heart the mouth must speak; in other words, when the heart is overladen with joy, sorrow, contrition, thankfulness, or other deep feeling so intense that it can be no longer restrained by the barriers of mere inner sense, but must overleap them and burst into the outward life of jubilant hymn or plaintive chant, if not in the hearing of men, at least before God and his heavenly host. But as faith is the life of the Christian soul, and as the Church comes nearest on earth to the high standard of perfection proposed by our Father in Heaven,[2] it is Faith that inspires her prayers, and they can breathe naught else but holiness and truth. She prays be-

[1] Assemani uses this as a critical test to determine the age in which some writers lived.

[2] "The just man shall live by faith," Rom. i., 17. "Be ye therefore perfect as your Heavenly Father is perfect," Math. v., 48.

cause she believes, and the fervor of that prayer is in proportion to the depth and strength of her faith. Hence, from whatever she says in her prayers, however unconscious and unstudied in expression, however varied in form, whether plain and childlike in their simplicity, or poetic and noble in their triumphant array,[1] we may clearly learn the faith that prompted them. And it is in this sense that we should understand the famous saying of the holy Pope, Celestine I.: "Legem credendi lex statuit supplicandi."[2] The doubting skeptic and the honest inquirer will feel more secure in discovering the faith of Ambrose and Leo, of Ephrem and Balæus, from what they said in prayer and song, than from what they uttered in the pulpit or discussed in learned volumes against the enemies of the Church.

Who can fail to recognize the wisdom of the Church and her Pontiffs in refusing to adopt, as a general rule, the policy recommended by the Synod of Diamper,[3] that the Roman Missal should be translated into Syro-Chaldaic for the use of the Christians of Malabar? Zeal, rather than prudence, seems to have prompted those who made the suggestion. It was carried out,[4] and, it must be feared, not with the happiest results. If there be one distinctive element in the character of Eastern Christians it is assuredly an unfounded, overweening jealousy of their Latin brethren, a blind, unreasoning fear which makes them perpetually suspect that the latter are anxious to obtrude on them, by fraud or force, the rites and discipline of the Western Church. This feeling pervades the minds of all, whether estranged from the Holy See by schism and heresy or united to it by bonds of faith and communion, and of every nationality, Greek, Syrian, Chaldean, and Armenian. And herein shines conspicuously the apostolic zeal, the wise discretion, of Leo XIII., who from the very beginning of his pontificate has done all in his power to soothe this senseless jeal-

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[1] The very expression of the Breviary of Antioch: "With triumph-clad hymn (bkinto tiphat zocuto) come and praise our king." Off. Syr., p. 487, 493.

[2] "Her form of belief is determined by her form of prayer." In other words, how the Church prays gives the clew to what she believes.

[3] The synod was held in 1599 under Portuguese dominion. See Io. Facundi Raulin, Historia Ecclesiae Malabaricæ cum Diamperitana Synodo . . . nunc primum e Lusitano in Latinum versa. Romæ (Mainardi), 1745, pp. 107, 154–155, 273, 282, 408. The book is rare. The Archbishop of Goa, Don Alexius de Meniezes, presided over the synod.

[4] "Ctob tucose w'kerione," etc., or "Order of Lessons from the Old and New Testament for the Festivals, Sundays, Commemorations and Serial days of the whole year, according to the Rite of the Chaldees of Malabar. Press of the Sacred Congregation in the blessed city of great Rome. In the year of Christ, 1844." Guriel, in his Chronotaxis, mentions an edition of 1767, under the auspices of the patriarch Joseph. The earliest editions seems to have been published, probably at Goa, by F. F. Francis Roz.

ousy, and give them the assurance of practical proof that he is determined to maintain inviolate the rights and usages to which they cling so fondly.

But while praising him, we must not forget the admirable prudence, the deep, motherly affection of the Roman Church, which under his predecessors allowed her children, newly gathered into the Fold from Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia and Chaldea, to retain their Missals, Breviaries, *Gazas* and *Hhudras*, after purging out the old leaven of heresy sprinkled through them in successive ages by the disciples of Nestorius and Eutyches. And, as regards the followers of these two heretics in particular, since the error of the one sect is diametrically opposed to that of the other, their special partisan additions serve clearly for mutual condemnation. For the Jacobite corruptions are condemned and rejected with disdain by the Nestorian, while the former looks with horror on the sacrilegious hand that has presumed to defile the purity of the primitive text with Nestorian blasphemy. Thus both unite with the Catholic Church in condemning each other, and bear involuntary, unimpeachable testimony, not only to her doctrine of the Incarnation, but also to all other great Catholic truths, which they hand down in common with the Church of all ages.

It looks providential—not to consider it merely as the result of intellectual and moral blindness entailed by anathema—that these poor heretics, withered branches cut off from the tree of life, should have retained in their liturgical books so many expressions of belief in the indestructibility, or, what is almost synonymous, the infallibility of the Church. Our object, however, is not so much to reproduce these testimonies in favor of the True Church as to exhibit the peculiar form in which the Eastern mind conceives and presents them. The language of the Latin Breviary is dignified and stately, and represents the majesty of Rome that in God's counsel was destined ever to be the mistress of the world, Pagan and Christian. But it is often tame by the side of the Eastern office, where abound bold figure, brief but vivid phrase, dialogue, apostrophe, and other dramatic forms. Thus, for example, in the Breviary of Antioch the glorious promise of our Lord,[1] to St. Peter is not quoted from the inspired writer, but is put into the mouth of the Church as the theme of her triumphant song, "On the Rock of the household of Simon, Prince of the Disciples, answers the Church, I am built up, and I have naught to fear. The floods and storms break over me and leave me unshaken. The accursed Nestur[2] fought against me, and it was his

[1] Matthew xvi. 18.

[2] An abridged form of Nestorius, though both are used indiscriminately. In the same office (p. 127) we find Nestur with the same epithet. In like manner Abris

ruin."[1] The text has, the Church "answereth and saith" (hnot w'emrath). This is, of course, Semitic phraseology, with which the Bible has made us familiar. Yet it is not an idle expression without meaning. It implies, if nothing else, a question or objection either likely or possible, which is met in advance. In the present case it casts aside and triumphantly defies the sneer of this cold world that seems to ask, "On what does this poor, persecuted Church base her hope of standing against the wealth and power of the princes of this world?" And the answer is: I am built on Simon Peter. Or it may be (for who can track the windings of a Syrian poet's fancy?) part of a tender dialogue between the invisible Head of the Church and His earthly spouse. "What is it, my chosen Bride, that fills thee with such confidence? I have told thee that thou art to be hated and persecuted of men, yet thy cheek is not blanched by fear, but radiant with joy and hope." And the loving answer is, "Why should I fear, when I know Thou hast built me on the rock of Simon Peter?" That this is something more than mere conjecture will be seen by comparing it with the next quotation.

Mgr. David,[2] Coadjutor Bishop of Mussul, tells us that in the most ancient copies the name of *Arius* was found where now we have that of Nestorius. Nothing more likely. In the days when the Arian heresy seemed on the point of triumphing over orthodoxy, and some timid souls began almost to waver, and ask if God had hidden His face or withdrawn His helping hand from the Church, it was proper for her to reassure her followers by reiterating the divine promise and applying it to the present danger. "Fear not for me (she said); though in me you see only the 'poor little one, tossed with tempests and without all comfort.' I fear not Arius, nor the kings of earth who are at his back. Arius is accursed, for he has raised his impious hand against me. He is doomed to perish, but I shall 'not be confounded, nor blush, nor be put to shame,'[3] for the All-powerful hath built me on the Rock of His own choosing, Simon Peter." And when Arius had run his wicked course, and vanished like his predecessors, Nestorius took his place and renewed the bold attempt to seduce the Christian people and overthrow the work of God's hands. Then the Syrian Church substituted his name for that of

(among the Chaldeans or Eastern Syrians Abbris for A(m)bris) is the short form of Ambrosius. See Assemani Bib. Or., Tom. III., in the list of early patriarchs at the beginning of the volume.

[1] Off. Syr., Rome, 1853, p. 409, in the Lauds (Ssaphro) of Saturday.

[2] Antiqua Ecclesiæ Syro-Chaldaicæ Traditio circa Petri Apostoli . . . . Divinum Primatum, Auctore Josepho David Chorepiscopo Mossulensi. Romæ, 1870, p. 6.

[3] Isaiah liv. 4, 11.

Arius, and cried out in the same confident strain that she feared not Nestorius nor his warfare, for she was built on the Rock, Simon Peter. And to this day the Eutychian cheerfully repeats these very words, forgetting in his blindness that what is true of Arius and Nestorius is true also of Eutyches, and of every teacher of error who hurls his puny defiance at this impregnable Rock. But does not the cultured modern champion of private judgment, who looks down with contempt on the Eutychian as ignorant and superstitious because he retains devotion to the Mother of God, read over the same promise in Scripture itself and fail to see or understand it? Both "search the Scriptures," because in them they think there is life everlasting; and both search in vain, for, like the eunuch of Queen Candace,[1] they have no one "to show them" the meaning of what they read. The difference, such as it is, must be set down in favor of the Eutychian. For he has drawn from Holy Writ but one or two errors, while the haughty scribe who scorns all interpretation but his own has fallen a prey to a score or more of glaring absurdities.

Here is another little gem from a hymn for "the dedication of churches" not yet published, but lying manuscript in the Vatican Library, and quoted by Archbishop Benni.[2] It is a dialogue in tetrameter verse between the Church and her Heavenly Builder:

> Tell me, O Church! whereon wouldst thou have me build thee;
> Shall I build thee, shall I build thee on the Sun?
> Oh no, no, no! For 'tis said, and said in Scripture,
> That the rays of the Sun shall be quenched.[3]
>
> Tell me, O Church! whereon wouldst thou have me build thee;
> Shall I build thee, shall I build thee on the Moon?
> Oh no, no, no! For 'tis said, and said in Scripture,
> That the Moon shall refuse to show her light.[4]
>
> Tell me, O Church! whereon wouldst thou have me build thee;
> Shall I build thee, shall I build thee on the Stars?
> Oh no, no, no! For 'tis said, and said in Scripture,
> That the Stars, like leaves, shall be falling from Heaven.[5]
>
> Tell me, O Church! whereon wouldst thou have me build thee;
> Shall I build thee, shall I build thee on a Rock?
> Yea, Lord, yea! For 'tis said, and said in Scripture,
> On the Rock will I build my Church.[6]

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[1] Acts viii. 31.

[2] The Tradition of the Syriac Church of Antioch, by the Most Rev. Cyril Behnam Benni, Syriac Archbishop of Mossul (Ninive), London, 1871, pp. 26, 27. The Vatican Codex is number 188 among the Syriac MSS. of that Library, and contains Hymns for all the festivals of the year.

[3] Joel ii. 10; Ezechiel xxxii. 7.

[4] Mark xiii. 24 is like the Vulgate, "shall not give her light," but in Matt. xxiv. 29, to which the poet refers, the Syriac text has, "shall not show her light."

[5] Mark xiii. 24; Matt. xxiv. 24. The word *Ntar* is technical for the fall of the leaf.

[6] Matt. xvi. 18.

The unbeliever and those who, as the Apostle says,[1] are puffed up by the sense of the flesh, or by knowledge, falsely so-called, may think these lines childish and trivial. But others will find them beautiful, and even grand, in their childlike simplicity. That Peter was not only the Prince and spokesman of the Apostles,[2] but the foundation of the Church, is repeated in a hundred passages of the Syriac Breviary, and is looked on as a subject of praise and thanksgiving. "Come all ye children of the Church and sing praise and thanks to Him who built His holy Church and set on Peter her foundations."[3] If he bears the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, they were only "given him as a pledge."[4] A pledge of what? Of Christ's unfailing promise to the visible Head of His Church. Faith must be preached and taught in the very words of Peter,[5] and those Bishops and Fathers are praised who so preached and taught. They walk in the footsteps of their teachers, and tread in the path of the Apostles, of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. They have drunk from the blessed fountain of their Lord. In them abounds, and from them goes forth, the doctrine of Life; and they have watered the thirsty world by their teaching.[6] Peter and the Apostles are not dead, as modern heresy vainly imagines. They live within the Church, and will live there forever. So we have been assured by Christ Himself, when He gave them their commission as teachers, with whom He was to abide to the end of the world.[7] This is also the faith of the Syriac Church, as we see by the continuation of the passage just quoted: "Lo! the Church cries out, I am persecuted on every side. Oh, Apostles of the Son! help me by your prayers. When the Son of God ascended to Him that sent Him, He left you in me as unconquerable strongholds" (Ibid.).

How deeply the Headship, or primacy in the Church of St. Peter, was impressed on the Syriac mind, Catholic or Eutychian, and how thoroughly they looked on him as the Founder (under Christ) of the religion of the New Law, may be seen from the way in which they love to compare him with Moses, the Founder (under God) of the Jewish Church. "Moses was the Head of the Old and Peter of the New (Church or Legislation). Both are like each other, and in them God dwelt. Moses brought down the Tables of the Law; and Peter received the Keys of the Kingdom.

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[1] Colos. ii. 18; I. Cor. viii. 1; I. Tim. vi. 20.

[2] "Head and mouth" is St. Eprem's plain form of speech, apud Assemani Bibl. Orient., Vol. I., p. 95.

[3] Off. Mar. in the Sugito near the end of Lauds for Tuesday, p. 170.

[4] Ibid., pp. 386, 283.

[5] Off. Syr., pp. 299, 300. *Babnot Kole d' Shemhun.*

[6] Ibid., p. 300.

[7] Matthew xxviii. 20.

Moses built a temporary tabernacle; but Peter built the Church. To Thee be glory from the Old and the New!"[1]

Besides the building of the Church on Peter in Matthew xvi. 18, another text that the Syriac Breviary loves to quote, or rather to apply in its own way to the Church, is that of Isaias xlix. 16: "Behold! I have graven thee on the palms of my hands, and thy walls are ever before me." Though the passage reads thus substantially in both versions, the Peshito (or simple) and the Hexaplar,[2] yet in the Divine office the Syriac Church by a natural, though apparently bold, figure, regards the Church as built upon God's hands, since he has graven there her structure and walls in token of perpetual remembrance of His promise. Thus, in the Lauds of Thursday: "Glory be to the Strength (the Strong One) who hath built Holy Church on the palm[3] of His hands, and hath established in her an Altar."[4] And again, "Blessed be Christ Our King who hath built His Church on the palm of his hands!"[5] Almost the same anthem is found in the Breviary of Antioch: Blessed be Christ who has built Holy Church on the palm of His hands, and has set in her as foundations the Prophets, Apostles, and holy Martyrs.[6] And again, "Blessed art thou, O Holy Church! for the Voice of the Son (the promise uttered to Peter on the plains of Cesarea Philippi) has been made thy Keeper,[7] and the bars of Hell shall not prevail against thee henceforth and forever. His Body He has given thee for food, and His Blood for a chalice of redemption. Oh, earth, earth! hear the word of the Lord God,[8] who hath sworn to His Church, 'I will not loose hold of thee forevermore. Thy walls, O Church! are always before my eyes.'"[9]

The same text is used again with new imagery elsewhere in the Maronite Office: "I am thy Church, O Lord! and I am built on the palm of thy hands. Loose not thy hold of me, O Heavenly Bridegroom! for I became betrothed to Thee through the Prophets, the Apostles have signed my dowry,[10] and the blessed Martyrs have thrown in (as a nuptial gift) the blood that flowed from their neck."[11] The nuptials of the Church with her Divine Founder are

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[1] Off. Syr., p. 127. Second Kaumo or Nocturn of Monday.

[2] In the latter it reads as follows: "Behold! I have graven thy walls upon my hands; and thou art ever before me." Codex Syriaco-Hexaplaris, ... edidit Henricus Middeldorpf. Berolini, 1835, p. 138.

[3] *'Al pasat idauki bno l'idat Kudsheh.*

[4] Off. Mar., p. 291.

[5] Ibid., p. 297. Lauds of Thursday, among anthems of Ps. cxlix.

[6] Off. Syr., p. 168, in Vespers of Tuesday.

[7] *Noturo*, keeper, guardian, watchman. See Gen. iv. 9 and Judges vii. 19.

[8] In imitation of Jeremy xxii. 29.

[9] Off. Syr., p. 169.

[10] *Phernit(i)*, a word adapted from the Greek φερνη.

[11] Off. Mar. in Lauds of Monday, pp. 111, 112. The "blood of their neck" is a standing form to express the beheading of the martyrs who died for Christ.

a favorite subject of the sacred Muse of Syria, and one that frequently recurs under varied forms. The wedding-feast, as they describe it, is a thing of wonder, and so they call it.[1] "The Heavenly spouse made a wonderful wedding-feast for His holy, believing Church, whom He espoused in his crucifixion. He prepared and brought to her feast glorious and holy Bridesmen.[2] Therein he seated the Twelve, and with them the seventy-two (disciples) as readers (*Koruyin*); and there was King David bearing his harp and singing."[3] Elsewhere it is added that "each glorious guest bore a nuptial gift (*rumiuno*) for the Royal Bride. The prophets offered their sufferings, the Apostles their buffetings, the martyrs their slaying and the blood of their neck."[4] The word Rumiuno (or Rumiono) is very appropriately rendered by Edmond Castell in his Lexicon "Strena nuptialis." It is a secondary or diminutive form of *rumo*, and is evidently from *Armi*, "to throw, throw in, contribute." It is a favorite word in the Syrian office, and from the blood of the martyrs, poured out in honor of Christ's Spouse, is extended to any other offering laid before His throne in her name, the sweet incense of prayer, the merits of a well spent life, etc.[5]

Like *Hhlulo* (the wedding-feast), the word *Hhdugc* (friends of the Bridegroom) also has a meaning that is often enlarged by metaphor, and ranges from the *paranymph*, not only to the guests at the wedding-supper, but to all who shall be found worthy of a seat at the Heavenly Banquet. Thus, one hymn[6] gives the name to all the dead who rose with Our Lord from His earthly sepulchre; and St. James of Sarug applies it to all priests who have died after their ministry and are awaiting the eternal reward.[7] But, as a general rule, when the nuptials of the Church are mentioned, the word *Hhduge* is used for the twelve Apostles. Sometimes it has for synonym *Mocuro*, "desponsator," and Shushbino, "sodalis,

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[1] *Hhlulo d'tehro*. This word seems to have been specially reserved for the sacred marriage feast, while *meshtuto*, *shoruto*, etc., though of the same meaning, are used in a profane or worldly sense.

[2] *Hhduge*, paranymphs, or next friends of the Bridegroom or Bride.

[3] Off. Mar., p. 14, in Complin of Sunday.

[4] Ibid., p. 411, in Lauds of Saturday.

[5] See Off. Mar., pp. 305, 397, 250, 22, 41, 93, 227, 118, 152; and Off. Syr., pp. 48, 306.

[6] Hymn on the Resurrection, quoted by Payne Smith in Thesaurus Ling. Syr., *sub voce* Hhdugo.

[7] "The dwelling of hell has trampled on the glory of the priesthood, and has gathered into her mansions the splendor of the Deacons. Their harps are unstrung, their sweet voices of song are mute, and they lie in the mire of hell." Hell, *shiul*, means here simply the bosom of Abraham, or purgatory, where souls are purged and fitted for Heaven. Off. Syr., p. 424, in Tierce of Saturday.

conciliator nuptiarum."[1] These terms are sometimes, and with good reason,[2] applied *par excellence* to St. John the Baptist. Though disclaiming all other titles of praise, he called himself by that special name, the "friend of the Bridegroom," and the Church has cheerfully caught up the designation, which even his humility could not refuse. St. Ephrem[3] calls him the "Paranymph" (Mocuro) of Christ and the Church, for he led to Christ as Bridegroom the first-fruits of his preaching, the infant Church. The Syriac Office gives him the same appellation:

> Who can name for me the two vines,
> Planted in His vineyard by Our Lord?
> The wine from whose bunches of grapes
> Has filled with delight all creation.
>
> The vines are Mary and Elizabeth;
> Their bunches are Christ and John,
> The Bridegroom and His friend,
> The Brideman of Holy Church.[4]

The medieval Latin Church and her poets, who were more conversant with every line and syllable of Holy Writ than any modern professional Scripture reader, Protestant or Catholic, can ever hope to be, though they knew nothing of Syriac and very little of Greek interpretation, concurred in giving him the same title. The grand poet, Adam of St. Victor, who till a few years ago was as unknown to Christian readers as is yet St. James of Sarug,[5] makes,

[1] *Shushbino* is also used in the Syriac Church for the *sponsors* in Baptism. See that most rare book, "Severi Patr. Alexandr. De Ritib. Baptismi, Antuerpii (Plantini), 1572, p. 59. Its Chaldæo-Rabbinical cognate word *Shoshbena* is used in the same sense by past-canonical Jews, of Moses, who brought about the union of Israel with her spouse, Jehova, under the Old Covenant. "God was the King, and His betrothed was the people of Israel. The *Shoshbin* (or Paranymph) was Moses." SHAMOT RABBA apud Buxtorf. in Lexicon Chald. Talmud. Rabbinicum. Denuo edidit, etc., Bernardus Fischerus. Lipsiæ, 1869, p. 1258.

[2] St. John's Gospel, iii. 29. "He that hath the Bride is the Bridegroom, but the friend of the Bridegroom, who standeth and heareth Him, rejoiceth with joy because of the Bridegroom's voice. This, my joy, therefore, is fulfilled."

[3] S. P. M. Ephræmi Opera Omnia, ed. Petri Benedicti (the Maronite Jesuit Ambarachi), S. I. Romæ, 1740, tom. II., p. 492.

[4] Heptameter anthem from the Syriac Office of Antioch, p. 413, in the Lauds of Saturday. The author is not mentioned, but the metre is that of St. Ephrem.

[5] It is a shame that the works of St. James of Sarug, in poetry and prose, have thus far not been collected and published. They would be a valuable addition to Syriac and Catholic literature. The Vatican Library and the British Museum superabound in material for such a collection. We do not expect such a work from those lazy, elegant, Catholic scholars who, sitting under the shadow of the Vatican and its treasures, can only find time to regale the European public with learned dissertations on the worship of Isis and Mithras, or on the shoes, sandals, myrrhine vases and scenic spectacles of the old Romans. But we do expect it from a Catholic land whose scholarship, like its temperature, is fresher, higher, less Pagan. Louvain has already given us the vindication of the orthodoxy of James of Sarug. And it is to the Lamys, Abbelooses and others of that University that we must look for the completion of the good work.

it is true, the same application, as does the Syriac and Greek Church, of *paranymphi* to the Twelve.

> Paranymphi novæ Legis
> Ad amplexum novi Regis
> Sponsam ducunt regiam.[1]

But this is because the hymn he writes is in praise of the Twelve Apostles, and we feel sure that when he wrote in honor of the Baptist he cannot have forgotten what the Saint said of himself. One of his contemporaries calls St. John *Sponsi sponsum*,[2] meaning thereby *Sponsi pronubum* or *paranymphum;* and another begins a Sapphic hymn for the feast of his Decollation (29th of August) with the words:

> Præco præclarus, sacer et propheta,
> Regis æterni paranymphus almi.[3]

Enough has been said to show what the Syrian Church, as represented by her Liturgy, thinks of the Church Catholic and of the Rock on which, built by her Divine Architect, she bids defiance to all assaults of fallen angels and evil men. But we would call attention to another feature of her prayers, which proves how thoroughly she is imbued with the Catholic spirit, and how no apparent exuberance of poetic feeling ever makes her lose sight of sound theological principle. She believes firmly that the Church built on St. Peter can never teach error, never fade away or perish, because this is vouched for by God Himself, whose word cannot be made void by any effort of Hell or earth. But she thinks herself bound none the less eagerly and ardently to pray and urge with assiduous supplication that He forget not His word, but keep it and make good His promise. Hear how she prays once every week in the Lauds of Thursday. After commemorating the blessings of the Incarnation and Redemption, she continues:

> Thou didst raise up on earth a Holy Church,
> Patterned after the One above in the Kingdom;
> Thou didst plant her in mercy and perfect her in love,
> The typical Bride, made Thine in Thy Passion.
>
> Lo! the Hater of men now troubleth her
> Through his servants so wicked and bold:
> O Lord! neglect not Thy Holy Church,
> Nor let Thy promise prove deceitful!

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[1] Apud Trench, Latin Sacred Poetry. London, 1874, p. 205. We have not been able to consult Gautier's collection of Adam's Works.

[2] Postills, Sequences and Hymns collected and explained by the Abbot Guillermus, printed at Cologne (in Sancta Colonia) by Henry Quentel, 1500, fol. lxxxiv. of the Sequences.

[3] Ibid., fol. lxxiii. of the Hymns.

Let not her fair beauty be blackened,
Nor her great riches become poverty;
Make good Thy promise once given to Peter,
And seal by deed what Thou didst say by word!

Strengthen her gates and make solid her bulwarks!
Lift up her horn and raise up her head!
Bless her children, etc.[1]

Assemani[2] seems to intimate that this hymn was actually composed by a Nestorian bishop, George of Nisibis, surnamed Hymnographus or the Hymn-writer. He may have been a heretic, but when the traditional idea of Peter and his unconquerable Church became uppermost in his mind, the power of truth was too much for consistency. By adopting the hymn the Syrian Church has made it her own, and it is unquestionably Catholic. By praying in this way the Church and her childreu betray no doubt or fear that God is unwilling or unable to carry out His promises. It is only the language of love reminding Him of what He has said, and urging Him, with pious, affectionate importunity, to hasten its fulfilment. It is the language of the Old Testament, ever in the heart and on the lips of those who were chosen to deliver the oracles of God in song or prophecy.

And this reminds us of something which may be opportunely mentioned here. Many of us (very many, indeed, among those on whom years have grown) may remember how we were accustomed to lisp in earliest years the beautiful words of Archbishop Carroll's prayer that was recited all over the country before the celebration of the Divine Mysteries on Sunday and holyday throughout the year. The prayer came to be gradually disused in the North and West; but in the Southern States it was faithfully retained, and was looked on as an indispensable part of the Sunday function, almost like the priest's sacred vesture or sermon for the day. How this magnificent prayer of the great American patriarch came to be disregarded and dropped is a mystery. We have heard an explanation, and from a Kentucky prelate, that is almost as much of a puzzle as that which it sought to explain.

It is this: In one of the first paragraphs of the prayer God is besought to preserve the works of His mercy, and these words are added: "That Thy Church being spread through the whole world may continue with unchanging faith in the confession of Thy name." This, though a very sound form of words, seems to have given offence to some who had more piety than judgment. They thought that it was quietly sapping the foundations of the Church and her indefectibility, to hint that God should be called on to keep unchanged her faith and teaching of revealed doctrine.

[1] Off. Mar., p. 299.

[2] Bibl. Orient., vol. iii. *sub* Georgius Hymnographus.

Does God make promises, they exclaimed with pious horror, that He does not intend to keep, unless forced to it by constant supplication? Is it possible for Him to forsake His chosen spouse and cast her away like those wantons who usurp her name? But though the Church herself—they added with grave shaking of the theological head—cannot change her faith, her children individually may. Hence, of their charity, they amended his incautious language by changing the words as follows:

. . . . "that, Thy Church being spread through the world, its members may continue with unchanging faith in the confession of Thy name."

And thus, wise in their own pious conceit, they thought they had sufficiently provided for the prelate's credit and for Catholic orthodoxy. The prayer, so amended, must yet be found in many editions. It certainly was so recited from many an altar. Others, whose orthodoxy was too stern to admit any claims of charity, it is said, gave up the use of the prayer. It is neither good nor safe to try to be wiser than the Church. The proud priest who attempts it is apt sooner or later to make shipwreck of his faith; others, who are simple-minded and mean no wrong, may yet do harm. They will certainly be led into acts of folly, which will make wiser men smile or weep. Those we speak of meant no harm by their mistake, but it does not say much for the state of theology and Liturgical science amongst us at the time. Archbishop Carroll was a thorough theologian, standing head and shoulders above his critics; and his prayer is culled from what is best and noblest in the Liturgy of the Church. Little did these good men imagine that in censuring him they were calling to account the great Leos, Gelasiuses, Gregories, and a hundred other Pontiffs of the Roman Church! The prayer objected to is a literal translation of a collect of the Roman Missal, which has been recited in the Church for centuries, and is yet recited throughout the whole world. It is the second Prayer after the Passion of Good Friday. Here is the Latin original:

Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui gloriam Tuam omnibus in Christo gentibus revelasti: custodi opera misericordiæ Tuæ; ut Ecclesia Tua toto orbe diffusa, stabili fide in confessione Tui nominis perseveret. Per eundem Dominum, etc., Amen.[1]

The Church is God's truth made audible to man, whether she teach by lesson or by prayer. She is not ashamed of what she utters; nor does she speak in a corner, nor with dark or doubtful phrase. She is what the Syriac Muse loves to call her, the Palace of Light and the Daughter of Day.[2]

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[1] Missale Romanum, Mechliniæ, 1874, p. 162.

[2] *Birat nuhro* and *Ba(r)t imomo.* St. James of Sarug in Hymn on St. Peter, yet unpublished, in the Vatican MSS. Apud Benni, op. cit., pp. 21, 24.

THE SACERDOTAL JUBILEE OF HIS HOLINESS POPE LEO XIII.

THE first stroke of the matin-bell on the last day of the year just closed ushered in the golden jubilee of Leo the Thirteenth's priesthood. Perhaps no event of the century has attracted so much attention, or has been celebrated with such universal rejoicing. Even before the dawn, the celebration of it had begun. The cloistered nun and the cowled monk in every religious order in the world whispered Leo's name in their prayers long before the sun of December 31st had risen, or the secular world had awoke from slumber. The breeze that rose with the sun in the distant East carried Leo's name on its pinions over the mountains, rivers, seas and continents, to savage lands and to the centres of civilization. It was spoken by the missionary in China, teaching the young catechumens the doctrines of Christ; by the preachers in the cathedral pulpits of Europe to cultured throngs of devoted Catholics, and by the poor priest in his lonely post in the far west and north of America to the devout Indian converts of California and Manitoba. The echoes of the *Te Deum* sung by nearly three hundred millions of the most civilized and enlightened portion of the human race, sung by Catholic emperors, princes, and peoples, were heard in the Vatican; and the ear of Leo could hear the cry of "Long live the Pope," spoken in every known tongue. The whole earth seemed to join in the cry. Even the infidel and the heretic rejoiced and paid homage. The potent Czar of Russia, the great Protestant Emperor of Germany, as well as the Protestant ruler of the British empire, the Sultan of Turkey, and the Shah of Persia, as well as the President of our free republic, offered their gifts; and the enlightened masses of men of every sect applauded their action. The very words of the prophet were realized: "All they from Saba shall come, bringing gold and frankincense, and showing forth praise." Even the critical press, of every shade of political opinion, with unheard-of unanimity, had nothing but words of praise and admiration for this latest Vicar of Christ.

Whence this unanimity? Why this universal homage? We are not astonished at the respect of Catholic potentates and peoples for the pontiff. It is their duty to show it, and it was expected. But how account for the encomiums of the Protestant and the schismatic, and the homage of the infidel? It is not that Leo has ever sacrificed a principle of Catholic truth, or yielded a single point of those doctrines decreed in the Councils of Trent and of

the Vatican. No! Leo XIII. has banned, and is ever ready to ban, error and heresy as vigorously as ever his namesake, Leo X., banned the German fox of the sixteenth century who ravaged the vineyard of the Lord; his courage in the face of emperors has been equal to that of the other Leo, who went forth from Rome to meet the "Scourge of God," in the fifth century, and turn him back in his career of conquest and spoliation. The sword of Peter may be sheathed, but it never rusts and is never broken. The Papacy may change its policy, but never its principles. The pontifical staff that Gregory VII. used to break the shackles of an enslaved Church, and to strike the simoniacal emperor down; the power that Innocent III. employed to bring the haughty king of France to obedience to Christian law; the vigor that Urban II. showed in summoning Europe, in the first crusade, to drive the Mussulman back from the tomb of the Saviour, still belong to Leo. He has sacrificed nothing. He has given up nothing. The homage of the schismatic, of the heretic, and of the infidel, is not founded on any concession made to their errors. In matters of doctrine the Papacy is always an "irreconcilable." The office is the same, whether it be filled by a Pius or a Leo. The former, surrounded by different circumstances, may fight differently, but the aim of both is the same, though their methods vary. Both work for the same end—the glory of God, the spread of the faith, the salvation of souls. When anything touches these questions, or endangers them, the weakest Pontiff is found to be as strong as the greatest. The gentle and physically weak and yielding Pius VII. proved, when the occasion required it, that he had as much courage in face of Bonaparte, the greatest soldier and conqueror of this age, as was ever shown by the mediæval giant pontiffs before the Henrys and Fredericks of Germany, the Philips of France, or the Henrys of England. The environment of Pius IX. was different from that of Leo XIII. Pius found himself in the midst of changes that were only beginning. He was the centre of aggression both from within and from without. He saw the walls of the old regimes crumbling around him; revolutions driving out the old dynasties in France; the Catholic empire of Austria deprived of the hegemony of Germany; and the Teutonic peoples united under a new empire entirely Protestant and bitterly anti-Catholic. He saw the little kingdom of Sardinia, like a lammergeyer from the Alps, pouncing down upon the Italian fold, desecrating and befouling everything it touched, and swallowing up the petty principalities of the country. By the cunning of Cavour, by the piracy of a band of lawless filibusters, the rapacity of the Sardinian parliament and monarch, through the duplicity and cowardice of the

last of the Napoleons, Pius saw himself at last stripped of every portion of the temporal sovereignty that had been the apanage of the Papacy for over a thousand years. The sturdy pontiff did not yield without a struggle. He fought manfully for his rights, for the rights of the Church and of the state, for the freedom of the Papacy, which is identical with the freedom of the Church. There is true heroism in the twenty-five years of struggle of Pius's reign against injustice, robbery, and infidelity. He stands among the falling ruins, protesting against usurpation, denouncing crime and persecution, trying to stem the torrent of infidelity and invasion; always firm, always unyielding, always courageous, full of faith and trust in Divine providence, to the end the very type of the poet's description of the man—just, and tenacious of his cause, who, without fear, sees the crumbling columns fall around him.

The environment of Leo is entirely different. The venerable Pius descended to his tomb like a setting sun amid a storm of black clouds. The wreck was complete. Leo ascends the throne, and at once the dawn appears. He sees around him a series of accomplished facts; the temporal sovereignty gone, Sardinian usurpation consummated in what is called United Italy, and a great Protestant empire established as the result of successful Prussian ambition. He had had a course of long training. Having been a diplomat, he knew the intrigues of courts and the progress of modern ideas. He had watched for a long time as bishop in his quiet palace at Perugia the advance of the Italian revolution. He knew the character of its promoters and the nature of his countrymen. He was a scholar, a poet, a philosopher, a profound theologian and a great writer. He knew that whatever measures he took for the good of the Church must be for its internal as well as for its external welfare. The eye and the hand of Leo were everywhere soon felt. People around him found that they no longer had to deal with a prime minister or a deputy, but with a ruler who was his own prime minister and who would personally see that his commands were executed. Extending his view over the whole Church, he saw that the promotion of science would elevate the priesthood and so lift up the laity to a higher plane. He had been a deep student of the works of St. Thomas and recognized in him a personal university of all theological science. The works of the "Angel of the Schools" should henceforth be studied, that uniformity might be established in philosophical research and superficiality thrust out of the seminaries of learning. Leo studied the errors of the age and the dangers to civil society; and, with apostolic vigor and divine inspiration, he at once condemned the

former and warned the nations of the latter. He proved to civil rulers and their subjects that the Catholic Church is the best safeguard of peace and order, of person and of property. His encyclicals showed minorities that the only guarantee for their protection against the despotism of the State or of shifting majorities is found in the Catholic doctrine which limits their power over the individual conscience, person and property. He promoted literature; but he showed at the same time that literature without God and Christ is only a revival of paganism and a corrupter of private and public morals. His quiet but magnetic influence soon became felt over the Church and beyond her pale. He attracted the attention of scholars and *litterateurs* by his poems and letters; of philosophers and theologians by his thorough mastery of their specialties; of statesmen and all conservative thinkers by his wise lessons and profound knowledge of the wants and perils of civil society. The press, ever vigilant and often prejudiced, discussed his sayings and his writings. Those who took the pen in hand to scoff soon learned to respect him. His personality and its surroundings were studied and scrutinized. He was found to be abstemious, studious, laborious, of great personal integrity and unblemished holiness of life. The whole world, after the pause of examination, respected the man, even where bigotry or infidelity would not permit them to respect the office. It was felt that Leo was fit for his office and a worthy successor of the saintly Pius IX.

Admiration of the man was soon developed into respect for his office. He dealt firmly but courteously with the enemies of the Church. The great Protestant Chancellor who had beaten Napoleon in diplomacy and Austria and France on the field of battle, and who was fiercely trying to conquer the Catholic Church, seeing that he was engaged in a hopeless task, and further captivated by the ability and urbanity of its head, made overtures for peace to Leo the Conciliator. The *Culturkampf* ended. The great intellect of Bismarck bowed to the superior statesmanship of Leo, and became the captive of his gentleness and Christian charity. The brawny and brainy chancellor who had never before let go his grip on an enemy till he had conquered him, or on a purpose till he had achieved it, forewent his plans for the subjugation of the Church and made her head his friend and the mediator of his quarrels at home and of his difficulties with foreign powers. Then did one of the greatest foes of the Church in this century become the instrument of restoring the Papacy to an office which it held in the palmiest days of Innocent III. Bismarck saw what every clear intellect apprehends, that the stability of civil society and the interests of conservatism are safe in the hands of the Church and of

the Papacy alone. They alone stand like a stone wall before anarchism, socialism and communism. But not the great Teutonic statesman alone, not merely the governing classes whose interests are identified with conservatism, felt that the helm of supreme ecclesiastical authority was held by the hand of a master. The people, the common people, everywhere found and loved Leo as a friend and a champion. He has resisted no legitimate aspiration of any race or nation, for autonomy in government or for improvement in the scale of industrial and of material comfort. The poor overtaxed and misgoverned peasants of Italy revere him and curse the sway of the usurper that deprives them of the Pope's beneficent government. The people of Ireland especially, in their gallant fight for Home Rule, have ever found Leo their defender. In spite of repeated efforts, by English officials and powerful foes of the Irish cause, to warp the pontiff's judgment and turn him aside from sympathy with a downtrodden people, in spite of potent intrigues extending to the very precincts of the Vatican, Leo's vision has always been clear, his firmness consistent; his love for his poor and suffering children in the Island of Saints has been the mantle of their protection. Rather than please a king by injuring a woman, one Pope sacrificed the whole of England; rather than sacrifice the rights of a helpless woman, another pontiff brought on himself the wrath of the powerful king of France; Boniface VIII. excommunicated another French king for "*loading his subjects with intolerable burdens;*" all the power and intrigues of the first Napoleon could not conquer the resolution of Pius VII.; and Leo has proved himself their worthy imitator.

Such being the well-known character of this pontiff, no wonder the whole world, rich and poor, honor him. In this age of progress more than ever do all roads lead to Rome. The railroad, the steamship, and the telegraph, while aiding the material progress of the world, have also helped to bring out more strongly the evidence of the interior and exterior unity of the Catholic Church. On the occasion of this very Jubilee the blood in the human body does not more rapidly go from the heart to the extremities and return from them again to it, than did the thrill of mutual love from the Pope to the whole Church and from the whole Church to the Pope. There was but one cold spot in the whole spiritual body, one black blotch in Catholic Christendom. And how dismal it looked in contrast with the splendor and glory of the Papal celebration! How black looked the Quirinal while the Vatican was robed in light; how insignificant the petty scion of Savoy near the illuminated figure of the Vicar of Christ! While the whole world was honoring the pontiff no one thought of his unfortunate

neighbor. What an eloquent and universal protest was the Jubilee celebration against the usurpation of the Papal territory by the house of Savoy!

That usurpation must end; that spot must out. It is the only dreary fact of importance that came before Leo's mind on the fiftieth anniversary of his priesthood. He would remedy the evil if he could. If conciliation or compromise were possible, he is the pontiff to make it. He is a true Italian, lover of his race and country, wishing well for her material, but above all for her spiritual prosperity. He knows that Italy can never advance with the chain of a great wrong tied to her limbs; that the ruin which overtook the house of Bonaparte for robbing the Pope will fall on the house of Savoy as the penalty for the perpetration of a similar crime. As Christ wept over Jerusalem, he weeps over Italy governed by apostates, administered by the heirs of depredators, and plundered by toll-gatherers. He knows that Providence sooner or later will avenge the wrongs done to the Church and the Papacy by the machinations of Mazzini, the cunning of Cavour, the piracy of Garibaldi and the spoliation of Victor Emmanuel. All is still dark, but Leo sees the bright lining of the cloud in the public opinion of the world expressed in the festivities of his Jubilee.

Yes, the usurpation must end! No crusade is necessary in this enlightened age save the crusade of public opinion. What the spear and the sword of the Crusaders were against wrong in an age that knew neither newspaper nor telegraph, are now the pen and the voice of truth and of sound policy. Even if the providence of God should not choose to undo the wrong as it has done before by the sword of the Catholic powers or of the heretic and of the unbeliever, public opinion will finally right it. The interests of Italy demand the restoration of the temporal power to the Pope; and the interests of the Church imperatively require it. Italy will never be a great power until she settles this question amicably. The statesmen of Italy know this; the people of Italy feel it. There is growing discontent among them. The day of infidel rule is passing way. The dormant Catholics are awakening. The peasant of Calabria and the Lombard farmer; the mountaineers of the Volscian hills and the Apennines, the shepherds of the Campagna, begin to demand liberty for the Church and freedom for the Pope. The great masses of the Italian people are loyal to the Church. They know that the glory of their race is the Papacy and its temporal power. They have gained nothing by its destruction. On the contrary, their taxes have been doubled, their faith insulted, their religion mocked by office-holding upstarts who have come down like a horde of hungry wolves from the Alps to prey on the

fertile plains of central and southern Italy. The full awakening of the Italian peasantry to the injustice of the Sardinian usurper will sound the death-knell of his tenure of the Papal territory.

But even if the honesty and self-interest of Italy should not be equal to the task of making restitution to the Pope of what has been stolen from him, the whole Catholic Church will continue to insist on it. The patrimony of St. Peter never belonged to Italy. It was held in trust for the whole Catholic Church by the supreme pontiffs. It was the guarantee of their spiritual independence. When for a time some of them unwisely left Rome to live in Avignon, misfortunes fell on the Church. The Popes of Avignon were suspected of being French satraps, and the Great Schism of the West has taught Christendom that the Pope must not be the subject of any earthly sovereign, but, as head of a universal religion not confined by national limits, must be his own absolute master even in temporal matters. A subject of the king of Sardina ruled by his laws, perhaps appointed by his intrigues, hampered by his officials, controlled by his power, might be suspected by the Catholics of other nations, and national suspicion is a powerful element in the breeding of schism and of heresy. We know, of course, that no matter to what condition the Papacy may be reduced, to the catacombs of Rome or to the jail of Fontainebleau, Divine Providence will always watch over and preserve it. But Divine Providence ordinarily works according to human methods and the freedom of the human will, and never sanctions the passive quietism of those who would remain inactive when the interests of religion are at stake. Good men must work to counteract what bad men do. In the bark of Peter every one must help to man the yards, set the sails, or take a hand at the oars when occasion demands it. The whole Church persists in demanding a restoration of the temporal sovereignty to the pontiff. Even Protestant rulers who have Catholic subjects demand it. The waves of Catholic and even of Protestant public opinion are beating on the walls of Piedmontese usurpation, and these must go down. That usurpation is to Italy a thorn in the side in time of peace, a bayonet in the rear in time of war. Not Italy, but the Catholic Church, owns the Papal territory. The institutions of Rome were founded by the Peter's pence of all nations. The generosity of Catholics outside of Italy built St. Peter's. The Quirinal is the property of the Catholic Church and not of the fox who has made it his lair. The fox must be driven out of Rome, which he has plundered and desecrated. The subjects of the Czar as well as the citizens of this free Republic demand it. The head of our Church, who has supreme spiritual jurisdiction in every land, whose office requires direct, immediate

and untrammeled action in matters of faith, of morals, of discipline, in the appointment of bishops, in the adjudication of internal disputes in the Church the whole world over, must be absolutely free and independent, not only *de facto*, but *de jure* also. No state guarantee of an Italian parliament suffices. The power that makes that guarantee to-day may destroy it to-morrow, and would be likely to do so under the impetus of an increasing radicalism. The guarantee at best is only an attempt to compound a felony. To steal the whole of the Pope's property and then to offer him a pittance in exchange for it, is a bribe offered to his independence, an insult to the dignity of his august character, a snare to entrap Catholic loyalty, a shallow attempt to induce the pontiff to condone the theft and forgive the injustice. The poet has said:

> "Not florid prose nor honeyed lies of rhyme
> Can blazon evil deeds or consecrate a crime."

All the oratory of Depretis, all the hypocrisy of Humbert will never make men forget that the taking of Rome by his father was a violation of the law of nations, an act contrary to natural justice, an outrage on the whole Christian Church. The Popes were trustees of the patrimony of St. Peter for the whole Church. Their temporal sovereignty was conferred on them for the benefit and in the interest of the whole Church. To deprive them of it is to be guilty of grand larceny from the whole of Christendom.

Perhaps no Catholics in the world are more intensely interested in this matter than we of the United States. We feel the necessity of having a Pope absolutely independent of secular princes, having an illustration in our own confederation of States. In order to have our central administration free from State interference, we have singled out a portion of territory to be the capital of the country. The city of Washington and the lands constituting the District of Columbia are the Rome and the St. Peter's patrimony of our republic. Now, that which a free people does here for the State, is what a free Church wishes to accomplish for the Papacy. The privileges and the exemptions of the District of Columbia do not weaken the inner or the outer force of our country. On the contrary, the independence of that District is one of the mainstays of our strength as a nation. There must be permanency in every society to insure peace and order. Continual and universal change disturbs the people and ruins commerce. We have felt that in a land where universal suffrage prevails, something should be done to proctect individuals and the minority from the injustice of a mutable majority. And thus by constitutional en-

actments, which mere majorities cannot change, and by separating our central from our State governments, we have established that stability which under regal regimes is assured by the principle of heredity. As in the order of physical nature there are centres, there are suns comparatively immovable, or at least having a motion different from the planets which revolve in order around them, so in well-ordered states and in the Church there must be a centre. Our states are like so many bishoprics in relation to the central government at Washington. Why cannot Italy imitate our example? A dead uniformity is not congenial to her, nor warranted by her history. The mosaic of Palestrina is a better symbol of the unity which should characterize her than the stupid and offensive unity of a mud pie. There is fully as much difference between the Neapolitan of the south and the Piedmontese of the north, as between the representative Irishman and the London cockney. The history of Rome under the Popes is as different from that of Piedmont as the history of our own wonderful progress is from the story of the Indian tribes. Uniformity is not strength. Our system of checks and balances in the political order, our republic of separate yet connected States, our allowance for local feeling, interest and prejudice, which find legal vent in the autonomy of our State governments, have made us the strongest republic in the world. France, a centralized republic, proves by her internal dissensions and external weakness that the best safety-valve of revolution is local home rule. That is what the Papacy demands from Italy; that is what the whole Church insists that Italy shall concede. Leo may not see the sovereignty of his predecessors restored; the times may not yet be ripe for it. But when radicalism, which was the precursor of the Sardinian monarchy in its career of spoliation, shall turn back and attack the king and the throne as it has attacked the pontiff and the altar, even the grasping statesmen of Italy may begin to realize the necessity of justice. The Czar of Russia sees that the Papacy is a protector against Nihilism; the Emperor of Germany and his great chancellor see that it is a help against socialism; the conservative republicans of France behold in it the bulwark of the commonwealth against communism; Americans who a quarter of a century ago looked upon the Pope as a spook with which to scare children and Puritans, now consider him the champion of the rights of property and of the Constitution of the United States. Will not Italy learn a lesson? Or must the bomb of the anarchist burst in the Quirinal before its tenant learns that the safety of his dynasty and the prosperity of his country depend on the independence of the prisoner of the Vatican?

Around that venerable captive of saintly life and eminent learn-

ing the monarchs of the earth are gathered in homage; and the peoples on their knees revere his person and his office. The light of the Incarnate Word shines from his dome-like brow, built as it were specially to wear the pontifical tiara. We see his hand extended to bless all men, to bless society and home; and the smile of benignant charity that lights up his countenance illumines the world with its beneficent warmth. We, his American children, prostrate before him like the rest of mankind, implore his benediction. We are grateful to him. He loves our country. He loves its liberty and its institutions. His interest in us is special. He has given to our hierarchy saintly and scholarly bishops, and honored our Church with another Cardinal. His love for our priests is shown in the paternal legislation made to guard their rights and make them happy subjects. He wants our scholars to become as great as the best in Europe, and therefore he has given us a university. We love the Pope. We are loyal to the Pope. The American Church will not yield to any other in devotion to his person and his office, nor in earnestness of demand for his liberation and for the restoration of his temporal power. Our devotion proves that although oceans may divide continents, they cannot break the chain of faith or of discipline, nor quench the ardor of Catholic charity. Prostrate before him, we kiss his feet as those of the living Vicar of Jesus Christ. We lift up our voices to express the deep emotions of our hearts and to swell the universal chorus of "Long live the Pope! Long live Leo the Great, the Good!" To the Pope and the Papacy we American Catholics are

> "Constant as the northern star,
> Of whose true-fixed and resting quality
> There is no fellow in the firmament."

THE CENTRAL ERROR OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

WHEN a student who has made his own any modern text-book of Protestant philosophy, approaches the dogmas of the Catholic Church and sets himself to inquire into their philosophic basis, he finds himself face to face with very serious difficulties. He becomes gradually conscious of the existence in his own mind of an assumption which he has always been accustomed to regard as true and to take for granted as a first principle of mental analysis, but which, nevertheless, effectually destroys all objective truth. He detects a worm that is eating at the root not only of Transubstantiation and other distinctive doctrines of the Church, but of all belief whatever; so that, if he is to be consistent, he must either dig up the worm that causes all the mischief, or relinquish his search after absolute certainty and after the realities of objective knowledge. This cankering worm is deep, and to drag it from its lurking place is not an easy task. It is to be found in the modern theory of *Abstraction;* it vitiates the very entrance into our minds of the *ideas* or *concepts* on which all else depends. Unless these are introduced by the door of truth, truth itself has little chance of taking up its abode with us, and consistency becomes impossible. We propose, therefore, in the following pages to trace the method by which we form our mental concepts or ideas, and, after establishing the true doctrine, to explain the aberrations of modern philosophy on the subject, and to expose the fallacies by which it misleads the unwary student.

We must begin by tracing certain previous steps which precede the process of Abstraction and the formation of universal ideas.

When any object is presented to us, and we turn our minds to the consideration of it, the first thing that comes before us is the sensible impression made upon the inner sense or imagination. There is painted upon the material faculty of the imagination an image more or less distinct of the object to which we turn our attention. This image is either transferred from our internal senses to the faculties within us, or else is reproduced by the sensible memory recalling past impressions. If any one says to us the word "pheasant," and we hear what he is saying, a vague general picture of a pheasant, copied from the various pheasants we have seen, is present to our imagination. So far there is strictly no intellectual process. Animals share with man the faculty of imagination, and can call up from their memories a vague image of

familiar objects. When we scratch, unperceived, the floor of our room and call out to our terrier the word "Rat!" there rises up in his mind an indistinct picture of the little animal that he loves to destroy. When the fox-hound comes across the fresh scent in the path which Reynard has but recently trodden, the confused image of a fox comes up before him and suggests immediate pursuit.

All this is a matter of the interior sense; there is no intellectual activity in the lower animals; they rest on the mere sensible impression, and cannot go beyond it. But an intellectual being does not stop here. The higher faculties of his rational nature compel him to go further than this. The intellect exerting its activity lays hold of the sensible image and makes it its own, at the same time transforming it from something individual and suitable to the apprehension of sense into something universal and altogether above and beyond sense. "Quicquid recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis." Whatever we take into any faculty has to accommodate itself to the nature of that faculty. Whatever is received by the intellect must be received as supra-sensible and universal. We mean by *supra-sensible* something which is beyond the power of sense, outer or inner, to portray; something which cannot be painted on the imagination; something which belongs to the immaterial, not the material, world. We mean by *universal* something which the intellect recognizes as capable of belonging not to this or that object only, but to an indefinite other number of objects, actual or possible, which have the same inner nature, and, therefore, a claim to the same general name. For the individual representation or phantasm which belongs to sense, and to sense alone, is substituted the universal representation, or concept, or idea which the intellect alone can form for itself by the first operation of thought properly so called.

We shall, perhaps, be able better to understand the process of simple apprehension if we distinguish it from certain other processes which either are liable to be mistaken for it or are preliminary steps which necessarily precede it.

1. *Sensation*, the act by which we receive on some one or more of the internal organs of sense the impression of some external object presented to it. The object producing the sensation may be altogether outside of us, or it may be a part of our own bodies, as when I see my hand or feel the beating of my pulse.

2. *Consciousness*, or the act by which we become aware of the impressions made upon our senses and realize the fact of their presence. Every day a thousand impressions are made upon our bodily organs which escape our notice. We are but conscious of their having been made. We have heard the clock strike outside our ears, but have never been conscious of the sound. When our

mental powers are absorbed by some interesting occupation or by some strong excitement, almost any sensation may pass unnoticed. In the mad excitement of the battle-field men often receive serious wounds and are not aware of the fact till long afterwards.

3. *Attention*, by which the faculties are directed specially to one object or set of objects, to the partial or complete exclusion of all others. The dog following the fox has his attention directed almost exclusively to the fox he is pursuing, and seems to forget all else. The soldier in battle has his attention absorbed by the contest with the foe, and for this reason his wound passes unobserved.

4. *Sensible perception*, the act by which the data of the external senses are referred to an inner sense which has the power of perceiving, comparing together and uniting in one common image all the different impressions made on the various organs of sense, whence it obtains the name of common sense (sensus communis). Sensible perception always implies some degree of consciousness and memory. A dog sees a piece of sugar; this draws his attention to it, and he becomes conscious of the impression upon his organs of sight. Next he smells it, and, if not perfectly satisfied as to its nature, applies his tongue to it to discover its taste. He then compares together the various impressions of sight, smell and taste, and the resulting image is that of a piece of sugar good for food.

5. *Memory* (sensible), which recalls the past by reason of the presence within us of certain sensations which recall other sensations formerly experienced. A certain perfume recalls most vividly some scene of our past life; a familiar melody stirs emotions long dormant; the fresh morning air brings with it the remembrance of some exploit of boyhood or youth. The memory of animals is exclusively a sensible memory dependent on sensation.

6. *Imagination*, which paints upon the inner sense some picture, the scattered materials of which already exist within us. It is the faculty which reproduces the sensible impressions of the past, grouping them, however, in a different order and arranging them differently. In this it differs from the (sensible) memory, which reproduces the impressions of the past as they were originally made. In dreams the imagination is specially active.

Hitherto we have been speaking of various processes belonging to the faculties of sense which man shares with the lower animals. We now come to those which belong to man alone, to the processes of *Thought* strictly so called. We have said that the first and simplest of these is that of simple apprehension or conception. But there is a preliminary process which is not really distinguishable from simple apprehension, and differs only in the aspect under which it presents itself to us.

We have spoken of attention as a concentrating of our faculties on some one object to the exclusion of others. The object on which we concentrate may be an object having an independent existence, or it may be some quality or qualities out of the many qualities belonging to something which is present to our minds. In this latter sense it is often called *Abstraction*, inasmuch as it is the drawing away of our attention from some qualities in order to fix it upon others. We may abstract from the whiteness of a piece of sugar and fix our minds upon its whiteness—we may abstract from whiteness and sweetness, and concentrate our attention on its crystallization. We may abstract from whiteness and sweetness and crystallization, and mentally contemplate its wholesomeness for little children.

But abstraction has a further meaning which includes all this, but goes beyond it. In every object there are certain qualities which may or may not be there without any substantial difference being made in its character. There are others the absence of any one of which would destroy its nature and cause it to cease to be what it is. A man may be tall or short, young or old, handsome or ugly, black or white, virtuous or vicious, but none the less is he a man. But he cannot be deprived of certain other qualities without ceasing to be a man—he cannot be either rational or irrational, living or dead, possessed of that form we call human or of some other entirely different one. If he is not rational, living, possessed of human form, he ceases to be a man altogether, because these latter qualities are part of his nature *as man*, constitute his essence, make him to be what he is, a man.

Now, abstraction in this further sense is the concentration of the intellect on these latter qualities, to the exclusion of the former. It is the withdrawal of the mind from what is accidental, to fix it upon what is essential, or, to give the word a strictly unvarying etymological meaning, it is the intellectual act by which we draw out (abstract) from the individual object that determinate portion of its nature which is essential to it and is said to constitute its essence, and neglect all the rest.

In this sense it is the same process as simple apprehension, regarded from a different point of view. It is called apprehension inasmuch as the intellect apprehends or grasps the nature of the object. It is called abstraction inasmuch as this nature is abstracted or drawn out of the object whose nature it is; and as it cannot be grasped until the intellect has withdrawn it from the object, abstraction is, at least in thought, a previous process to simple apprehension.

Thus, when a horse is presented to us, abstraction enables us to withdraw our mind from the fact of his being a race-horse or

dray-horse, chestnut or gray, fast or slow trotter, healthy or diseased, and to concentrate our attention on that which belongs to him as a horse, and thus to withdraw out of him that which constitutes his essence and which we may call his *equinity*. In virtue of our rational nature we fix our mental gaze on that mysterious entity which makes him what he is, to grasp or apprehend his equinity, to apprehend or perceive intellectually that hidden something which is the substratum of all his qualities, the root whence the varying characteristics which mark him out as a horse all take their origin. It is in the assertion of this faculty of abstraction as the power of drawing out of the object something which is really there independently of the mind that draws it forth, that consists the whole distinction between scholastic and the so-called modern philosophy. It is in the definition of simple apprehension as not merely the grouping into one certain qualities of the object selected by the mind, but the grasping by the mind of an objective reality in the object whence certain qualities flow quite independently of the mind which apprehends them, that consists of the central doctrine which gives to the philosophy of the Catholic Church a bulwark against the inroads of skepticism impossible to any system which has lost its hold on this central and vital truth. Modern error starts with misconceiving the very first operation of thought; with such a foundation we cannot expect the superstructure to be remarkable for solidity.

From the process of simple apprehension we must now turn to the result of the process, from the act to that which the act engenders, from conception to the concept.

We have seen that whatever is received into any faculty has to accommodate itself to the nature of the faculty, and consequently that the image of the external object received into the intellect must be something supra-sensible and spiritual. It has been grasped or apprehended by the intellect and transferred, so to speak, into itself, and it has consequently been purified of the materiality clinging to the image present to the imagination and prepared for its abode in the sphere of immaterial thought. It has thus no longer the representation of the single object and no more; it is now applicable to each and all of a whole class of objects; it is no longer a particular, it is a universal. It is not the sensible image stripped of those attributes peculiar to the individual as such and applicable to a number of objects by reason of its vagueness. It belongs to quite a different sphere; it is raised above the region of sense to the region of intellect and of thought properly so called. This distinction between the two images, the sensible image painted on the imagination and the supra-sensible image dwelling in the intellect, is of the greatest importance. The sensible image must

precede the supra-sensible; we cannot form a concept of any object unless there has been previously imprinted on the imagination a material impression of that object. The sensible image must, moreover, exist side by side with the concept: the one in the imagination, the other in the intellect; and as long as we are thinking of the intellectual concept, the material phantasm must be present to our imaginations. This is the result of the union of soul and body: in virtue of our animal nature the phantasm is present to the material faculty, and in virtue of our rational natures the concept is present to the intellectual faculty. When we think of a triangle our intellects contemplate something which is above sense, the idea of triangle, an ideal triangle, if you like, and at the same time our imagination has present before it the material picture of a triangle. The intellectual image is something clear, precise, exact, sharply marked without any defects or deficiencies. The material image is something vague, indistinct, indefinite and applicable to a number of individuals only by reason of its indistinctness and indefiniteness. The intellectual concept we form of a triangle is as precise as it can be. We know what we mean in every detail belonging to it, we can define it and set forth all its characteristics one by one with perfect correctness. The picture of a triangle present to our imagination is the reverse of all this: it is dim, imperfect, undetermined. It is neither isosceles, rectangular nor scalene, but a sort of attempt to combine all these. If, in order to give it definiteness, we picture not only a triangle, but an isosceles triangle, still we have to determine whether the angle at the vertex shall be an obtuse angle, a right angle, or an acute angle. Even if we introduce a fresh limitation and decide on the acute angle, we are not much better off: our picture is still quite indeterminate. For the sides must be of a certain length, it must be drawn in a certain position, and some color must be chosen for the sides. But however many limitations we introduce, we cannot be perfectly determinate until we have thrown away altogether every shred of generality belonging to the triangle and are satisfied with some one individual triangle with individual characteristics belonging to itself and to no other triangle in the world.

But there is another important distinction between the immaterial concept in the intellectual faculty and the material phantasm in the imaginative faculty. If we examine the latter we not only find that it is vague and indistinct, but that it is not a true representation of the object; it is not what it professes to be. The picture of a triangle which is present in our imagination is not, strictly speaking, a triangle at all. For the sides of a triangle are lines, *i.e.*, they have length but not breadth, whereas in the picture of a triangle as imagined or actually drawn, the sides are not lines at all, but good thick bars of appreciable breadth. If they were lines

they would be invisible, not only to the naked eye, but to the most powerful microscope. Worse still, they are not even straight. They are wavy bars with rough, jagged edges. They have no sort of pretence to be called straight lines, nor has the so-called triangle any real claim to the name.

Not so the intellectual concept formed by the process of simple apprehension. The image is purged of its materialism when it is adopted by the immaterial faculty, and so it is purged of all its indefiniteness and incorrectness. It is an ideal triangle; it is worthy of the noble faculty that has conceived and brought it forth. It is not the clumsy attempt at a triangle with all the imperfections which cling to the figure depicted on the imagination and drawn on paper or on wood, which in practice serves very well the purpose of a triangle, but which has no true lines for its sides and is crooked and defective in every portion of it. It is a true, perfect, genuine triangle dwelling in the spiritual sphere, the sphere of what philosophy calls *noumena*, things capable of being intellectually discerned, as opposed to phenomena or mere appearances. When we argue about the properties of a triangle, it is about this ideal triangle that we argue, else nothing that we said would be strictly true. We argue about something which in point of fact has nothing corresponding, but in the world of phenomena only feeble and clumsy attempts to imitate its inimitable perfections. When we assert that an equilateral triangle has all its sides and angles equal, we do not assert this in reality of the triangle A B C or the triangle D E F, or any triangle that we have ever seen with our bodily eyes, but about an ideal equilateral triangle which is not realized in the world of sense, but is realized with the utmost precision in the world of intellect. When we say that the radii of a circle are all equal, we do not mean that any circle has ever been drawn by the most skilful limner in which any two radii were ever exactly equal, but that in the ideal circle the ideal radii are actually equal, and that in the attempts to draw a circle on the blackboard or on paper or on the imagination, the so-called radii are approximately equal in proportion as the circle approximates to an ideal circle and the radii to the ideal radii of that ideal circle.

It is true that the geometrician cannot pursue his researches without palpable symbols to aid him. This is the consequence of our intellect inhabiting a tenement formed of the dust of the earth. We cannot think of an ideal circle and its properties without at the same time imagining in vague fashion a circle which can be rendered visible to the eye. It is because of this that intellectual activity so soon fatigues; it is not the intellect which wearies, but the material faculty of the imagination which works side by side with the intellect. Very few men can argue out a single proposi-

tion of Euclid by means of an imaginary triangle present to the imagination, and they therefore draw a picture which appeals to the external sense, in order to save their imagination the impossible task of keeping before the mind its own imaginary triangle. But whether the symbol be drawn on paper or on the imagination, we must remember that it is not about the symbol that we argue, but about the corresponding image in the immaterial faculty, the ideal triangle present to the intellect.

Before we discuss the strange aberration of modern philosophy on this subject, we must distinguish between the various images of every object of which we speak or think.

1. There is the intellectual immaterial image present in the intellectual faculty. It is something ideal. It belongs to the spiritual world, not the world of sense. It is engendered on man as the consequence of his being created in the Divine image, with an intellect framed after the likeness of the intellect of God. The intellectual image which he forms by the process of simple apprehension is a pattern or exemplar of the object which exists outside of him and corresponds to the pattern or exemplar present to the Divine mind when the external object was created. Man can idealize because he is a rational being and possesses within him this gift of recognizing the ideal of the object such as we conceive to be present in the mind of God. Brutes cannot idealize because they are irrational and do not possess this likeness to God. Their mental faculties can apprehend only sensible phenomena as such. They cannot think of anything except so far as it can be depicted on the imagination and is palpable to sense.

2. There is, moreover, the sensible material image present in the material faculty of the imagination. This necessarily accompanies the intellectual image, so long as the body is united to the soul. We cannot think of any object whatever without the material picture of it, or something resembling it being present to the fancy.

This picture is sometimes vivid and distinct, as when we think of some individual object very familiar to us. Sometimes it is utterly faint and indistinct, as when we think of something which is applicable to a number of varying external objects. In proportion to the number and variety of these objects is the faintness and indistinctness of the image representing them. When we recall to our thoughts our favorite little Skye terrier Die, whose winning ways and clever tricks have imprinted her image on our grateful memory, the picture is clear and vivid as if we saw her before us begging for one dainty morsel or chasing the nimble rat, just freed from the cage, over the meadows that border on the silver Isis or the sluggish Cam. But when we think of Skye terriers in general the image becomes blurred, other Skye terriers, the associates and

predecessors of the much-beloved Die, come up vaguely before us. If we enlarge the circle and fix our mind on terriers as a class, the image becomes still more indistinct. Scotch terriers, Dandy Dinmont terriers, black and tan terriers have to be combined in one common picture. If we go still further afield and think of dogs in general, the picture lapses into a sort of confused indefiniteness, and this again increases a hundredfold when the subject of our thoughts is no longer *dog*, but *animal*.

But all this time the concept has remained clear and sharply marked. The intellectual image of animal is no less distinct than the intellectual image of Skye terrier; perhaps rather more so, inasmuch as we can define in precise terms what constitutes animal nature; but it is not so easy to expound what are the special and essential characteristics of a Skye terrier and constitute his peculiar nature as distinguished from that of other dogs. In fact, we may say, in general, that the vividness and brightness of the image varies in inverse ratio to the simplicity of the concept. It is easy enough to imagine an isosceles triangle, the sides and angles of which are of a certain determinate length. It is very difficult to imagine mathematical figures in general, or to paint any sort of corresponding image upon our material faculties. On the other hand, the concept mathematical figure is a far simpler one than an isosceles triangle. We shall have to recur to this subject when we treat of the extension and comprehension of concepts, and will reserve any further discussion of it till then.

But, whether the picture painted on the imagination be distinct or indistinct, vivid and lifelike or so faint and dim as to be scarcely perceptible; whether it be a real likeness of the object of thought or is merely a feeble attempt to give concrete and sensible form to that which is abstract and spiritual, still an image of some sort is always there. When we think of honesty, or truth, or courage, some sort of dim image, having some sort of relation to the abstract quality present to our intellects, paints itself without fail on the material faculty just as certainly as when we think of Skye terriers, or ocean steamers, or balloons, except that in the one case the resemblance of the image to the object of thought is a very remote one, in the other it is clear enough. We cannot too strongly insist on the necessary and universal coexistence of the two images in the spiritual and material faculties respectively, and at the same time we cannot too strongly insist on the points of contrast between them. There is just enough similarity between them to make the attempt to identify them a plausible one. We will, therefore, recapitulate the most signal differences between them.

In fact, it is scarcely too much to say that, as in the nobler ani-

mals there is something which is a sort of shadow of reason, and so nearly resembling reason that the *a posteriori* observer cannot discern any wide distinction between the intelligence of the dog and the intellect of the savage; in the same way the common phantasm is so respectable an imitation of the concept that we can scarcely wonder that those who do not start from the solid foundation of philosophic truth have regarded the two images as identical.

But we must, first of all, notice that they have this in common, that they are both applicable to a number of individuals; the phantasm has a sort of universality (counterfeit though it be) as well as the concept. We also notice that one cannot be present without the other. The intellectual image is always accompanied by its material counterpart. It is these two circumstances which have misled so many modern schools of philosophy, and involved them in the fatal mistake of confusing together the immaterial and the material, conception and imagination—the region of intellect and the region of sense. This unhappy confusion has, in its turn, introduced the so-called relativity of thought, and has opened the door upon a boundless vista of contradiction and skep ticism.

1. The first difference between the *concept* and the *phantasm* is, that the concept is received into the intellect by the process of conception, or intellectual perception, and, as the intellect is a spiritual and immaterial faculty, removed altogether above sense, the concept, too, is a spiritual and immaterial and supra-sensible image.

The phantasm, on the other hand, is received into the imagination or fancy by the process of sensible perception, and, as the fancy or imagination is a material and sensible faculty, the phantasm, too, is material and sensible.

The intellect is, moreover, a faculty of universals; its special function is to see the universal under the particular; it does not recognize the individual object except so far as it possesses a nature capable of being multiplied. Hence the concept is also something universal, something which is found not in one individual alone, but in many, either really existing or at least possible. The *imagination*, on the other hand, is a faculty of individuals. All its pictures are pictures of individual objects as such. Hence, the phantasm is also something individual and united to the indivdiual. It is a picture of the individual object or of a number of existing individuals whose points of distinction are ignored in order that they may be depicted on one and the same individual image.

2. The concept, which is common to a number of objects of thought, is something precise, definite, distinct, capable of analysis.

The phantasm, which represents a number of objects of thought, is something vague, indefinite, indistinct, incapable of exact analysis. It fades away before our attempts to analyze or define it. We can explain and define our concepts or ideas of triangles, but if we attempt to explain and render definite our picture of triangles, we find ourselves confronted with triangles of all sorts and descriptions dancing about before the eyes of our imaginations, some right-angled, some obtuse-angled, some acute-angled, some equilateral, some isosceles, some scalene. The picture is all, and yet none of these, utterly dim and uncertain, and existing only in virtue of its dimness and uncertainty. The larger the class of objects which this picture present to the imagination has to represent, the fainter and more indistinct does it become, until at length it fades away into space altogether. Thus we can form a sort of common picture of *man*, which stretches, as it has a sort of reality; but our picture of animal, which is to represent at once men and brutes, can scarcely be called pictures at all, while for living thing, which is to confine together the monkey of the animal and vegetable creation in a common picture, we cannot produce any respectable phantasm at all.

3. The concept is not interfered with by minuteness of detail. We can form as distinct and accurate an intellectual concept of an octahedron or dodecahedron as we can of a triangle or quadrilateral figure. We can argue with no greater difficulty about the number of degrees in the angles of the more complicated figures, or of any other of their distinguishing characteristics, than we can about the number of degrees in the angles of an equilateral triangle or a square.

But the *phantasm* becomes gradually more difficult as it becomes more complicated, until at last it becomes a thing impossible. We cannot imagine a dodecahedron with any sort of exactness. We can picture it only in the vaguest way. We cannot distinguish at all in our imaginations between an eicoshedron (or figure of twenty sides) and an eicosimiahedron (or whatever the name for a figure of twenty-one sides may be). When we attempt to imagine a figure with a much larger number of sides, say a myriahedron, or figure of ten thousand sides, we cannot for the life of us see any difference between it and a circle, unless, indeed, we have seen it drawn on an enormous scale.

4. The concept is peculiar to man. No brutes can form any ideas in the true sense of the word. They cannot rise above the world of sensation: they have no appreciation of the spiritual and the immaterial, and no faculties which can enable them to apprehend them—their knowledge is simply a knowledge of phenomena. They have no power whatever of perceiving the universal under

the particular. They cannot idealize. They cannot attain to any knowledge of the universal.

The phantasm, on the other hand, is common to men and brutes. A dog can form a very vivid mental picture of some individual with whom he is familiar. When, during our sister's absence from home we said to her little toy terrier "Madge, where is Alice?" Madge would prick up her ears, look in our face, search the drawing-room, and finally run upstairs to our sister's room in anxious quest; when by a lengthened series of protracted sniffs beneath the door she had discovered that her mistress was not there, she would come back to the dining-room and lie down on the scrap of carpet provided for her, with a half petulant air as much as to say: "Why do you recall to me the image of one who you know perfectly well is not at home?" Every one who is familiar with the ways of dogs has noticed how during sleep all sorts of phantasms pass through their minds, often evoking outward expressions of surprise, or joy, or fear.

But animals have also certain common phantasms. A dog is able to form a sort of mental picture, not only of this or that rat, but of rat in general. The very word "rat" will often throw a little terrier into a perfect fever of excitement by reason of the common picture it summons up of many a rat happily pursued to the death. The smell of a fox at once recalls to the hounds not this or that fox, but fox in general, and there is present in their minds a vague phantasm representing a sort of common product of all their experiences of individual foxes.

It is this common phantasm which is so plausible a counterfeit of the universal concept that the whole of modern philosophy outside the Catholic Church has been misled into the fatal error of mistaking the one for the other, and of supposing that the gross, material, individual phantasm present in the imagination is identical with the intellectual, spiritual, universal concept present in the intellect.

We now pass to the uncongenial but necessary task of dealing with the aberrations of modern philosophers on this vital question, the importance of which it is scarcely possible to overrate. Just as in theology the central point of the "Reformation" of the sixteenth century consisted in the rejection of Papal supremacy, so in philosophy the new order of things. The philosophy of the "Reformation" had its point in the modern theory of the *concept* and of *conception*. It is not really new. Like all modern errors, it dates from pre-Reformation days, and is but an old fallacy refurbished and dressed up in new terms. But it never took root in Europe until it found a home under a congenial religious system, under which it grew and flourished, and to which it afforded the most

material assistance. Without this new theory the confusion between intellect and imagination, which serves Protestantism in such good stead in its resistance to dogma, would never have gained a permanent footing; without this the philosophical skepticism, which is the offspring of the "Reformation," would have been checked at its outset. It is this theory which, once adopted, is fatal to the consistent acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist. It is this which in its ultimate consequences renders belief in God impossible.

It is a universal subverter; little by little all rational belief, all religious dogma, becomes under its influence faint and feeble, and at last altogether disappears. All truth becomes subjective to the individual. All knowledge becomes relative. If men who number it among their philosophical opinions nevertheless still retain some positive beliefs, it is only because the human mind so rarely follows out an opinion to its final results, or because in contradiction to all reason it holds opinions which are irreconcilable with each other. This last alternative we see realized in a most remarkable way in the cynical philosophy of our modern "thinkers." The antinomies of Kant, the contradictory propositions which Hegel admits as simultaneously true, the despairing agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, the open infidelity of the materialistic school, are all based on one or other of the different phases of the modern philosophical heresy respecting the concept and conception.

We ask our readers to keep carefully before their minds the essential difference between the common phantasm of the imagination and the abstract idea abiding in the intellect. This is the talisman to keep the Catholic philosopher unharmed of the modern foe. This is the touchstone of a philosophical system. If the root is corrupt, the tree will be unsound and the branches rotten. If a system of logic at its outset neglects this all-important distinction, we shall find that it is infected with a disease which will affect it from beginning to end and render it unsound in almost every part of it.

We will take as our two representatives of the modern teaching on conception and concepts, two men who in most respects stand widely apart, Sir W. Hamilton and John Stuart Mill. The former states the doctrine generally held outside the Catholic Church, with great clearness and at considerable length. We will give for brevity's sake only an abstract of his exposition of it, and will refer our readers to the original, if they desire to obtain a more detailed knowledge of it. When a number of objects, he tells us, are presented to our sight, our first perception of them is something confused and imperfect. But as we dwell more carefully upon them and compare them together, one with the other, we find that in the

various objects there are some that produce *similar* and others dissimilar impressions. By the faculty of *attention* we fix our minds on the former of these, and by abstraction we turn away our thoughts from the latter. When we come to examine these *similar* impressions, we find ourselves compelled to regard them as not only similar, but actually the same. To use the words of Sir W. Hamilton, there are certain qualities in the objects "that determine in us cognitive energies which we are unable to distinguish, and which we therefore consider as the same." Having observed in succession a number of these similar qualities, and one after another identified them with each other on account of the undistinguishable character of the impressions they make upon us, we at length sum them up, bind them together into a whole, grasp them in a unity of thought, unite the simple attributes with the complex *notion* or *concept;* and inasmuch as each and all of the several qualities or attributes belong to each and all of the objects in which they have been observed, it follows that this common notion or concept which sums them up is the common notion or concept formed in our minds as belonging to each and all of these same objects. It is a *notion* inasmuch as it points to our minds, taking note of or remarking the resembling qualities of the object; it is a concept inasmuch as it is a synthesis or grasping together (*con capere*) of the qualities.[1]

We shall, however, make this process more intelligible by a concrete example: We are standing in a room in the Zoological Gardens before a cage containing a number of objects large and small, well looking and hideous, blue and gray and brown and black. As we watch one of them we observe in it movements which indicate life, and we mentally apply to it the attribute *living*. In a second we observe similar movements indicating the possession of similar endowments, and in a third and fourth in like manner. Though the life of the first is not identical with that of the second, nor that of the second with that of the third, yet the effects as observed by us are undistinguishable, and we feel ourselves compelled to regard all these objects as sharing in a common quality of life, and consequently to call them by the common name of *living*. As we continue to watch them, one of them seizes his neighbor by the tail and elicits a cry of pain; this cry of pain indicates the possession of what we call sensibility or feeling. A second receives from a visitor some highly esteemed delicacy, and gives vent to a cry of joy; and this sign of pleasure we attribute to a similar gift of sensi-

[1] Compare Sir W. Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, III. 131), whose words we quote almost verbatim.

bility. A third and a fourth show corresponding signs of pleasure or pain, as the case may be, and though we cannot say that the feeling of the one is the feeling of any of the others, yet we cannot help identifying in all of them the common quality of sensibility, and of each we say that it is sensitive or possessed of feeling. As our examination of the objects before us proceeds, we find in each of them other qualities which we call hairy, quadrumanous, imitative; each of the females suckles its young, each of them has a certain shape of body, to which we give the name of ape-like or pithecoid, until at length, our detailed observation over, we sum up its results in one complex notion which comprises in itself all the qualities we have observed. We bind together into the common concept *monkey* the various attributes, living, sensitive, quadrumanous, imitative, hairy, mammal, etc. We *apprehend* these various objects as monkeys, and bestow on them the common name in recognition of their common characteristics.

Such is the process of simple apprehension or conception according to the majority of modern writers. We do not think that any one can say that we have misrepresented it. At first sight it seems plausible enough. But the reader who has borne in mind the distinction between the sensible and material phantasm existing in the imagination and the abstract and immaterial idea existing in the intellect, will perceive how this theory labors under the fatal defect of confusing them together, or rather of ignoring the universal idea in favor of the common phantasm. It tells us to strip off from a number of individual phantasms that which is peculiar to them as individuals, and to retain only that which is similar in all of them. But when the process is complete, and these similar qualities have, by the transforming power of the human mind, been regarded as identical with each other, as not only similar but the same; when, moreover, these identical qualities have been gathered together into a unity of thought, into a concept comprising them all into a composite whole of which they are the component parts, the whole has its home in the imagination, just as much as the various attributes originally observed in the individuals. The only difference between the individual objects and the common concept is that it has lost the distinctive characteristics of the individuals, and by reason of this dimness and indistinctness is capable of being fitted on to all of them. It is not an independent object of thought, it is essentially relative and imperfect; it is no longer the essence of the various individuals, that inner something which is the subtraction of all their qualities. We cannot even think it until we supplement it with all the various qualities which render it an individual thing. We cannot think of monkey as such; we must refer our concept to some individual monkey of which we form a picture in

our mind. Hence the modern theory of the relativity of all human knowledge. Hence, too, the philosophical skepticism to which it necessarily leads is carried out to its ultimate conclusions. If all knowledge is relative, absolute truth disappears from the face of the earth. What is true to one man is not true to another. The identity of nature, which we attribute to the various individuals comprised under the common concept and called by a common name, is a pleasant fiction of the human mind and has no corresponding identity of nature in the individuals as they exist in reality. There is nothing but a certain similarity which we consider as identity because we cannot distinguish between the objects produced upon our cognitive energies by these similar qualities. The slovenly and inaccurate use of the words *thinking* and *thought* is one of the most fruitful sources of error in modern philosophy. Instead of being limited to intellectual knowledge, it is extended to every exercise of the inner faculties—sensible memory, imagination, attention, as well as to the acts peculiar to a rational nature. Hence the mischievous confusion between the nature of the lower brutes and of mankind. If a dog is capable of thought, he is also capable of *reasoning*, and has an intellect differing only in degree from that of man.

Thought is no longer the exclusive property of the intellect, but is concerned with the products of the imagination as well. It is true that a certain distinction is drawn between *thought* and *cognition*, on the one hand, and *representation* or *imagination*, on the other; but this distinction is an utterly inadequate one. It is explained as consisting in the manner of cognition, in the way in which the objects are known. The contrast between the immaterial faculty with which we *think* and the material faculty with which we *picture* or *imagine*, is certainly ignored. The contrast between the objects of thought which are essentially abstract and universal, and the objects of imagination which are concrete and singular, is in no way recognized. Thought is made out to be a process of the same faculty as *imagination*, and we think about exactly the same things as we have already pictured in our imagination, only in a different sort of way. Thus the gulf which separates the material from the immaterial is entirely ignored, and the fundamental confusion which is the necessary result extends itself to every part of the systems which, outside the Church, have succeeded the clear and consistent teaching of scholastic philosophy. But as yet we have been considering only one of the leading schools of English philosophy at the present day, the one which, strange to say, represents the more orthodox section of modern philosophers, and this in spite of the utter skepticism which is virtually contained in the fundamental doctrine from which it starts. The weak points

which it presents are attacked with great vigor and success by what we may call the wise school of John Stuart Mill. We are not concerned with the dispute, but simply with the counter theory, which we may call that of the modern school of nominalists, according to which the process of simple apprehension, or rather of the formation of complex ideas, takes place as follows: We suppose ourselves, as before, in the same house in the Zoological Gardens; we fix our minds on a certain group of attributes in one of the objects before us, and banish all the rest. Living, sensitive, mammal, quadrumanous, hirsute, imitative, pithecoid, etc., these are the attributes which attract our attention. These we stereotype under the name *monkey*. We are thus enabled to argue about them as if there existed a corresponding entity which had these attributes only and was endowed with none of the accidental characteristics of individual monkeys. In another of the objects before us we observe another group of attributes which makes upon us the same impression as those already enumerated, and we say to ourselves, this, too, is a monkey. In a third and a fourth case the same process is repeated, and thus we form a class of monkeys and include under it all those objects which possess the attributes aforesaid. There is nothing really common in the individuals that form the class save only the *name*, and the upholders of this theory point out with good reason the inconsistency of the conceptualist doctrine, which makes concepts play so prominent a part in the whole of logic. Thus all the time its upholders confess that a concept is always something *relative* and has no existence apart from the concrete imagination of which it forms a part.

The nominalist theory is, it must be confessed, more consistent than that of conceptualism, but at the same time it is more directly and immediately skeptical and produces under its specious exterior the same distinctive fallacy as its rival. It is important that we should have this fallacy very distinctly before us, lying as it does at the root of the whole system and vitiating it from first to last. Mill and Bain, and the nominalist school generally, tell us that we are to select a group of attributes from an individual, and to bind them together by means of a common name. But what is to guide us in our selection of the attributes? Their answer is that we are to choose those which are similar in a number of individuals, and which, therefore, make upon us the same impression.

But what is the origin of this similitude? Why is it that we cannot help recognizing in a number of objects what we call common properties? We imagine that all would admit that it has at least some foundation in the objects themselves. If the impressions on our senses, which we are compelled to regard as not only similar but the same, represent no corresponding qualities with objects the

identity of which we recognize, it is merely something subjective, a mere delusion by which we deceive ourselves without any counterpart in the objects, then our senses can be in no way trustworthy, and we soon arrive at a self-contradictory skepticism. Both nominalist and conceptualist desire to avoid this conclusion from their premises, and they therefore concede a certain likeness between one and another of the objects around us, which is the cause of the impression they make, appearing to us to be the same. But in what does this likeness consist? To a scholastic logician the answer is simple enough. The objects, he tells us, are alike, inasmuch as they possess the same nature and are made after the same ideal or pattern. There is the same form in all of them. The common name of *monkey* is given to a number of individuals because they have one and all the common form or *nature* of monkey. The common ideal (or concept) of monkey is not picked up from the mere observation of a number of the class of monkeys. It represents something which exists really and truly outside the human mind, an intellectual entity which is quite independent of the individuals. This entity stamps its stamp, so to speak, on all individuals; and the human mind by a sort of rational instinct, recognizes at once the common mark or type wherever it exists. The intellect claims it as its own, transfers it into itself, abstracts it from the individuals, not by shaking off some of their attributes and leaving others, but by the power it possesses to extract the immaterial form from the material object in which it is realized. Not so the conceptualists. They would tell us that what we call a common idea or concept has no reality whatever apart from the mind, that it is the mind that creates it, and that it has no sort of existence outside the creative mind of man. The nominalist goes still further and says that there is no such thing as a concept at all, but that the bundle of attributes common to a number of individuals that it is supposed to represent are but the selected attributes on which we choose to fix our attention, to the exclusion of all other attributes. The attributes which form the bundle are, in their first origin, and always remain, individual attributes. The fact that others similar often are found in other individuals does not alter their character. All, therefore, that is common about the bundle we have found is its *name*, which is applicable to all the individuals contained in it, as well as to its original possessor.

Thus the nominalist abolishes the very notion of anything like universality in the concept or idea that is the result of simple apprehension. All that is universal is the name. Here it is that he breaks with the conceptualist. The latter at least keeps up the theory of a universal concept applicable to a number of individuals,

even though the mere fact of its being relative to each of them destroys any claim on its part to true universality: he still asserts the existence of *ens unum in multis*, one and the same thing found in a number of individuals, even though its unity is merely a factitious one, brought about by the action of the faculty of generalization, which enables us to regard the sensibility of one ape as one and the same with the sensibility of another. The nominalist, more consistent and thorough-going, does not attempt to keep up the sham of the universal. "Your concepts," he says to the conceptualist, and he says so very rightly, "are but the shadow of a shade, a convenient stalking horse of which, however, a closer examination shows the utter unreality. Why not throw over the delusion and frankly confess that universal names are but a sort of abridged notation very convenient for practical purposes, and as a means of classification, but having nothing really corresponding to them for the objects for which they stand?"

But nominalist and conceptualist alike leave one question unsolved. What is it guides us in the process of classification? What is it enables us to regard as the *same* the different attributes found in different individuals and to give them a common name? I imagine that the answer that both nominalist and conceptualist would make, would be that these attributes, though different, nevertheless so resemble one another that they produce upon our senses indistinguishable impressions. But if we pursue the question and ask them whether similarity is possible without identity, whether any two objects belonging to the same order of things can be *alike* without having something in *common*, whether language does not cease to have any meaning if resemblance does not imply a certain unity of nature, nominalist and conceptualist alike would find it hard to make any satisfactory answer. We shall see as we proceed what the true doctrine of universals is. We are at present concerned with it only so far as it affects the doctrine of simple apprehension. We are considering what is the underlying fallacy which vitiates the theory of conception or simple apprehension as put forward by post-Reformation philosophers, and leads them into the abyss of skepticism into which they are forced by the inexorable power of an unpitying logic. Their weak point does not consist merely in their confusion between the phantasm of the imagination and the *idea* of the intellect. This is the central error of modern logic, but it has a twin-brother in metaphysics no less subversive of truth. The radical and fundamental mistake of modern metaphysicians consists in the supposition that it is possible for two objects to resemble each another without having some *fundamentum in re*, something truly and really common to *both of them in*

which this resemblance has its origin.[1] The metaphysical error is, however, very closely connected with the other errors we have enumerated above as introduced into the modern doctrine of simple apprehension. It is because Hamilton and Mill alike fail to recognize identity of quality as the basis of resemblance that they fall into the blunder of confusing together the material phantasm and the immaterial idea. If Hamilton and his followers had clearly perceived that in each and all of the individual objects which are classed together there must be, in virtue of their mutual resemblance, some one or more common qualities existing in each or all, and the same in each and all, they would have seen how the common phantasm arrived at by stripping the individual of his individual peculiarities could never furnish qualities common to the various individual members of the class. In the same way, if Mill and his disciples had borne in mind that the group of attributes on which they fix their attention in the individual are from first to last individual attributes inapplicable to other individuals, and incapable without some further process of a name which is really common, they would not have fallen into the error of attempting to classify without any real basis of classification.

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[1] Aristotle defines similarity as unity in some quality, and distinguishes it from identity, which consists in unity of essence. Hence two things that are alike must have some one quality which is one and *the same* in both. It is not enough that they should have similar quality or qualities, and that the mind should have the power *of regarding this* SIMILARITY *as* IDENTITY.

A PILGRIMAGE TO THE BIRTHPLACE AND CLOISTERED HOME OF THOMAS À KEMPIS.

Thomas A Kempis; Notes of a Visit to the Scenes in which his Life was spent, with some Account of the Examination of his Relics. By Francis Richard Cruise, M.D. (Univ. Dublin), late President of the King and Queen's College of Physicians in Ireland, etc. Illustrated. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1 Pater Noster Square. 1887. 8vo. 332 pp. Maps and plates.

TO the thousands upon thousands of Catholics who find through life so much to console and encourage them in the way of salvation in the pages of the "Following of Christ," it has, occasionally, seemed strange that the Church has never, in any special way, honored such a master of spiritual life as Thomas à Kempis, who is not to be found in the catalogue of the canonized or beatified, nor is even spoken of as venerable. The author of the work which says, "*Ama nesciri et pro nihilo reputari*—Love to be unknown and esteemed of no account," has certainly been gratified in his wish to be ignored. The ascetic work which outlived hosts of others, which, century by century, exercises its wondrous influence for good, seems entirely sundered from its author. It is one of the wonders of "The Following of Christ," as our old English Catholic name has always been, that it is the only spiritual book which the so-called reformers and their followers carried with them when they went from the Catholic Church into the outer darkness to become children of the mist. True, as they tore out and threw away part of God's revealed word, they tore out and threw away the fourth book of the treatise "*De Imitatione Christi*," but they retained the rest, and in the Providence of God the work has continued to teach its lessons of perfection in lands and homes where no other light of Catholicity entered.

The little work is extant still, in the handwriting of Thomas à Kempis, and had no question been raised as to the authorship, he would, doubtless, have been venerated as a saint, and even the great apostasy of the sixteenth century would have failed to obliterate devotion to him and lead many to his tomb to implore the intercession with God of one who knew so well how to lead souls to God, and has continued his work as the ages roll on.

But his authorship was disputed. The fact that the oldest known manuscript is acknowledged to be in his handwriting was declared to lack decisive force as evidence of authorship, because he copied

many works of others, and this was probably the work of some one else which he merely copied. The argument is weak, for Thomas à Kempis was not merely a copyist, but an author himself, a master of spiritual life, a director of young religious whom he formed to the true spirit in aiming at perfection. In those days, before the invention of printing, the student was, of necessity, a copyist. Even since the invention of printing, where books are prohibited or rare, a student must often copy not only manuscripts, but printed books which have become so rare that he cannot buy a copy at all or buy it *à prix foux*.

The first besides Thomas à Kempis to whom the authorship of the "*De Imitatione Christi*" was ascribed, was John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, a mighty man in his century, active in matters of state, religion and education, yet one who penned religious treatises which found their way to all pious readers of the times. This was especially the case with his "*Meditatio Cordis*," or "Meditation of the Heart." And in days when it was common to put several smaller treatises in one bulky volume, the "*De Imitatione*" and "*Meditatio*" were frequently bound together, and both were ascribed to the great and well known author of the "*Meditatio*." At the University of Paris his claim was held as a part of the rights and privileges of that learned institution. The question does not seem to have been critically examined, nor is it certain by whom Gerson's claim to the authorship was first advanced. St. Ignatius of Loyola and his companions in founding the Society of Jesus, were Paris-University men, and, as he used, in his rule, the word "Gerson" to mean the treatise "*De Imitatione Christi*," the custom of attributing the work to Gerson was disseminated by the order he founded. When the question came to be seriously examined, no authors could be adduced earlier than the founder of the Society of Jesus and his followers, who did not discuss the matter, but used the term common at the University of Paris. In recent times the claim of Gerson has found little favor, as no fresh evidence can be adduced in its support and very positive evidence against it.

Early in the seventeenth century another claim for authorship was put in at the court of public opinion. This was for John Gersen, Benedictine abbot of Vercelli in Piedmont. The theory was started on the finding of a manuscript of the "*De Imitatione*" in a Jesuit house at Arona on Lago Maggiore in 1604, at the end of which was written: "*Explicit liber quartus et ultimus Abbatis Joannis Gersen de sacramento Altaris*—Here endeth the fourth and last book of Abbot John Gersen on the Sacrament of the Altar." As the house had once been a Benedictine monastery, it was assumed that he was a Benedictine abbot, and a note in a printed copy at Ven-

ice gave him a site for his abbey at Vercelli. The Jesuit Father Rossignoli first put forward this claimant. The Benedictine order was not slow to maintain the theory thus advanced, and thus that ancient order became a champion against Thomas à Kempis. It laid claim to the "Following of Christ," the "Spiritual Exercises" of St. Ignatius Loyola, and the "Spiritual Combat" of Scupoli.

It was to ridicule these claims of the Benedictines that the Jesuit Father Hardouin put forward a work so learned and serious that few people saw the joke or could understand what he was driving at. He set to work to prove that nearly all the writings which are ascribed to classical authors were really written by Benedictine monks in the Middle Ages. He excepted Cicero, but he went into elaborate proofs that Virgil's "Æneid" and the "Odes of Horace" were purely Benedictine. His wit misled, as, in our day, the wit and learning of Father Prout, who translated several of Moore's melodies into Greek, Latin, Old French, etc., and then published in Fraser these pretended originals, charging Moore with arrant plagiarism. Would-be critics, like Mackay, took this as many took Father Hardouin, in sober earnest, and repeated the charge against the Irish poet, to whose genius Mahony really paid a tribute.

An early English edition of the work upholds the claim of Gersen. It is entitled "The Following of Christ, in four books, written by John Gersen, Abbot of Vercelles, of the Holy Order of St. Benedict. Drawn out of ten ancient manuscripts; some written above four hundred years ago, and set forth by the famous Abbot Caietan, Chronologist to Paul V., and dedicated to him and printed at Rome with approbation and general acceptation, 1644. Printed at London, Anno Dom. 1673."

The dispute as to the authorship is not our theme, and we have referred to it only to show why Thomas à Kempis has personally been so much neglected; at the same time it must be remembered that he died in Holland, which soon after the preaching of Luther embraced many of the new heresies, and where the Protestant party turned on the Catholics, who nearly equalled them in numbers, deprived them of religious liberty, and made war on everything Catholic. Of course, under such a persecuting rule, of which the Martyrs of Gorcum are witnesses, Catholic religious houses disappeared, churches were appropriated for Protestant worship, and all honor to great worthies of Catholic times and orthodox religion suppressed.

Men made pilgrimages to the tombs of men who had added treasures to the literature of the world, but few sought the grave of him whose right to the title of author of the "Following of

Christ has been most generally recognized, and from whose manuscript it was given to the world.

An Irish gentleman has just enriched our literature with the result of his pious pilgrimages to the spot where Thomas à Kempis labored and prayed. He calls his work "Thomas à Kempis—Notes of a Visit to the Scenes in which his life was spent, with some account of the Examination of his Relics."

It is in every sense a charming book, and affords English readers the best account of his life, his writings, the justice of the claim that he really wrote the "*De Imitatione Christi*," and the present condition of the scenes where his holy life was spent.

"As a pilgrimage to the localities wherein Thomas à Kempis spent his long and holy life may appear a somewhat unusual undertaking," writes Dr. Cruise, "I think it right to preface my account thereof by a short statement of the circumstances which led me to make that most interesting journey.

"From boyhood I was fascinated by the power and beauty of the wondrous book, 'The Imitation of Christ,' and even in my school days at Clongowes Wood my curiosity was roused concerning its authorship. I remember still, as though it were but yesterday, the occasion upon which my beloved master, the Rev. Joseph Lentaigne, S.J., first laid before me the story of the controversy anent its paternity, illustrating with his lucid mind and rich classical lore the main features of the dispute. His studies, always profound and accurate, had led him to believe that Thomas à Kempis was in truth the author of the book. As years went by my interest in the subject never diminished, and in moments of leisure I read all I could find to bear upon it; and I may truthfully add that in the study of the book and of the life of its gifted saintly author I have found many hours of rest and happiness amidst the wearisome labors of a busy, anxious life."

His travels were, therefore, not aimless, nor were they without being mentally equipped; he had a definite purpose, and his mind was so imbued with his subject that every road, and every stock and stone, had an interest and a meaning. What a pity the European trips of the Catholics from this country, amid the gay myriads who yearly cross the ocean, are not similarly motived! What fruit would they not gather for the devotional nourishment of their own hearts, and what might they not do to inflame the hearts of their fellow-countrymen? Some pilgrims reach Lourdes, a few Paray-le-Monial, still fewer the Holy Land; but who goes to visit the places hallowed by the life and labors of St. Teresa, St. Vincent de Paul, St. Bernard, St. Thomas Aquinas? There are localities in London associated with St Vincent Ferrer, St. Ignatius Loyola, as well as with great English saints, including

the recently beatified martyrs, but who seeks them out with pious reverence? Our fellow-countrymen who have no such religious association seek out with interest the very spots whose names are imprinted on their minds by the works of favorite authors. Surely American Catholics can learn a lesson from Dr. Cruise, and do better.

Our author sketches well the wonderful beauty of the "Following of Christ," and the tributes paid to it, not by saints and holy men of the Church only, but by writers in whom faith had almost become extinct. This Protestant appreciation was shown on this side of the Atlantic by the publication of an edition of the three books at Germantown, Pa.,[1] as early as 1749, and of the "Soliloquy of the Soul" at a later period.

He dwells especially on the characteristic of all the writings of Thomas à Kempis, which is apparent in the "Imitation of Christ," and that is not what can be called quotations from the Holy Scriptures, but the expression of a mind so imbued by devout reading and meditation on the Word of God that almost every idea, every sentence can be traced back to the Bible. You may mark sentence after sentence which seem almost quoted word for word, but you find in those between an echo of a well-remembered passage, which you see the writer had in his mind.[2] The "Three Tabernacles," "The Soliloquy of the Soul," "The Little Garden of Roses," and "The Valley of Lilies" show the same mind. Of these last two little works Catholics in this country fortunately have a translation.

Depicting the condition of Europe after the Great Schism of the West, our author next sketches the life and conversion of Gerard Groot, and his foundation at Deventer, with the aid of Florentius, of the society called at first "The Modern Devotion," but soon after by the name it long retained, "The Congregation of Common Life." The little community, in conformity with his wishes, was placed by his pious successor Florentius under the rule of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine, and the disciples of Gerard took a regular form in the monastery of Windesheim.

It was in this community, full of its pristine fervor, learned, laborious, prayerful and recollected, that Thomas à Kempis was formed to the spiritual life of which he was to be a master instructing the ages.

He was a German, born at Kempen between the Rhine and the Meuse, not far from Düsseldorf. His parents were John Hae-

[1] *Of the Imitation of Jesus Christ*, being an Abridgment of the Works of Thomas à Kempis, by a Female Hand. London. Printed 1744. Germantown. Reprinted by Christopher Sower, 1749.

[2] Dr. Cruise verifies about six hundred in the "Following of Christ." In an English edition which the present writer revised carefully by the Latin he introduced 459 references.

merken and his wife Gertrude, but on entering Gerard's community he was called from his birthplace Thomas à Kempis. The pious mother is said to have been a teacher of little children, and her training of her own sons may be seen in the fact that all three devoted themselves to the service of God. Born in 1380, Thomas at the age of thirteen went to Deventer and thence to Windesheim, where his elder brother John was already a religious. Dr. Cruise gathers from the writings of Thomas and other writers of the community a charming picture of his student life there, which it would be impossible to condense. After seven years of study at Deventer he proceeded to the monastery of Mount St. Agnes near Zwolle, where his brother John was prior. He entered in 1399, was invested with the habit at the close of a year's novitiate, and was ordained in his thirty-third year. Our author traces his spiritual life in the "Soliloquy of the Soul," the "Imitation," and the "Elevation of the Mind."

The diocese in which the Community lived was at one time placed under an interdict for refusing to obey a decision of the Pope. There was a general revolt against authority, but these good religious, and Thomas among them, withdrew to Lunenkirk, from which he returned to close the eyes of his pious brother. When the interdict was raised in 1432 Thomas à Kempis came back to Mount St. Agnes, where he remained till his death in 1471, filling important offices to the edification of all.

Dr. Cruise reproduces an ancient picture of this great religious. The original "is of great antiquity, possibly an original portrait. It is painted on oak and though very dark, is in wonderful preservation." He is represented sitting in the open air, the buildings of Mount St. Agnes in the distant background, while on the pages of a volume at his feet are inscribed the words: "I have sought rest everywhere, and never found it unless in a little corner with a little book."

Three manuscripts still exist in Thomas's handwriting. The first completed in 1441, contains the "Imitation," followed by several of his treatises. This manuscript of the great work has been reprinted in *fac simile* by the aid of the photograph. The second, bearing the date 1456, contains four treatises; and the third manuscript contains sermons to the novices, and the life of St. Lidewige.

His chronicle of Mount St. Agnes terminates with the notice of the death of a pious lay-brother February 12th, 1471; for the next paragraph, written by the religious who took up his pen to continue the history of the house, is devoted to the death of Thomas Haemerken, born at Kempen, who died on the feast of St. James the Less, in his ninety-second year.

Dr. Cruise gives a very satisfactory account of the dispute as to the authorship of "The Imitation;" but that question has, as Dr.

Cruise gracefully states, been already handled in these pages by a priest now deceased, a Father of the Society of Jesus.

Passing rapidly through Kempen in a railroad car inspired our author to visit the birthplace of Thomas à Kempis, and though years passed before he could carry out his pious wish, the resolution was better than many we make. He became an amateur photographer to fit himself for the work and set out in 1883. Cars at Cologne took him in two hours to Kempen. It "is nowadays a quaint little German town of some five thousand inhabitants,—cleanly, healthful, prosperous, and up to the present intensely Catholic." "It is not often," he writes, "that one sees, even on the Continent, a priest in full ecclesiastical robes carrying the Blessed Sacrament through the streets to the sick and dying, preceded by an acolyte with lamp and bell, the people kneeling down most reverently while the august procession passes. Here, however, that touching spectacle is of daily occurrence." We are at once prepossessed in favor of the birthplace of Thomas Haemmerkin. The gymnasium is in part the old castellated palace of the Prince Archbishops of Cologne; the Franciscan church and convent occupy the site of a former gymnasium, and a monastery of the Congregation of Common Life. In this church is a life-size painting of Thomas such as we have described. In the parish church dedicated to Our Lady, the traveller found in the vestibule another picture of Thomas, representing him kneeling in alb and cope before an altar. In this church the old choir stalls and frescoes still remain on which in all probability the boyish eyes of Thomas often rested. He is not forgotten. The site of the house where his parents lived and where he was born, was pointed out to the traveller, and his camera soon gave him its modern appearance. The almshouse occupies the site of the children's school in the olden day. In the Stadthaus is another, but poor and modern, picture of the great religious. Near Kempen is a plain old church dedicated to St. Peter, dating back beyond Thomas's day, and connected with him in the minds of the people.

The little German town has not forgotten the boy whom she sent forth "to do giant work in the vineyard of God, calling souls innumerable, in every age and country, to serve, love and imitate their Divine Lord and Master."

Encouraged by finding so much at Kempen to keep alive the memory of Thomas à Kempis, our pilgrim proceeded to the neat, thriving and prosperous Dutch town of Deventer.

The bustle of business and the clang of factories seemed to say, "you will find nothing here to remind you of mediæval religious buried in their silent cloisters; they knew nothing of business." But it was not so; he was taken to the Engel street and shown where the house stood in which Gerard Groot lived, and where

with Florentius he formed the plan of his community. The modern high school stands where stood the school which the German lad Thomas from Kempen attended. A street continuous with the Engel street, and called the Broedern street, led him to the Broedern Kerk, street and church being still called after the Brothers of Common Life, whose church and house occupied the site of the present church. In this church the skulls of Gerard Groot and Florentius Rædewyn are kept in a little glass cabinet on top of the press containing the vestments in the sacristy. Dr. Cruise, who mounted a ladder to view them closely, describes them as beautifully formed heads, indicating high intellectual capacity, and still in excellent preservation.

He found that the site of the house of Florentius was known, and in the church of St. Lebuin, now used by Protestants, he visited the place before the altar where Florentius was buried in 1400. Thus his visit to the scene of Thomas's schoolboy days was not unrewarded. But he hastened on to Zwolle, which he reached in an hour. Here there was much directly connected with the great master,—the Church of St. Michael, Mount St. Agnes, Windesheim, the oldest portrait and the relics of Thomas à Kempis. He was thus at the spot and amid the scenes where the venerable author passed most of his holy life. We can imagine the rapture of the pilgrim who had been prepared for the crowning enjoyment by his visits to Kempen and Deventer. The grand old Gothic church of St. Michael stood opposite the very hotel at which he took up his abode. To this church Thomas à Kempis came in 1399 when on his way from Deventer to Mt. St. Agnes, and he made his visit to obtain the indulgence granted by Pope Boniface IX. that very year. But the church where the pious boy received communion so devotedly is no longer Catholic; no one who reveres the author of the "Following of Christ" can, like him, receive there the Body of our Lord, which he has taught so many to receive worthily.

A drive through Thomas à Kempis street, and over a flat Dutch expanse, brought him to Mount St. Agnes, northeast of Zwolle, the home of the great religious for more than seventy years.

Reaching Agnetenburg, he walked up the hill to visit the site of the old monastery, now occupied by a couple of farm houses, a school, and the cemetery of Zwolle. On the spot where Thomas spent his pious life, where he imbibed the rich treasures of spiritual life which he infused into the "Imitation" and his other works, there is nothing now to remind the Catholic of the great master.

Four miles south of Zwolle is Windesheim, where the mother house of the Congregation of Common Life stood. It is now a hamlet with a Protestant church, the latter formed of the only remaining part of the ancient Catholic structure. In a room

adjoining the church are two old tablets on what was once the wall of the church where Thomas à Kempis must have said Mass so often.

On his return to Zwolle the learned Pastoor Spitzen showed him the famous Zwolle portrait of Thomas à Kempis, believed to have been taken during his life, old and faded, purporting to show him at the age of fifty-nine. At the church of St. Michael the Archangel the Pastoor Roelofs gratified his devotion by showing him "the sarcophagus in which is preserved the remains of the great Monk of Agnetenberg. This casket is a wooden box, some thirty-seven inches long by fifteen wide and twenty deep. It bears a scroll on one side neatly carved and inscribed with the words: 'Reliquiæ pii Thomæ à Kempis.'" The relics consist of about one-half a male human skeleton, including the skull, portions of the pelvis, the thigh bone, bones of the leg and arm, and some smaller; also fragments of textile fabrics, portions of vestments, and very old documents authenticating the relics.

Dr. Cruise carried the skull most reverently into the sanctuary, "feeling," he writes, "how unworthy I was even to touch it, and placed it on a little table in a suitable position," to obtain a photograph. It shows a high vaulted head, indicating a large development of the faculty of veneration. The brain must have been of more than ordinary dimensions. The lower jaw was taken by Cardinal Pitra to the great Benedictine Abbey at Solesmes.

"Far as I have wandered," he writes, "and often as I have trodden sacred places and beheld many relics, I can truthfully say that I never felt more deeply impressed than in beholding and touching those of Thomas à Kempis." This is not difficult to understand. If our reverence for one distinguished for holiness is proportioned to the influence he has exercised for good, where shall we find the equal of the great monk of Agnetenburg, whose saintly counsels and earnest teaching of the love and following of Christ stand preëminent and must last for all ages and nations until the end of time.

Our pilgrim feelingly adds: "One, and only one, painful thought crossed my mind. I could not but regret to behold this priceless treasure concealed in so humble a receptacle, now time-worn and covered with dust. I longed to see it placed, casket and all, in a more fitting reliquary, with a plate-glass lid through which its contents might be viewed. I spoke with the Pastoor Roelofs on the subject, and told him how willingly I should contribute towards carrying out this wish. I know many who will aid me, and possibly before long I may be instrumental in accomplishing this good work."

In his wish, and this good work, many readers will doubtless feel it a privilege to join.

Of the authenticity of the relics there can be little doubt. During the persecution of the Catholics of Holland, at the close of the sixteenth century, the religious were driven from Mount St. Agnes, and the buildings so completely demolished that only the faintest trace remains by which to detect the place they occupied. But the exact spot of the grave of Thomas à Kempis was preserved in records and kept alive by tradition. It was known to be seven feet east of the choir door. The prior who witnessed the demolition of his monastery confided to the pastor at Zwolle, in 1607, the knowledge of the place of the grave, and this information was kept with conscientious minuteness till 1672, when the town of Zwolle was taken by the Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Münster. The Elector ordered search to be made for the grave of Thomas à Kempis. Arnold van Waeyer, with the details in his possession, indicated the exact spot, saying: "If you find not the relics here, then further search is useless." But the search was not in vain. At the very spot pointed out the coffin of the great Thomas à Kempis was discovered. This was on the 10th of August, 1672. The remains were carried in solemn procession to Zwolle, and confided by the Elector to Pastoor van Waeyer, to be placed in St. Joseph's chapel, in the Spiegel Steeg. He directed a reliquary to be made for their safe custody, in which they were placed June 29, 1674, and it is that in which they still remain. When St. Joseph's Chapel became ruinous in 1809, the casket was removed to its present place of deposit, the sacristy of the church of St. Michael, in the Nieuw Straat.

No work that has appeared in our language will give the Catholic reader so much consoling and interesting information about Thomas à Kempis and the scenes connected with his life as this of Dr. Cruise. Yet it is, unfortunately, not a book likely to be reprinted in this country, and the imported copies are few and dear. The readiest way to obtain it would be to send a postal order for the price and postage to the publishers; but we trust the author will soon issue another edition at a price more likely to put it within the reach of the numbers of Catholics in this country who cannot fail to appreciate and enjoy his work.

In closing this article, it may not be out of place to add that one of the most important works[1] defending the claim of Thomas à Kempis, is from the pen of Mgr. J. B. Malou, late Bishop of Bruges, whose grandfather, after leading the Belgian armies against the Austrians, entered the Society of Jesus, and was for many years a zealous priest in New York city.

[1] Recherches Historiques et Critiques sur le Véritable Auteur du Livre de l'Imitation de Jésus Christ; Examen des Droits de Thomas à Kempis, de Gersen et de Gerson. Paris: Castermann. 1838.

INDIVIDUALISM AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP.

IN the ages of authentic history there has now and again cropped out, in one guise or another, indications of a desire for the realization of some undefined communistic ideal. Roman agrarianism, lasting for several centuries, was a definite movement under the influence and direction of this desire. The Golden Age delineated by poets, a time when man

"No rule but uncorrupted reason knew,"

included the conception of a communion in the use and enjoyment of terrestrial things.

The same ideal entered into the speculations of the Grecian schools of philosophy. Plato reasoned about a theoretical state of mankind, an ideal polity, in which absolute and universal communism was to be the rule. The now beatified Sir Thomas More framed his celebrated Utopia, a production which has added a word to language, upon principles similar to those of the Platonic hypothesis. He of course omitted the gross and intolerable errors which are included in the visionary project of Plato. The fruitless expectations of the Chiliasts, or Millennialists, are another indication of the same dominating desire or tendency. In our own day we have Mr. George's celebrated scheme for common proprietorship of the soil.

Such yearnings of the human heart have an adequate cause to excite them. It may be admitted that there is in our identical nature a certain propensity to some manner of life in common. The inclination often manifested to realize a theoretical and communistic conception of man's condition is, in its way and degree, a witness that he is now in a violent, or at least an uncongenial, state: a witness of the authenticity and truth of his primeval innocence, and of his subsequent fall from that happy and peaceful condition. For we are enduring an "exile in a valley of tears, banished children of Eve."

Although such are the promptings evinced by these recurring movements to establish an unexclusive and universal freedom and community in the possession and enjoyment of all the goods of the earth, it is evident that the end is unattainable, the hope chimerical.

But, in connection with these reiterated aspirations of the race for a method of life in common, it is well to remember the supreme

ideal which the Christian Church proposes for man's attainment. She has taught from the days of her Founder, and she will ever teach, that there is a higher and more excellent mode of life, which those who would be perfect and are able to adopt are counselled to follow, namely, her approved life in common, with voluntary poverty. Nevertheless, mankind do not compose a great monastic community. Of the ideal of communism it may be said that its only realization which is true and practical is in the religious orders of the Catholic Church. This is the method of living in common which was founded by our Divine Redeemer. It is a system for a chosen and limited few. "Non omnes capiunt verbum istud." The multitude of mankind must live by a different rule.

The Creator and Sovereign Ruler originally gave all the goods of the earth to men *in common;* for reasons of ascertained importance and manifest necessity to the general welfare, men have divided the stores of nature. They have authorized nations and individuals to acquire the exclusive ownership of particular portions. This was actually accomplished *jure humano,* by human law. Such is the admitted principle of sound jurisprudence.

The public mind has been directed to a consideration of land. Why was it made the subject of exclusive ownership? A brief examination of the reasons why will be useful. The best use of land is obtained when it is rendered most fruitful by careful, industrious, and intelligent cultivation. By dividing it amongst individuals, or giving to them a separate portion with exclusive ownership, the highest degree of cultivation is secured for the soil, and its fruitfulness is brought to the greatest perfection. Such is the avouchment of history and experience. The aboriginal Indians of the United States owned the land in common. They subsisted almost exclusively by hunting. A small tribe of them roamed over a vast area of country, and were ever, we may well believe, in a state of extremity for the absolute wants of the coarsest and commonest necessaries of life, raiment and food. Whereas, by the proper cultivation of the ground, the same area could be made to yield an abundance of all things for a great and numerous population.

In early days the colonization of Virginia had long been attempted. But one failure had followed another. Still, the colonists, some remnants of earlier bands and new arrivals, struggled on. They owned the land in common. At length a new and successful turn in affairs occurred, the reasons for which our historian, Mr. Bancroft, thus narrates: "The greatest change in the condition of the colonists resulted from the establishment of private property. To each man a few acres of ground were

assigned for his orchard and garden to plant at his pleasure and for his own use. So long as industry had been without its special reward, reluctant labor wasteful of time had been followed by want. Henceforward the sanctity of private property was recognized as the surest guarantee of order and abundance." (U. S., vol. i., A.D. 1611.)

And so, too, it was with the Plymouth Pilgrims. They verified the wise and prophetic words of Aristotle who, long before, had, with his accustomed accuracy, noted the evils resulting from systems of communism. "Such evils are manifest," he says, "from the methods of common proprietorship (*Κοινωνίαι*) practised by those who go out to settle a colony. For nearly all of them have disputes with each other upon the most ordinary matters, and come to blows upon trifles." (Polit. Lib., 2, c. 5.) The Plymouth Fathers were no exception to the rule thus sagaciously discerned by Aristotle. Their situation had become burdensome. With them, says Mr. Bancroft, "the system of common property had occasioned grievous discontents; the influence of laws could not compel regular labor like the uniform impulse of personal interest; and even the threat of keeping back their bread could not change the character of the idle. After the harvest of 1623 there was no general want of food. For, in the spring of that year it had been agreed that each family should plant for itself; and parcels of land in proportion to the respective numbers were assigned for cultivation, though not for inheritance. This arrangement produced contented labor and universal industry; even women and children now went into the field to work. The next spring every person obtained a little land in perpetual fee." (Ibid. Plymouth, 1623.) If among a handful of colonists the system of common ownership and occupancy of land was found to be so impracticable and disastrous, it follows irresistibly that the widespread and populous nations would experience the evils of such system to a degree beyond imagination and endurance.

Admitting that bounteous nature primarily bestowed upon mankind the earth with its plenitude of resources for their common use and well-being, it is evident that creatures so richly endowed with reason by nature and the author of nature would, in due time and as circumstances and conditions pointed out the way, seek a remedy and mode of escape from a state of things fraught with never-ending disputes, quarrels and tumults, being convinced that

> "Reason's whole pleasure, all the joys of sense,
> Lie in three words, health, peace and competence."

Nature's beneficent gift of land, the permanent spring of life-materials for all the countless generations of men, was never intended

to become the source of evils wholly unbearable and destructive of human happiness. Had separate ownership and occupancy never been established, the records of strife between individuals and nations over the possession of land or territory, even now so numerous, would have been increased a thousand-fold.

The bellicose principles of the philosopher Hobbes would have found almost universal illustration. An occurrence in patriarchal days is instructive. Abraham and his kinsman Lot shared their goods in common. But dissensions were on the point of arising between them. "Neither was the land able to bear them that they might dwell together, for their substance was great, and they could not dwell together." (Gen. 13:6.) The favored and venerable patriarch Abraham judged that it was expedient for himself and Lot to have their lands and other possessions apart. "Let there be no quarrel . . . . between me and thee. . . . . Depart from me, I pray thee: if thou wilt go to the left hand, I will take the right." (Ibid. 13:8.) Thus "the Father of many Nations" discontinued the practice of living in common with his own kinsman, the upright and "just Lot." The separation was necessary that each might have the undisturbed possession and peaceful enjoyment of his own. If even these holy patriarchs found it indispensable for harmony and mutual happiness and welfare to divide the land, and to institute separate and exclusive ownership of things, it is quite evident that the less favored of the race will not live together in peace, if their possessions, and especially if their lands, are owned in common. This is the result declared by universal experience, an experience which is based on the indisputable facts and principles of human nature as at present existing.

It has been admitted, though incorrectly, that Mr. George does not defend communism. It is true he does not maintain that false theory in its complete universality. That is, he does not advocate a scheme of common ownership which would extend to all the possessions of men. But he does maintain an absolute communism of *the land*. This is his chief and fundamental error reiterated in all his writings with the directness and eloquence of style for which he is remarkable. His leading principle, stated in his strong, unequivocal language, is this:

"In the very nature of things, land cannot rightfully be made individual property. This principle is absolute. The title of a peasant proprietor deserves no more respect than the title of a great territorial noble. No sovereign political power, no compact or agreement, even though consented to by the whole population of the globe, can give to an individual a valid title to the exclusive ownership of a square inch of soil." (The Land Question, Ch. 8.)

When the great and ruling minds of the race constructed their

irrefutable arguments against the impracticable theory of communism, they did not fall into the error of excluding communism of the land from the number of those false doctrines against which the cogent validity of their reasoning was directed. The arguments which demonstrate that, for cultured and populous nations, communism is a visionary project, also prove that it is, for the same nations, an unfeasible plan when applied to *real property*.

The profound scholastic philosophers examined by disputation the topic of exclusive ownership—*De Rerum Divisione*—until they completely exposed its metaphysical principles. Their reasoning, too, is comprehensively *universal*. It applies to all its legitimate objects, and it embodies the entire truth respecting all. For, these objects have an intelligible unity, and they are thence coupled by a logical tie. There is not, in the material objects of wealth themselves, any sign or other evidence declaring that they shall not be owned in common. The reasons which carry conviction to the mind that the various communistic schemes are not practicable, but on the contrary illusory, are not deduced from the intrinsic nature of the objects of wealth. These paramount reasons are derived from a consideration of the undeniable characteristics of human nature in its present state. Change the conditions of man's being, as would be done by restoring him to what the theologians call "A State of Innocence," and the reasoning against systems of common proprietorship no longer applies. Mr. George's arguments against the legitimacy, and even the validity, of exclusive ownership of land, are fully as cogent against exclusive ownership of other property, whereas he admits personal and exclusive ownership of other goods.

If it be granted that other objects may legitimately become private property, it is inconsistent to affirm that land should be owned in common. Although Mr. George's arguments are inconsequent and invalid, their weakness cannot be exposed by any process based on inconsistency.

A plan which cannot be reduced to practice, save by a violation of the rules of equity, public order and tranquillity, is clearly impracticable and unlawful. Communism of land is precisely such a plan. It is therefore unfeasible, and contrary to law and equity. Whether men be considered as living in civil society or under conditions preceding the establishment of States, it is equally true to affirm that exclusive ownership was actually introduced by their positive, or conventional rules. The land of the earth has, in all the great and enlightened nations, been distributed amongst individuals by public authority guided by equitable general laws. It was the law of the land which established and regulated its division. Particular persons were thus invested with the legiti-

mate and sole dominion of and over their allotted shares. And, although the right so obtained is of man's origination, it is nevertheless valid and inviolable. It imposes on others, by the rules of natural justice, the duty of respecting it. Analogy serves to illustrate. The mutual dominion of husband and wife is also of human origin. A wife belongs to her husband, and he to her, by virtue of their common choice or consent. Nevertheless, a profanation of the conjugal rights of either is opposed to the most elementary precepts of nature and reason. "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his house, nor his field, ... nor anything that is his." (Deut. 5 : 21.)

The practice of dividing the soil by an impartial general rule, so as to assign to individuals the sole dominion over specified portions of it, is universal among the leading nations of mankind. The comprehensive conclusion of men's combined reason, declaring that "the land of the earth should be divided," appertains to that species of human law which the Roman jurists styled "*Jus Gentium.*"[1]

It is law which comes down to us from venerable antiquity. It is in accordance with the dictates of right reason. Mankind in all ages from very primitive times have seen its expediency, and its peculiar necessity for well-ordered civil societies. To this law are referred the bringing into general use of ordinary buying and selling; the introduction of exclusive ownership of land and other property; and the establishment of many other fundamental institutions of organized society.

To attack the legitimate vested rights of individuals to the ownership of land, the most important object of property, would

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[1] These terms of Justinian jurisprudence have, in this paper, been translated by "The Common Law of Nations." To render them literally by "Law of Nations" would be equivocal, and understood to mean International Law, something widely different from the *Jus Gentium*. In Roman juristic philosophy, these Latin words are used to define certain general laws of equity and expediency. They prevail in all, or nearly all the nations of the earth by way of universal customs founded on identical and universal needs. The general conditions which give rise to them are everywhere similar. "Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes gentes peræque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium."

The excellent authority of the learned Jesuit, Rev. W. H. Hill, has been followed in using the phrase, "The Common Law of Nations." The student who desires to perfect his knowledge of this matter is referred to Father Hill's "Ethics, or Moral Philosophy." In that excellent work will also be found, luminously defined, the manner in which separate ownership in every species of property first originated; how it justly became vested in particular persons. The subject in all its important relations is discussed conformably to the methods of the old masters of thought and truth; that is, to the depth of its absolute and immutable principles.

William Whewell, D.D., in the "Editor's Preface" to his "abridged translation" of "Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace," says that the ancient Roman meaning of the expression, *Jus Gentium*, was, "*The Law common to most Nations.*"

be surely destructive of the peace, order, and justice whereby civil society preserves its existence. Were communism of the soil possible to be realized, its speedy and disastrous effect would follow. Rightful individual prerogatives may not be interfered with, save for recognized and real purposes of public necessity; and then, only by the proper authority acting by prescribed and lawful methods. The State has the right of eminent domain.

Yet there is another aspect of these reflections. The system of private ownership of land and other property is the product of human legislation. Could it not, then, be abolished by the same authority which brought it into being? It must be admitted that, speaking merely of what is within the absolute limits of human government and law, it could be abolished. Yet not arbitrarily. It could, if there were adequate reasons on account of which the public welfare required so radical a change, and if the abolishment of the system were effected by methods which would be equitable and legal, including the due compensation of expropriated owners. The case is extreme and hypothetical. These reasons cannot exist until the universal moral character of mankind be wholly transformed and elevated from its imperfect state. Human nature cannot, unless it be entirely transfigured, attain to those conditions which would render a return to common property in land or other objects practicable or expedient. To expect that such a change, such a consummation, will be brought about, is to entertain a hope which is simply chimerical.

Still, it must be conceded, by the requirements of speculative truth, that the abrogation of exclusive ownership would not be an act which simply exceeded the boundaries of human law. It would indeed be wholly beyond the range of men's legislation, did each person hold his particular possessions by a title vested in him immediately by the *natural law*. But this he does not. His title is a human title.

It was the *Jus Gentium* which decreed that it was expedient to divide the goods of the earth. The actual allotment of land and other kinds of property in equitable proportions to individual persons was regulated by the special civil laws of each country. "Dominium et prælatio introducta sunt ex jure humano." (St. Thom. Sum. Th., Q. 10 a. 10.)

No human law is absolutely unchangeable. Even the common law of nations, more stable than any other species of men's enactments, is not exempt from mutation. Instances are not wanting in which important changes actually occurred in the *Jus Gentium*. Anciently, it was in accordance with it for prisoners of war either to be put to death or made slaves, at the option of their captors.

But, by present international law, it is made illicit either to put prisoners of war to death arbitrarily or to make slaves of them.

Slavery has been gradually done away with by a change in men's manner of judging it; by greater refinement of the higher sentiments; not by any change in the manner itself which the law regarded, except as consequent upon the diversity wrought in men's ideas. Civilized peoples have also changed their judgment respecting the right to execute at will captives of war.

These are changes in the common law of nations proving that it is mutable, or that men can judge its principles differently at different times. It is by superior enlightenment that we now abhor some things authorized by the *Jus Gentium* in other days. It is because of better knowledge of the same matter; more definite and correct ideas of what is reasonable, becoming and humane. Our greater refinement and perfection of laws, correlative with the spread among us of highly cultured and humane feelings, have brought about the abolishment of property in human beings. The supernatural principles and influences of the Christian religion should also be present in thought to appreciate adequately the causes which, in the Evangelical periods, produce orderly changes in the direction of what is noble and beneficent.

Slavery is not in itself, or intrinsically, evil. The obligation of refusing to allow the practice of it is created and imposed on civilized peoples by positive, not by natural law. Consequently, it should not be concluded that, in introducing it, men were sanctioning or practising a system inherently wrong. Human laws, like everything else which is human, are of necessity variable and amendable.

It follows, therefore, that even the *Jus Gentium* is not necessarily immutable, as is the natural law. We find that what was once allowed by it is now contrary to it; and this, without any change in the matter to which the law pertains. Take the case of the prohibitory rule which once forbade the charging of interest on money lent, whereas the charge is now licit, the matter itself of the law having changed. For *capital* has altered the nature of money as representative of values, and has made a different object of it. Money is no longer merely what it was in the days of St. Thomas Aquinas, an object whose chief, if not only, function was to be a medium of necessary exchanges. It is now adapted to investment. The intelligence of men, as time went on, devised new commercial conditions not foreknown by the generations of the past.

It is true that the system of private property in land is directly contrived by man, not nature. Nevertheless, there is no valid reason for concluding, with Mr. George, that it should be abolished.

Far less is there any reason for supposing that the system is essentially "iniquitous." There are, on the other hand, positively fatal objections to absolute communism of land. For it is an impracticable scheme when intended as the universal rule. It is contrary to the established usages of all the leading and prosperous nations of the earth. The accumulated experience of all generations attests that, in the interests of peace, order, and abundance, the land, as well as other things, should be divided amongst nations and individuals, so as to give to them the exclusive ownership of their respective shares.

It is also a fundamental principle of Mr. George's reasoning that exclusive ownership can be legitimately acquired only by *labor* or *production*. "There can be to the ownership of anything no rightful title which is not derived from the title of the producer, and does not rest upon the natural right of the man to himself." ("Progress and Poverty," bk. 7, chap. 1.) Hence the importance which he attaches to the difference between land and other species of property. The latter is the result of human production; the former is the gift of nature.

Consequently, he deduces the injustice of individual and exclusive ownership of land, forasmuch as the soil is not the product of human industry.

Moreover, if exclusive individual ownership of the soil is intrinsically unjust for the reason that the individual person does not produce the land, so must it be unjust for any nation to have exclusive ownership of the territory which they inhabit, and over which they exercise the sole proprietorship, the sovereignty and jurisdiction; for this particular part of mankind thereby excludes all the other nations of the earth from the benefit and use of that same territory. A nation of men no more produces the land which it occupies than the individual produces the piece of ground whereon he dwells. The one as much as the other is the endowment of nature. And, if by any reasoning derived from the fact of non-production the title of an individual to land can be shown to be spurious and "iniquitous," by exactly similar reasoning can a nation's exclusive dominion over its territory be proved to be fictitious and unrightful. Mr. George, it would seem, does not decline to draw this conclusion: "Nor have I ever asserted, but on the contrary have expressly denied, that the present population of . . . . any . . . . country have any exclusive right of ownership in the soil, or can in any way acquire such a right." (The "Reduction to Iniquity.")

Thus does Mr. George hold the absolute communism of the land. His desire, indeed, to alleviate the evils of the suffering poor is generous and honorable. But the remedy does not consist

in attempting to disprove by a "reduction to iniquity" the right of private property in land. In affirming that the soil may not be divided and subjected to exclusive ownership, Mr. George attacks the fundamental principles of Christian jurisprudence, and ranges himself in opposition to the universal judgment of enlightened mankind.

The essay has been made to refute Mr. George's special theory of communism by maintaining that exclusive ownership of land originates in mere "occupancy." The individual is accordingly said to be empowered by natural right to appropriate vacant land just as he chooses, as to site and quantity. Society, it is held, is not free to refuse its ratification to such exercise of dominion by the particular person. It is even the *duty* of public authority to declare the validity of the individual's act. But the governing power has no right to limit or define the quantity of land to be "occupied" or "appropriated" by any human being. This is wholly within the scope and exercise of indefeasible personal rights. Any limitation set to them, any determination of their range by the power which represents all the people, would be an arbitrary usurpation of inalienable individual liberty.

So runs the theory. It is evident that the will of the supreme authority in society is, by these principles, subordinated to the will of each individual. This theory has therefore been styled very aptly the theory of "absolute individualism." It is the unconditional autonomy of the particular person. He is a law unto himself. Is he not, *sui ipsius*, *sui juris*, possessed of dominion over self, invested with the complete ownership of his own free operations? The individual will is the last rule of action, to the exclusion of any equitable public law framed for the general good and the protection of the common rights of all. "Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas."

But notwithstanding all this, the principle is indubitably as well as metaphysically true that the common good of an entire people is an object of greater solicitude and moment than the good of a single individual. "Bonum multitudinis," says St. Thomas Aquinas, "majus est et divinius quam bonum unius." But by the doctrine of individualism even the right of any one person is made to transcend the rights of all the persons composing the whole community or nation. Indeed, the aggregated rights of all mankind would be as nothing compared to the paramount prerogative of any individual man. Supreme civil power would be in abeyance before the arbitrary and still more authoritative power of the individual. This theory accepted in practice would operate to the utter extinction of human society.

Communism is not *per se* opposed to the natural law. It would

even be practicable if man were in the state of innocence in which he was originally constituted. But absolute individualism is directly contrary to the principles of natural justice and equity. It would not be possible in any plan of human society. To answer the tenets of absolute communism by the assertion of absolute individualism, is to pass from the denial of one extreme error to the affirmation of another even more untrue and fallacious.

The theory of "Occupancy" does not recognize any authority in civil society to regulate the appropriation of land by an individual. If occupation solely and primitively creates exclusive ownership, then a single individual could legitimately appropriate, and claim as his own, an entire district or country. He could, consequently, make all later comers to the same region his dependents, impose upon them at his arbitrary discretion what terms he listed, however onerous. For his title, *ex hypothesi*, came not through human law. It was conveyed to him by nature herself. *Jus est primi occupantis.*

It is easily perceived that this reasoning runs counter to the principle that nature originally donated the land of the earth to men in common. She gave it to all, not to each. Antecedently to human law, and the division thereby made, each person had a right to an equitable share in the same land. It is not consistent with equity, and it would be intolerable in practice, that an individual should be the last judge in his own case concerning that which equally involves the rights of others. The theory of occupancy constitutes the individual the sole arbiter of his own cause, with the right to decide against all others equally interested with himself.

The same theory falsely applies the maxim of human law, "*res nullius est primi occupantis.*" For land is not "*res nullius*," an ownerless thing. Neither has nature clothed any one with the right to appropriate it at his absolute discretion. Were such the case, land would be, by its very nature, positively common property, whereas, in truth, it is by gift of the Creator common only *negatively*.

It is a principle of demonstrative reasoning that, primitively, the soil of the earth is owned by mankind *collectively*, not singly or individually. It, therefore, requires their tacit or express consent, in the natural sequence of things, before it may be legitimately divided, or reduced to the exclusive possession of any.

The individual is not, and cannot be, the entirely adequate cause which originates private or particular ownership of the things which nature gave to men collectively. The requisite power for this must ultimately be lodged in all to whom the gifts were made. And they were made to all. Mankind, by common consent, express or

tacit, have authorized a division. Exclusive ownership is not prescribed immediately by the natural law. To affirm that it is, is to attribute to the individual a fictitious all-sufficiency for an act which can legitimately proceed only from a public representative body. For a regular assemblage of all, or of the representatives of all, alone can exercise the authority to legislate for the entire collection respecting things related equally to each person of the multitude. Were the individual thus self-sufficient, then must he also have a congenital right anterior to all the laws of men, an inherent moral power to seize to his own use at will the goods which, previously to human legislation, are the exclusive property of none, though the common store of all.

Such is individualism. Mankind have never conceded, and it is clearly impossible for them ever to concede, that the individual is vested with any such prerogative of self-sufficiency, any such imaginary congenital right. Nor will mankind ever admit that nature's endowments to the race may be divided and reduced to the separate possession of individuals by a method so dangerous, so arbitrary and so inequitable. The admission of the principle and its practical operation would result in endless dissensions, sanguinary tumults and universal discord, presaging the total annihilation of civil society.

The same theory bases the origin of exclusive ownership of land upon an indeterminate condition, or an accidental circumstance; that is, upon mere "occupancy." It does not define what land may be "occupied," nor where, nor how much. And it denies all power in the public authority to determine these things. For the individual is rendered simply autonomous.

The defenders of individualism falsely identify "The Common Law of Nations" (*Jus Gentium*) with the natural law. Yet these two great fundamental laws, on which together rests the fabric of human rights and institutions, are, in reality, distinct and different from each other. But, even if they were identical, it would still be false to say that the particular rule by which a division of the goods of the earth was everywhere actually made, was not a human law. "*Rerum divisio facta est jure humano.*"

To maintain that civil government sprang from individuals ceding their personal liberty and rights for the general good, is to assume that man is a social being, not by the law of his nature, but by voluntary choice. That human society validly possesses the authority and the power to rule by righteous laws, does not spring from, nor is it dependent upon, the volitions of men.

The fanciful "social contract" of Rousseau has no legitimate matter save in this, that particular polities and special forms of government are devised by human wisdom for the general good,

and are imposed upon, or rather deliberately chosen by, the people comprising such and such portions of mankind.

Man is, by a principle of his being, gregarious. He is naturally a "πολιτικὸν ζῶον." To conceive him as in "a state of nature" which is extra social, is to conceive him as he is not: as inferior, or else superior, to man, "ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός." His real state of nature is a condition of political companionship with others of his kind. In the absence of other beings like himself he would, for extrinsic reasons, be unable to exercise his functions as a member of society. But the principles of his nature would be the same. He is intrinsically social. In organized society under a definite form of civil rulership individuals rather acquire rights than give up any.

Thus was it, relatively, as to dominion over the goods of the earth. Individuals rather got possession of than abdicated rights, when they were invested with legitimate authority to become exclusive owners of particular things.

It may be concluded, then, that the theory which claims to found exclusive ownership of land on "occupancy," or, in other words, the theory of "absolute individualism," leads to inconsistency and absurdity. It is a species of *radicalism* which attacks the root or first principles of human society by denying an essential prerogative of social authority, namely, its power to determine and protect individual rights of property.

Communism is, indeed, a false theory. But its valid refutation cannot be founded upon the tenets of individualism.

The nations of the earth were made "for health"; they have never yielded assent to the principles of communism, nor have they ever accepted as true that the purely fortuitous fact of "occupancy" is, of itself, sufficient to invest the individual with any true proprietorship of land. It is the universal teaching of the highest theological authorities in the Catholic Church that the true, safe, and expedient rule for mankind to follow as regards the possession of property is that of exclusive dominion. It is the rule which is the most efficacious and conservative of the general weal. Its known subserviency to the ends of public utility is not a discovery peculiar to Christian times; it is a valuable inheritance of most venerable antiquity. Passing by more ancient testimony, the following is the deliberate judgment of Aristotle:

"Community in the ownership and management of property is beset with inconveniences. But the manner of life which is now established (*i.e.*, the personal and exclusive ownership of things), more especially when accompanied and embellished by good morals and a system of just laws, is a condition far superior and greatly to be preferred. Indeed, the latter mode with its ameliorations embraces also whatever advantages would attach to the plan

of common or undivided possession. Property in some respects ought to be common, but in the main separate, private, and personal. For, when each man's time and attention are given to his own particular concerns, there will scarcely ever be room or occasion for mutual complaints. Furthermore, prosperity will flourish and increase for the reason that each individual applies himself more assiduously to amplifying and improving his own possessions." ("Polit. Lib.," 2 c. 5.)

THE APOSTLE OF ALASKA.

"ARE not the Indians the least of the brethren of Christ? The least—yes, the poorest, the most ignored, and the most despised. Blessed those who contribute to the work of their edification and sanctification." Thus, from the heart, spoke the saintly Archbishop Seghers, in the Cathedral of Baltimore during the Third Plenary Council. Far more blessed, then, is he who lavished his labors and laid down his life for these least ones of Christ. The text of this same discourse brings us comfort in the irreparable loss the mission of Alaska has sustained: "*Wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly.*" (Wisdom viii., v. 1.) We can but bow our heads before that wisdom which first inspired Charles John Seghers to devote his life to the salvation of the Alaskan Indians, and then, in the very outset of their evangelization, allows him to be stricken down by the hand of a friend. Had the murderer been a savage, there would be no doubt that the Archbishop had won a martyr's crown. Not even this consolation is ours, yet "wisdom ordereth all things sweetly," even though no martyr's aureole adorn his brow.

The lamented Archbishop was born in the quaint old Belgian city of Ghent, on December 26, 1839. Was it a presage of his fate that his birthday fell on the feast of St. Stephen, the first martyr? Two days later, in St. Martin's church, he was given the names of Charles John Baptist in holy baptism. On May 30, 1850, when eleven years old, he received his first communion and confirmation from the hands of the Rt. Rev. L. J. Delebecque, Bishop of Ghent. His parents, Charles Francis and Pauline Seghers, died when he was quite young; but, as they were in easy circum-

stances, their son had the advantage of an excellent education in the famous College of Ste. Barbe, in his native city. Having finished his course of preparatory studies with success, his gentle and pious nature led him to choose the sacred ministry for his profession, and on October 1st, 1858, he entered the diocesan seminary. On the 18th of June, 1859, he was tonsured, and in the three following years received respectively the minor orders, subdeaconship, and deaconship, in the Cathedral of St. Bavon, in Ghent, from the same bishop who had given him his first communion and confirmation. Feeling himself called to an apostolic life, he left the seminary on August 9, 1862, the day on which he was ordained deacon, to finish his studies in the American College at Louvain, where he could better prepare himself for missionary labors in America. Finally, at Mechlin, on Saturday of Whitsun-week, May 31, 1863, he was raised to the priesthood by his Eminence Cardinal Engelbert Stercke, Archbishop of Mechlin, and on Trinity Sunday offered for the first time the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. In a *totum* breviary given him by the Rev. J. de Nève, V. G., and Rector of the American College, we find the inscription, "Argue, obsecra, increpa in omni patientia et doctrina." (II. Ep. S. Paul to Tim., iv., 2.) Words of counsel which he strove to fulfil to the letter, and with what success all who knew him can testify. The diocese of Vancouver Island, B. C., which he selected for his field of labor, was, humanly speaking, one of the least attractive and, at the same time, one of the most laborious missions. Vancouver Island is nearly three hundred miles in length, with an average width of thirty miles. The population consists of whites, who dwell chiefly in the towns of Victoria, Kanaimo, and Esquimalt, and in the settlements of Saanich, Cowichan, and Comox, and of Indians, who number about eleven thousand. Here there was a field, ample, indeed, and awaiting the harvester, whose devotion, self-sacrifice, and zeal led him far from his native Belgium to preach Christ crucified to those who had never heard of His saving cross. He knew of their spiritual destitution from their saintly bishop, Modeste Demers, and offered himself for work, hard work, with no alluring prospect of a martyr's crown. His studies completed, nothing now detained him, and so he set sail on the 14th of September, 1863, the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross—a fitting birthday for his apostolic career. In these days of rapid passage and inter-ocean railroad connections, it is hard to conceive the difficulties of travel twenty-five years ago. Now, one might make the journey in wellnigh two weeks; then, it took as many months. So the young missionary started for his far-off island of the Pacific, by way of the Isthmus of Panama. He reached Victoria, V. I., his destination, on the 17th of November

(1863), and received a welcome such as only a bishop who has a vast field with a multitude of souls to be saved, and but few laborers, can give to a new apostle. The venerable Modeste Demers saw in Fr. Seghers a man after his own apostolic heart, and felt that he could lay upon these young and willing shoulders a portion of the burden that was crushing him. Of the early years of Fr. Seghers' priestly life no better account can be given than the words of his bishop, spoken in the American College at Louvain: "There may be an equally good priest on earth, but I do not believe there is a better one." What sacrifice, devotion, and zeal underlie these few but pregnant words! When Fr. Seghers came to Vancouver Island the diocese was in disorder; even the Sisters wanted to leave. For the Oblate Fathers, who had hitherto assisted the Bishop and cared for the Sisters, had been called away to labor in the newly-established vicariate apostolic of British Columbia, lately committed to their congregation. Bishop Demers appointed the new-comer chaplain to the Sisters, and under his care they soon became a model religious community, who for contentment, regularity and observance could not be surpassed. Such love of rule and religious life did their new spiritual director instil into their hearts. Fr. Seghers was stationed at St. Andrew's Cathedral, in Victoria, first as assistant and afterwards as rector. He remained in active charge until December, 1867, when he began to spit blood. He always administered the temporalities of the diocese in the absence of the Bishop, while Fr. Joseph Mandart held the office of Vicar-General. It was Fr. Seghers that established the first missions on the west coast of Vancouver Island. The occasion was the alleged murder of a shipwrecked crew. In consequence of this, a gunboat went in the year 1869 to a place called Hasquiat, to hang two Indians. The young missionary, who had instructed them in prison and baptized them, went with them to the scaffold. There he saw thousands of Indians plunged in utter barbarism, without ever having seen a priest, though living within a few hundred miles of Victoria. This was too much for his zeal, and he determined to help these benighted people. But a severe hæmorrhage prevented the immediate carrying out of this missionary enterprise. The critical state of Fr. Seghers' health filled Bishop Demers with alarm. By what means could he prolong so valuable a life? A summons to assist at the Vatican Council suggested the idea of giving the frail young priest the benefit of a visit to the Eternal City. The change of scene and climate might restore his shattered health. So the Bishop and Fr. Seghers set out for Rome. At a private audience in the Vatican Mgr. Demers presented the invalid to Pius IX., and begged a very special blessing for him, telling his Holiness that the poor diocese of Vancouver could ill afford

to lose so valuable a priest. The Holy Father gave the blessing most heartily, and assured the anxious prelate that the life of his protégé would be spared, for the Church had need of his services. He then alluded to a saying, common among Italian ecclesiastics, that a cleric who spits blood has already the Cardinal's red, by saying, jestingly, "You must not encroach on my privilege of making Cardinals."

After this Father Seghers seemed to recover strength for a while. This visit to Rome as secretary to Bishop Demers brings out the young missionary's capacity for study. Before he went to the Vatican Council he scarcely knew of the existence of the *Corpus Juris Canonici;* when he returned home he had acquired a thorough knowledge of Canon Law. On December 31st, 1870, Bishop Demers had a stroke of apoplexy which incapacitated him for any active work. This increased the responsibility and labor of the already overburdened Father Seghers. This strain brought on in the following spring a severer hæmorrhage than ever before. That he might be better cared for he was sent to the convent, as there was no hospital. There, however, he got worse, so that the doctor declared that his lungs were in such an alarming state that his death was only a matter of time. The naval doctors gave the same decision. Indeed, his appearance showed that his life was in imminent danger. On the 28th of July, 1871, Bishop Demers went to his rest after thirty-three years of missionary labors and after an episcopate of twenty-four years. When the sad news was cautiously broken to the invalid a pint of blood poured from his lips whilst tears streamed from his eyes. What a situation! The Bishop dead and the newly appointed administrator liable to smother in his own blood! All human remedies seemed powerless to aid him, yet he could not fail to see in what a sad state the diocese was about to be left. Some time before he had dictated a letter to Cardinal Barnabo asking him to obtain the Pope's blessing for him. From it he expected his cure. The Pope, he said, cured him once, he can finish the cure. The event warranted the confidence. For, as far as can be ascertained, Father Seghers ceased to spit blood about the very day of the audience in which the Cardinal asked the blessing. The petition was written and sent the 24th of July, 1871, four days before the Bishop's death. The following extract is translated from the Latin answer of Cardinal Barnabo to the Very Rev. J. J. Jonckau, in whose name the letter had been sent: "I hasten to notify your Reverence that our Most Holy Father, in an audience on the 27th of last August, willingly acceding to the request contained in your letter to me dated the 24th of July, deigned to impart the Apostolic blessing to the Rev. Charles Seghers with all his heart." Father Seghers,

who had such faith in that blessing, attributed his recovery to it. The doctors were nonplussed. They knew that it was attributed to prayers, but dared not say much about it, as they had openly spoken of his speedy death as certain. Overflowing with gratitude, Father Seghers wrote a letter of thanks to the Cardinal to be sent in the name of Father Jonckau, his faithful friend and now the administrator of the widowed diocese. The translation runs as follows: "I have received with a joyful and grateful heart your Eminence's letter of the 2d of September, in which you informed me that the Holy Father had bestowed the Apostolic blessing on the Rev. Charles Seghers, and the more so as it appears that the blessing of his Holiness has restored to health my beloved friend and fellow-laborer. I should have acknowledged your Eminence's letter before this, but I deferred doing so that I might judge more certainly whether or not my friend had recovered. I beg your Eminence to pardon this delay." This letter was dated December 18th, 1871.

Father Seghers' lungs were permanently healed, and never again did he spit blood, in spite of the severe strain to which he often subjected them. For instance, when he was collecting alms for the diocese in 1884–85 he sometimes lectured as often as six times in one day, the lectures lasting over an hour, some even an hour and three-quarters. Still his lungs held out. The blessing of Pius IX. had a lasting effect. That blood was reserved to fertilize Alaska! Having so marvellously recovered his strength, the young administrator devoted himself to his responsible office, and displayed in it such zeal and prudence that at a solemn consistory held in Rome, March 23d, 1873, he was appointed to fill the vacant See. Pius IX. had not forgotten the protégé of Bishop Demers. Charles John Seghers was at this time only thirty-four years old, and thus became the youngest of the American bishops. His episcopal consecration took place on the 29th of June, 1873, in the Cathedral of St. Andrew at Victoria. Now that the full responsibility of the diocese was on his shoulders, he began to organize it thoroughly. New missions were started, new churches and schools built, and the fine building known as St. Joseph's Hospital erected. On Easter Sunday, April 5th, 1874, he consecrated his diocese to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the solemn ceremony being performed in the Cathedral, Victoria, and in all the residences of the mission. Alaska was under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Bishop of Vancouver Island, but as yet no missionary of that diocese had visited the numerous Indian tribes in that almost unknown region. The youthful Bishop determined to be the pioneer of the Cross in Alaska. In the very year of his consecration he travelled to Sitka, the capital, and thence 1120 miles west as far as the Islands

of Kodiac and Unalaska, one of the Aleutian Isles. It so happened that while Bishop Seghers was journeying through the lower portion of the territory, Right Rev. Bishop Clut and Father Lecorre, O.M.I., were traversing the northern portion, not knowing to whose jurisdiction it belonged.

Though five years had passed since Father Seghers had visited the west coast of Vancouver Island in 1869, he had not forgotten the destitute condition of the poor aborigines. But ill health and over-work had hitherto prevented him from advancing their evangelization. Now as their chief pastor he hastened to supply their great need, and in 1874, accompanied by Father Augustus Brabant, he journeyed through the twenty-one villages into which the four thousand Indians were divided. In each village they preached the word of God and taught them the Catholic prayers in their own language, as well as several religious canticles. They also baptized 960 children under seven years of age.

The following year, with the same companion, he paid another visit to the west coast. To have an idea of what this implied, hear an extract from one of Mgr. Seghers' letters. "In passing from the camp of the Clayoquots to that of Ioucloulict we spent three days and two nights. We had to walk by day and sleep by night under a pelting rain. We had to clear ourselves a path through the brushwood, climb along cliffs, and jump from rock to rock. Our provisions were exhausted, and we were forced to pick up some mussels and eat them raw. Towards the close of the third day we reached Ioucloulict. It was time. Our shoes and clothes were in tatters, and we were nearly dead from hunger and fatigue." Yet he could see the humorous side of things, for he tells how an old man of the Machelat tribe had made himself a vest of an old flour sack, and bore on his back, in big letters, "*Imperial Mill.*" In this tribe he had the consolation of having the Indians ask permission to say the prayers they had already learned, and with one accord they made the sign of the cross, and recited, without missing a word, the Lord's Prayer and the Hail, Mary! Truly a good soil, in which they sowed more of the good seed by teaching them the Creed, the Commandments of God and of the Church. Such happy dispositions determined the Bishop to establish a permanent mission at Hasquiat on the west coast, and the missionary he selected was the one who had twice been his companion—Fr. Aug. Brabant. On May 11, 1875, this young priest took possession of a modest church and presbytery there. The whole tribe had been converted except the chief, Mat-la-how, who only simulated conversion. Small-pox, that dreaded scourge of savage tribes, broke out. By the precautions and care of their missionary, the deaths at Hasquiat were comparatively few, but among the victims were

the wife and the sister of the chief. The zealous priest tended them in their sickness, and after death buried them with his own hands. Mat-la-how feigned illness, and sent for the Father. Not suspecting any evil, he answered the summons. The treacherous chief, armed with a rifle, awaited his victim. To the inquiry, "what ailed him?" the answer came, "*memeloast*," meaning equally "*I die*" and "*thou shalt die*," at the same time raising the gun. Fr. Brabant turned aside his head, and stretched out his hand to seize the weapon, and received a charge of a dozen shot in his right hand. Distracted with pain, he rushed from the lodge to a stream to bathe the wound. The chief pursued and fired again; twenty-six shot lodged in the missionary's loins. The guilty chief fled to the woods. All the Indians of the camp rushed to aid the wounded priest. Fr. Brabant wrote the name Mat-la-how on a slip of paper, and sent it by ten young men to the Bishop. Twelve days later, Mgr. Seghers reached Hasquiat. To the intense grief of the Indians he bore away the wounded missionary to Victoria, promising, however, as speedy a return as possible. Mat-la-how could not be discovered by the officers who had come to arrest him. Seven years later, Fr. Brabant found the would-be assassin's bones, together with the rifle, in the woods to which he had fled after the dastardly deed. The good priest has revenged himself by educating Mat-la-how's little son with the intention of making him a chief when he becomes of age. This incident illustrates the truly fatherly care Mgr. Seghers had for his priests, going, as he did, himself to bring home the injured missionary.

Having established missions on Vancouver Island, the zealous Bishop once more set his face towards Alaska, for which he seems to have always had a predilection. In June, 1877, he started with Fr. Joseph Mandart, by steamer, for St. Michael's Redoubt, on an exploring expedition to plant the cross in the heart of Alaska. They selected the region of the upper Yukon River. The reason for the choice was that the Indians on the lower Yukon live in the neighborhood of the Russian mission. The Indians on the coast are said by the whites to be spoiled by their intercourse with whalers and given to the use of intoxicating drink. "Therefore," he says, "our field of labor will be confined to the interior of Alaska, particularly that portion watered by the grand and noble Yukon. What a magnificent river it is! Here at Nulato, 600 miles from its mouth, it is no less than three miles wide. Its length is estimated at 2000 miles. Having made up our minds to go to Nulato, and to push our way through the interior, the question arose—how shall we get there? The little stern-wheel steamer, which every year sails up the Yukon, had left a few days before our arrival at St. Michael's. The traders that get their provisions there

every year at the opening of the season, had left for their respective trading posts on the 3d of July, *via* the Yukon river. There remained, therefore, only the alternative of waiting, nobody knew how long, for some unexpected chance to sail up the Yukon, or of pushing our way through the Ulukuk portage, the only practicable one in summer. We chose the latter." They accordingly set out in a *bidarra* or skin-made canoe, entirely covered with the exception of a few holes to receive the occupants. A sail of eighty miles in twenty-four hours on the Behring Sea brought them to the Indian village of Unalakleet. Up the river of the same name they sailed to *Anouhtak*, where they landed and hired two Indians to carry their baggage across the *Perenoz* or portage to *Ulahuk*. There they encountered Alaska's scourge—mosquitos! "They are innumerable; their number is not legion, but millions and hundreds of thousands of millions. What a plague they are! One is involuntarily reminded of the third plague of Egypt, the celebrated *Sciniphes*. They unceremoniously drop into your cup of tea; they are uncouth enough to fall into your spoon before you take it to your lips. You open your mouth, either to speak or breathe, and half a dozen mosquitos sail into your throat, and give you a fit of coughing. We wrapped ourselves in our blankets; and having covered every inch of our bodies, we victoriously bade defiance to the bloodthirsty insects, and enjoyed a sound sleep until 3 o'clock the following morning. At 5 we were ready, and off we went, Fr. Mandart and the Indians each carrying a load proportioned to his strength, and marching through the *tundra* like soldiers ready to die or to conquer. *Tundra* is the name given to the marshy lowland of Alaska. It is overgrown with very soft and moist moss—so soft that at every step one sinks down above his ankles, and not seldom to his very knees. So you can imagine what a fatiguing march it was on a rising ground, and what amount of perspiration it drew from every pore.

"A word about our costume. Above our coat we donned the *Kamleeka*, which is a water-proof overcoat with sleeves, and a hood to protect the head, made of the entrails of seals. It is nearly transparent and very light, and as it has no other opening except a small hole to pass the head through, it reminds me of a chasuble. We wore gloves made of deer-skin, and boots without either heels or soles, also made of skin. Finally, a piece of mosquito netting to protect our faces gave us a most picturesque appearance. The hoods which the Indians have on their *Kamleekas* and *parkies* (overcoats made of reindeer-skin), and the manner in which they cut their hair, exactly like the monastic tonsure, would make one imagine that he is in a monastery of Benedictines. But this practice of wearing the tonsure is peculiar to the coast Indians." It

would be too long to follow them in their eighty-mile walk across the portage, crossing and recrossing creeks, making their way with great difficulty through thick brushes, deep ravines and tortuous defiles between high mountains, depending for food on the chance game they might shoot. What a consolation when they descried in the distance the placid waters of the noble Yukon, which looked more like a lake than a river. (The Yukon is said to be twenty miles wide in places.) The river reached, how were they to ascend it to Nulato? They were quietly eating some *yukali* or dried fish, which they had discovered stored away by an Indian called Tom, whom they afterwards met and paid, when one of the Indians shouted: "One canoe!" "We took it easy," says the Bishop, and continued our breakfast whilst the other Indian ran outside. They presently both returned with the shout: "Two canoes!" Undisturbed, we proceeded to satisfy our hunger with our *yukali*, when the Indians, having returned to the bank of the river to be on the lookout, suddenly came back with the welcome news: "One *bidarra!*" Then we could stand it no longer, but rushed out and beheld, at about a distance of four miles, a large *bidarra* sailing up the river and nearing the place where we were camped. It was one of the three traders that had left St. Michael's on the 3d of July, and was on the way to Nulato. Another of the traders was four days ahead, and the third some ten days in advance of the second. We applied for passage, were cordially received on board the *bidarra* with our baggage, and left for Nulato, a distance of some 120 miles from Lofka, their camp. During that trip, which lasted four days, our meals consisted of flour in the shape of flapjacks and *yukali*." Wearied out by hunger and fatigue, they reached their destination. Nulato has an ancient Russian fort, built of three houses with palisades, which give it a square form. It is now occupied by a Russian who trades for the Alaska Commercial Company, and several other whites. There are two large Indian villages near this redoubt. It is here that the Kayukuk Indians murdered Lieutenant Barnard, an officer of the British navy, in search of Sir John Franklin, besides two Russians and several women and children. A few crosses back of the fort indicate to the traveller their mournful fate and resting-place. "Here, then," says the Bishop, "is our centre of action. From here we intend to extend our sphere, and if we suceeed, here will, probably, be the mission of the first resident Catholic missionary of Alaska."

"The Nulato Indians appear somewhat more cleanly and intelligent than the Indians we have hitherto seen on the Yukon river. The Kayukuk Indians are said to be a fierce, savage, indomitable race, always breathing menace of death to the white man. This, of course, will not deter us from going among them, as 'the last

are often found to be the first.' What astonishes me is the amount of hardship, suffering and misery traders have to endure in this country for the sake of temporal gain. '*Nonne potero quod isti?*' and that not for earthly and perishable goods, but for goods heavenly and eternal."

In order to be effective missionaries a knowledge of Russian and the Indian languages was absolutely necessary. Their acquisition was, as the Bishop says, an almost herculean task, for there are no less than twenty-three different dialects. Our European ideas of arithmetic, too, must be cast aside in this region, if we expect to be accounted good scholars, as two and two do *not* make four in Alaska! In order to count *seven* the Indians here repeat *two;* to count *eight* they repeat *three;* to count *nine* they repeat *four;* so that twice two (with them) is *seven;* three and three are *eight*, and twice four is *nine!* And then the dialects, besides being numerous, have the almost insurmountable difficulty of words almost endless! Thus, for instance, the numeral *eight* is called by the Mahlenuits—"*pinyusumlagwinuleet*," and the number *nine* by the still longer cognomen of "*nikoznalakaythlukchkulla*"! If the length of the words increases according to numerical expression, we can scarcely imagine how much space it would take to write down the denomination of a thousand! Yet the zealous Bishop and his companion set themselves to acquire these dialects and the almost equally difficult Russian. Monsignor Seghers must have had a special gift for languages, for when in 1877, in passing by Unalaska, he visited the Russian priests there, he could only converse with them through an interpreter. When he returned that way a year later he spoke such fluent and correct Russian that the popes were amazed.

In September, 1878, the Bishop reached San Francisco, after his year of missionary work in Alaska, full of plans for the evangelization of that vast country. What was his amazement to learn that he had been named on June 18th, 1878, titular Bishop of Canæa and coadjutor to the Archbishop of Oregon City. When some one congratulated him upon his promotion, the poor Bishop, according to Father Mandart, turned as pale as death, so greatly did he feel the sacrifice of giving up his cherished Alaskan mission. What he could do for Alaska he determined to do at once. He had a church built at Wrangel, a small town in the southern part of the territory, and stationed a priest there. Later on he was recalled to Vancouver Island, as his services were indispensable. After the missionary's departure an Indian woman was seen Sunday after Sunday kneeling before the closed door of the church, beseeching our Lord to send a priest once more to that mission. This was done in 1885, when Monsignor Seghers resumed his

jurisdiction over Alaska. But to return to his new appointment. The venerable Archbishop Blanchet had felt that the end of his long and unceasing labors for the advancement of the Church in the Northwest was at hand. His ever-increasing infirmities of mind and body forced him to ask for some one to share, if not to relieve him altogether of, the now too great burden. Where could he find a more suitable assistant and successor than the devoted Bishop of Vancouver Island? He signified his wish and his choice to the Holy Father, who knew how to appreciate the worth of the nominee. Accordingly Leo XIII. first appointed Monsignor Seghers Bishop of Canæa, June 18th, 1878. Then, on September 28th, Archbishop of Emesa *in partibus infidelium*, and by brief of December 10th confirmed the appointment and made him Coadjutor with right of succession to the See of Oregon City. Before entering upon the duties of his new office, Monsignor Seghers set in order the diocese in which he had labored for fourteen years and over which he had ruled as chief pastor for five years. It can easily be imagined that the grief of his flock at losing him was only equalled by his own at parting from them. He bade them farewell the latter part of June, 1879, and reached Portland on the first of July. He was most heartily received at the boat by several hundred of the most prominent and influential Catholics of the city and escorted to St. Mary's Cathedral. There in a few words of touching simplicity and sweetness the aged prelate welcomed his youthful assistant to the field where he had sowed and reaped so well, to which Archbishop Seghers replied in fitting and feeling language. He entered upon the active duties of Coadjutor immediately upon his arrival in Portland. So we find him in the month of October, 1879, making a visitation, or rather an exploration, of the vast territory under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Oregon City, who was also vicar-apostolic of Idaho, and as such was charged with Idaho and Montana as far as the Rocky Mountains. His journey lay principally in the rich mining region of the Salmon river mountains. On the 3d of October he arrived at a town of some thirty houses with about a hundred inhabitants, called Salmon City. There he celebrated the first Mass ever offered up in that town. There were about twenty Catholics, and he heard the confessions of eight, gave three baptisms and performed one marriage. We state this as a sample of the work he was anxious to do in this newly opened country. Travelling was no easy matter. It involved a continual ascent and descent of mountains thousands of feet high and a constant crossing and recrossing of rivers and streams. In the Archbishop's graphic narrative we find him again and again drawing on his classical lore for illustrations, showing his love especially for the Latin poets. "I

was loath," he says, "to leave my horse at Challis on the way to Bonanza; for the poet was much mistaken when he said: '*et post equitem sedit atra cura;*' there had been no such thing behind me. Being without a horse, I travelled to Bonanza, forty miles west of Challis, in a fruit wagon. About halfway a kind-hearted Irishman made me share his tent for the night, which I passed very comfortably. At Salmon City, when writing a letter on the hotel-keeper's desk, I was mistaken for the bookkeeper by a miner who paid me one dollar for two meals, and whom I thanked with a grateful smile. At Challis I was taken for a '*bilk*' and a '*bogus*' bishop—and that by a Catholic! But here, halfway between Challis and Bonanza, I was mistaken for a *gambler!* Such is the fate that awaits clergymen when they pioneer through new countries."

He crossed the *Main Divide*—the ridge of the Rocky mountains that separates the waters of the Atlantic from those of the Pacific slope, 9000 feet above the sea-level—in a fearful snow-storm. He was the first clergyman of "any persuasion" that had ever visited Bonanza, and was eagerly listened to by nearly the whole population. Before leaving he named a committee to look after the interests of the True Faith and to purchase land for a church and cemetery. "Such is the manner," he writes, "in which I crossed the country where there is no priest, never had been any, and where perhaps there will be no resident priest for a long time to come. I have tried my best to do good. Instead of leaving our ninety-nine sheep on the mountain, I have often, after the example of our blessed Saviour, rather left those in the valleys, in order to look on the mountains for the lost sheep." After a year's travel through Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana, he returned to Portland with a thorough knowledge not only of the spiritual condition of the country, but also of the soil, climate, capacity, and general contour of the Northwest.

In the meantime Archbishop Blanchet had become convinced that it was for the advantage of his flock for him to resign his See. He, therefore, on the 12th of December, 1880, confided the entire charge of the archdiocese to Mgr. Seghers. On the 27th of February, 1881, the venerable Archbishop published his farewell pastoral, announcing the acceptance of his resignation by the Holy Father, from which we make an extract: "After sixty-two years of priesthood; after forty-three years of toilsome labor on this coast; after an episcopate of thirty-six years; after thirty-five years spent at the head of this ecclesiastical province, we may say with the Apostle St. Paul: 'The time of my dissolution is at hand; I have finished my course. Let, therefore, the Lord dismiss His servant in peace, for truly my eyes have seen the wonderful works

of His salvation.' We came to this country accompanied by the late Modeste Demers, the first Bishop of Vancouver's Island, in 1838, to preach the true Gospel for the first time; and where we saw nothing but 'darkness and the shadow of death,' we have now flourishing dioceses and vicariates, prosperous missions, a zealous clergy, fervent communities and a Catholic people of whom we expect great works and noble deeds."

Less than two years later, on June 18th, 1883, the Patriarch of the Northwest went to his reward, and the young Archbishop in moving words spoke over his lifeless body a panegyric that befitted an apostle to speak of an apostle. "His life was a continual, an incessant cause of edification; but, alas! it has come to an end. Do you realize it, beloved brethren? He is the Apostle of this coast, the foundation of this mission; the corner-stone of this Church, the seed that was sown here and grew into a large and lofty tree was sown by his hand; to him, under God, we owe the flourishing condition of Christianity in this country; and he is dead! 'Praise none before their death.' (Eccles. xi., 30.) What we were not allowed to do before, we are permitted to do now, and you will all bear witness to the truth of my words when I resolutely tell you that in his life and in his death we find much to praise. Ah! let us praise him! Let us be proud to be allowed to praise him! Do you know, beloved brethren, that a time will come when the name of Archbishop Blanchet will be coupled with those of Las Casas, the first missionary of Central America, of Marquette and Brébeuf, the pioneers of the Cross in Canada and the States of the Atlantic? Why? Because he was the first missionary, the Apostle of Oregon; he is to Oregon what St. Boniface was to Germany, what St. Augustine was to England, what St. Patrick was to Ireland!" May we not add, now, what Seghers was to Alaska! For even then the humble prelate had it at heart to lay aside his metropolitan rank to go forth once more to the drear and frozen Arctic regions. Nor did he lose the opportunity offered him soon after, in October, 1883, when called to Rome, with the other American Archbishops, to confer with the Holy Father about the Third Plenary Council to be held the following year in Baltimore. His former See of Vancouver Island had become vacant by the translation of his successor, the Rt. Rev. J. B. Brondel, D.D., to the new diocese of Helena, Montana. It was not easy to fill the vacancy, as the Very Rev. J. J. Jonckau, the priest selected, had begged to be excused on the plea of ill-health. With some concern Cardinal Simeoni, the Prefect of the Propaganda, and Mgr. Jacobini, the Papal Secretary of State, consulted his Grace about a suitable candidate. Addressing him, the Cardinal Prefect said: "Well, Monseigneur, what are you going to do with

Alaska? That extensive region is altogether abandoned, and neither the Jesuits nor the Oblates are able to take charge of it."

"I replied that the matter was very simple. Let them send me back to Victoria. I would take care of Alaska and continue the work I had commenced in 1878. If they said: '*Quem mittemus? et quis ibit nobis*,' I would answer, '*Ecce ego, mitte me.*'

"'And would you,' asked Cardinal Jacobini, 'give up the Diocese of Oregon, which you administer so well?'

"'I would,' I replied, 'if I were sure of the Pope's approval and blessing of my resolution.'

"The Cardinal suggested to me to ask the Pope himself. I said I felt too delicate about the matter, and would prefer him to do it for me. He promised he would. A few days afterwards the Cardinal mentioned the matter to the Holy Father and told me the same day that the Pope approved of it."

The following translation of an autograph Latin memorandum of his Grace shows conclusively, perhaps, to whom the initiative for his return to Vancouver Island is due:

BELGIAN COLLEGE, VIA DEL QUIRINALE,
Nov. 19, 1883.

TO THE MOST EMINENT AND MOST REV. JOHN, CARDINAL SIMEONI,
PREFECT OF THE SACRED CONGREGATION DE PROPAGANDA FIDE:

Your Eminence is aware that I labored in the missions of the diocese of Vancouver and of the Territory of Alaska, or Russian America, from the year 1863 until 1879. In that year I was promoted, as your Eminence also knows, to be Coadjutor of the Archbishop of Oregon City, with the right of succession. Now, I would not have given my consent to this translation had I not thought that I should fulfil the will of God by fulfilling the will of the Sovereign Pontiff. But, owing to the late transfer of Rt. Rev. Bishop Brondel from the diocese of Vancouver to the administration of the vicariate apostolic of Montana, and the illness of Very Rev. J. J. Jonckau, who had been named Coadjutor to the Bishop of Vancouver, the Church of Vancouver has been left in a state of widowhood, to the great detriment of religion, especially as regards the above-mentioned Territory of Alaska, now forsaken by all. Considering, therefore, on the one hand, that it would not be so easy to find a suitable pastor for the diocese of Vancouver, who has also care of Alaska, and on the other hand being confident that the nomination of another Archbishop of Oregon City would involve scarcely any difficulty at all; moved moreover by the love which I have ever felt for the above-mentioned charge of Vancouver, I beg your Eminence as a grace and a favor that the Holy See will leave me free to resign the metropolitan church of Oregon City and to return to the bishopric of Vancouver.

Nor is such a thing unusual in the Church. For St. Livinus, said to have been Bishop of Dublin in Ireland, retiring from his episcopal see, is related to have come to the shores of Belgium to labor for the conversion of a barbarous tribe near Ghent, my native city, which honors this same saint as its patron. St. Boniface, also, leaving the Archbishopric of Mayence and substituting for himself Pullius, passed over to the Frieslanders. If your Eminence deigns to judge my request acceptable and worthy of being offered to the Sovereign Pontiff, namely, that the Rt. Rev. Bishop Brondel be relieved of the diocese of Vancouver, then I humbly and earnestly beg that this matter be concluded as soon as possible, in order that while in Europe I may provide priests, money, vestments and other things necessary to found missions in Alaska.

The Holy Father was very much moved at the self-sacrifice and humble zeal of Mgr. Seghers. The interview between His Holiness and the Archbishop, in which the latter's plans were approved and blessed by the Sovereign Pontiff, was deeply affecting.

"On this occasion," writes the Archbishop, "I distinctly saw his eyes moistened, and I noticed him pressing his lips two or three times to overcome his emotion. My own feelings at that solemn moment I fail to describe. My offering was accepted. My scheme had received the highest sanction it could receive in this world, and the Pope's blessing on it is in conformity with the will of God. Prepare for me, therefore, a small corner on Vancouver Island, the land which in 1863 I selected as the portion of my inheritance, where I began my missionary career, and where, God willing, I shall terminate it."

Alas! how soon the end came! And not yet does he rest in "the land of his choice."

Leo XIII. accepted and ratified the noble proposal of the heroic prelate, but with the express condition that he should continue to use the title and cross of an archbishop.

On his return journey from Rome, in March, 1884, Mgr. Seghers spent a few days in his native Ghent. But always full of activity and zeal, he tried to interest his countrymen in the mission of his heart—neglected Alaska, then without a single Catholic missionary.

But, if Alaska was so dear to him, he had no intention of neglecting his island diocese. In his appeal he says: "A new church and a new house for the clergy are urgently needed in Victoria. The present cathedral is a wooden structure, seventy-five feet long, and can last but a few years more. The Bishop's house, also of wood, is fast decaying, and its unhealthiness exposes the clergy to serious danger." Then he appeals for alms to undertake new missions among the infidel tribes of Alaska, saying that he cannot believe that an appeal, made by a missionary archbishop who has spent twenty-one years of his life on the shores of the Pacific, will be made in vain. Thus did he throw himself and his cause on the generosity of the Catholics of France, Belgium, England, and Ireland, making his needs known in sermon and lecture. He returned to America in time to take part in the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, which opened November 9, 1884, and closed December 7, and still ranked as Archbishop of Oregon City. He preached during the Council a powerful sermon on the subject so close to his heart—Indian missions. His words were potent, not with human eloquence, but with that which comes from a life of intense unselfishness and self-sacrifice. Who could hear unmoved the simple tale of his labor for souls? No sentimental enthusiasm

did he strive to arouse, but the desire of toiling, suffering, and dying, if need be, to further Christ's kingdom on earth.

At the close of the Council, his Grace made a tour in the Eastern States, lecturing and preaching for the Alaskan mission. In the meantime, his successor, Most Rev. William H. Gross, D.D., had been appointed to fill the archiepiscopal see he had made vacant. He returned to Portland, and there, on March 29, 1885, in St. Mary's cathedral, he delivered his farewell sermon. Soon after he proceeded to Victoria. The joyous welcome that awaited him can be better imagined than described. His first care was the welfare of his clergy at Victoria; and he began at once the erection of a suitable residence. In September, 1885, we find him in Alaska, whither he had gone to found two missions, one in Sitka, the capital, the other at Juneau, a mining town. The following account, from his pen, will give an idea of his power of description:

"To a stranger who sees Juneau for the first time, its houses appear as if they had fallen pell-mell from the sky; one house is turned to the west, another seems to be looking for the rising sun, a third one turns its back to the water and its front to the mountains, as if it were about to start on a climb along the steep slope of the bluff; another, instead of appearing to stand on the ground, seems to be made fast and hanging from the side of the mountain. Sidewalks, twelve feet above the ground, are connected over the street by means of a bridge, if you please, making one think of New York's elevated railways. . . . . On every side, except where the salt water is, lofty mountains of forbidding appearance, and rising to the height of 4000 feet, protect this American Gibraltar from the onslaught of unknown foes; and on the salt-water side, a vessel, glorying in the sublime name of *Pinta*, presents a lame excuse for a man-of-war, and keeps a sharp lookout to ward off, probably, the attacks of whales."

The Archbishop's sense of humor shows itself in the same letter. He had heard the report, he says, that the Witch mine at Sitka had been sold to a company with large capital, so he prophesies a great increase of population: "Now, people will say no more that 'Sitka has but one horse, and the same is a donkey.' And, N.B. —he is neither the one nor the other, but he is a mere old-fashioned mule."

Mgr. Seghers was not satisfied with establishing missions in the towns of lower Alaska; he was determined to push into the interior; the more so that he heard of the intentions of non-Catholic missionaries to advance into the Yukon region. What could he do? He had no priests at his disposal. He appealed to Very Rev. J. M. Cataldo, Superior of the Jesuit missions in the Rocky

Mountains, for aid. The first answer was, that it was impossible at that time, owing to the dearth of missionaries, but that perhaps in 1888 some help might be given. The Archbishop could not be put off. The need is urgent. Now or never. If the Protestants get the lead, the field will be rendered sterile for Catholic endeavor. Fr. Cataldo could not resist such a man, making such an appeal. He accordingly placed Rev. Fathers Paschal Tosi and Aloysius Robaut, S.J., at Mgr. Seghers' disposal for missionary work in Alaska. The eager prelate intended to start in April, 1886, but was detained several months to receive a special mark of the esteem and love of the Sovereign Pontiff. As Archbishop of Oregon City Mgr. Seghers had been invested with the Pallium by the Rt. Rev. Æ. Junger, D.D., Bishop of Nesqually, W. T., on August 23, 1881, in his cathedral church in Portland. He laid it aside, however, on resigning his metropolitan see. Leo XIII., wishing to honor the apostolic zeal of the humble prelate, sent him once more the Pallium, which was conferred on him May 30, 1886, in the cathedral in Victoria, V. I., by his own successor, Archbishop Gross. His plans being now perfected, and his companions having arrived, nothing hindered the starting of the expedition. On the 12th of July he writes from Victoria to the editor of the *Catholic Sentinel*, of Portland: "I presume your readers are aware that since I returned to this diocese I have been able to start only two permanent missions on the coast of Alaska Territory; but the interior, the Yukon country, the Aleutian Islands, the coast of the Arctic Ocean, are without Catholic priests. Human patience is often put to a sore trial, which has to wait and to let weeks and months pass by without being able to do anything; and we are often made to feel that 'the Father has put the times and moments in His own power.' But at last, thank God, the work of the evangelization of the interior of Alaska bids fair to have a good beginning. We will show the way, take the lead, open the gate, with the fond hope that others will come, enter, and join us." He then gives a brief sketch of the projected journey, and adds: "We shall, of course, select a central place where we intend to establish a permanent 'Mission of the Holy Cross,' besides the 'Mission of Our Lady *ad Nives*, or at the snow,' which I prepared at Nulato, in 1877. But, furthermore, we shall have to visit different parts of the interior, travel among the various Indian tribes, and scatter the seed of the word of God far and wide, with the expectation that, under the influence of the heavenly dew, it will grow up into a tree, and stand firm and unmoved in defiance of the fierce storms that may happen to rage around it. My absence will, probably, be long, very long, if God's blessing accompanies us, and this blessing I expect your pious readers' charity to ask and obtain for us."

Surely, God's blessing did accompany them, and the Archbishop's absence is beyond the measure of time.

The details of the journey are too well known by Mgr. Seghers' long and interesting narrative to be repeated here. We shall give only a few items. The route chosen was from Victoria to Juneau, and thence to Chilcat by steamer. There Indian guides and packers were secured for the crossing of the coast range of mountains. They experienced great annoyance at the hands of the chief of the Chilcat Indians, who to extortion added violence. They entered the Yukon country, writes the Archbishop, fulfilling nearly to the letter our Lord's commandment to go forth, "without gold, without silver, without money in our purses." On Saturday, July 24th, the Feast of St. Francis Solano, an American saint, they left salt water navigation. They formed a numerous party. Besides Mgr. Seghers and Fathers Tosi and Robaut, S.J., there were two servants, Frank Fuller and Antoine Provot, a French Canadian lately engaged, and in addition five miners and about sixty Indian packers, some with over a hundred pounds on their backs, "all in good spirits and great glee to begin the wearisome, arduous tramp."

By a remarkable coincidence, the Archbishop saw the Yukon the first time this year, on the same feast on which he had seen it in 1877—the Feast of St. Ann. The next day Provot mysteriously disappeared, and was never heard of after. On the 30th, Mgr. Seghers had the happiness of celebrating the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass on the head waters of the Yukon, where, as he believed, no Mass had ever been offered. "But where was I?" he asks. "Was I still in Alaska, inside of the line that runs parallel with the coast? Was I in the Vicariate Apostolic of British Columbia or in my own diocese, in the far end of the Northwest Territory or in the Dominion? This is difficult to determine. I hope, however, that some accurate map will soon determine all the boundary lines and clearly show where the foot of Lindeman lake is situated. At all events, before leaving that place I nailed to a tree the following inscription: "Archbishop Seghers, of Victoria, V. I., accompanied by Fathers Tosi and Robaut, camped here and offered the Holy Sacrifice, July 30th, 1886." We must pass over the interesting account of how they built a raft, and gave evidence of how the Archbishop availed himself of the absence of his companions on the search for timber, to overhaul his wardrobe. So, on the shore of Lake Bennett, Saturday, August 14th, was a general washing day; not only the altar linen, but towels, handkerchiefs and underwear underwent a thorough cleansing. "If you had seen my clothes-pins," he writes, "you would have been very much amused; some of them burst. But, of course, my discom-

fiture was all to myself. Monday, August 16th, was a general mending day. I had to remain under my blankets to subject some of my clothing to the necessary repairs, perfectly safe from the intruder's visit. I hope," he adds, "you will pardon me the minuteness of these private details. They serve, at any rate, to give a complete description of a missionary life in a new country. The raft built, the most serious obstacles to navigation were in the shape of a succession of rapids about four miles long. These rapids are on the river connecting Lakes Marsh and Labarge, and between two cañons—Miles Cañon and White Horse Cañon. Each cañon is about one mile long, and necessitated consequently two portages, the packing of which was done by ourselves. Miles Cañon lies between two steep, almost perpendicular, banks of basalt in the shape of columns, through which the whole river, compressed into a space of fifty feet, rushes with tremendous velocity. The water boils up in large waves, having a depression in the centre, so that no floating object can possibly strike against the rocks of the bank. For about a quarter of a mile the banks are nearly parallel, then they widen out, the current being more slack between two eddies; the water, after leaving this wide spot, rushes over a large rock into another channel, and leaves the cañon roaring and foaming, as if to testify to its fury. One boat was unloaded, and the cargo, as I said, packed across the trail along the cañon. Fuller took the helm, Father Robaut took the oar, a miner we had picked up at the foot of Lake Marsh took one other, and as I did not want to see my people jeopardize their lives without sharing their danger, I took my place in the front of the boat, my watch in hand to measure the velocity of our locomotion. My presence seemed to remove from my followers all dread of the gloomy cañon. We started off at 1 P.M., and in a moment the swift current caught our boat, and whirled it between the breakers on each side of the cañon. It was a terrible scene. We were visibly on an incline, and rushing downhill with the velocity of a locomotive. The roaring of the water, the spray that filled the air all around us, the waves that struck our scow, which rolled and pitched as on the billows of the sea, made an impression on our minds that will not easily be forgotten. But we had no time for reflection. In a few minutes we found ourselves in a slack current and between two eddies, which we had to avoid most carefully. Then another plunge into the rest of the cañon. Passing over a rock over which the water poured and formed a real liquid hill behind us, that screened from our view the head of the cañon, we were hauled right and left, tossed and shaken, skipping the water at intervals, and emerged from the dark place, having made a mile in three minutes and twenty-five seconds. A quick motion

of the rudder gave a sharp turn to our scow, and brought her into slack water; whilst we landed, three of the miners waved their hats at us to congratualte us on the success of our achievement."

The party arrived at the mouth of the Stewart River on September 7th. Here they were heartily welcomed by Mr. Harper, a trader of the Alaska Commercial Company, by about thirty miners who had come to camp for the winter, and by the Indians. The river was already freezing up, and the Arctic winter with its intense cold was rapidly approaching. The zealous Archbishop thought that three missionaries in the same place were too many, especially as he learned that any delay in reaching Nulato might give the Protestants the first possession. He determined then to push on, without loss of time, though Nulato was nine hundred miles away. The Fathers were opposed to the plan, but had to yield to his superior judgment, though they seriously mistrusted the companion he had chosen—Fuller. This latter had given signs of mental derangement on the steamer "*Ancon*," expressing fears that white men were seeking to take his life, so much so that Fathers Tosi and Robaut both begged his Grace to send Fuller back by the same steamer. But the Archbishop, judging his services necessary, decided to take him along, hoping that his fear of white men would subside when they reached the interior, where they would meet but few whites. Fuller's extravagances, it seems, had not lessened, as had been hoped; still the Archbishop insisted upon taking Fuller with him. On the 8th of September they started on the long journey. Fr. Robaut says: "This separation was very hard for him (Mgr. Seghers) and for us; but it was necessary, he said, and so, after a tender and repeated good-bye, he departed from us." The two Fathers agreed to meet the Archbishop at his new station as soon as the river should be open for travel, at the end of May, or the beginning of June.

Monsignor Seghers and his companions reached Nuklukayet, a small Indian village and trading post on the Upper Yukon, on the 24th, where they were hospitably received by the trader, Mr. Walker, and the Indians. They remained there four days, and then the Archbishop decided to go back up the river eight miles to an abandoned trading-post where there was a small tribe of Indians, build a cabin and return in about ten days for supplies. It was noticed during their stay that Fuller was querulous, complaining and disposed to get out of sorts if required to do any work that did not meet his views, while the Archbishop was always pleasant and apparently light-hearted. Their Indian companions had observed the same thing. As they did not return at the expiration of ten days, Mr. Walker became alarmed and sent an Indian to find out the reason. In the meantime the missing

party returned by a different trail. They had not built the cabin as intended, and though it was not then stated, it appears that Fuller refused to assist in the undertaking. The Archbishop remained at Nuklukayet till about the 19th of November, and spent the time in instructing the Indians, to whom, as with all the Upper Yukon Indians, he had long been well known, and by whom he was revered and beloved. Fuller continued to be peevish and suspicious, showing resentment on the slightest cause, particularly towards the Archbishop, who, however, appeared to take no notice and always seemed in good spirits. Monsignor Seghers had not given up his intention of reaching Nulato, and tried to induce Mr. Walker to accompany him, but did not succeed, nor had he any better success with the miners; for the weather was growing bitter, the temperature ranging between 10° and 20° below zero. Finally he hired two trusty Indians—a man and a youth—and an outfit of three sleds with dogs. The Archbishop used one sled, Fuller and the Indian each one, and the boy went ahead on snow shoes, leading the dogs. Fuller, it seems, was much incensed because the outfit was only hired, and not purchased. About the 23d of November, three days after leaving Nuklukayet, the party reached a small trading-post kept by a Russian named Kokran, who was also an old acquaintance of his Grace's, whom he warmly welcomed. From this point the Archbishop wrote to Walker, giving an account of the journey thither. The letter was full of characteristic pleasantry about their little mishaps on the way, the behavior of the dogs, and other incidents, but nothing to indicate any trouble. It was the last letter that the beloved prelate is known to have written, and is still in Walker's possession. On the morning of the 24th they resumed their journey, and travelled on about four days. Towards the evening of the 27th, Fuller, who, according to the Indians' account, had grown more and more impatient and dissatisfied because of the Archbishop's attention to the suggestions of the Indians and indifference to him, asked his Grace to stop and pitch camp for the night at a place selected by him. The Indians advised going farther on to a place two miles distant, where they could find more comfortable quarters for the night in some abandoned huts. The Archbishop agreed to this, telling Fuller that the Indians knew best, and they pushed ahead and reached an empty hut in the evening. According to the Indians who accompanied the Archbishop, Fuller was very much displeased because his advice had not been followed, and he complained bitterly that the advice of Indians had been preferred to that of a white man. They say, also, that Fuller was very much excited during that night, and seemed not to have slept. At daybreak they saw him get up and go about as if he would start the

fire, but did not do it. All at once he called the Archbishop and told him to get up. The Archbishop sat up, and on seeing Fuller with his gun levelled, folded his arms on his breast and bowed his head in resignation. The bullet passed through his forehead near the left eye and came out from the upper part of the neck, causing instantaneous death. The Indian witnessing the tragedy got frightened, and fearing that Fuller would kill them also, disarmed him. But he reassured them by saying that he meant to kill only the Archbishop. Nor did he show the least sign of regret. He seemed perfectly calm and cool, even helping to arrange the body of the martyred prelate. He took off the pectoral cross and episcopal ring, saying that he would deliver them to the ecclesiastical authorities in Victoria, B. C. Leaving the body, Fuller and the Indians went at once to Nulato. The murderer confessed his crime to the trader, Mr. Frederickson, but stated that he had a good cause for killing the Archbishop. The Indians of the village were so much incensed that Fuller's life was in danger. The next day, Mr. Frederickson sent for the body, which was found frozen, and had it brought to Nulato. There he had a wooden coffin made for it, and on the 10th of December it was taken to St. Michael's by some Indians, whom Fuller followed. The guilty man, while at Nulato, had written to Mr. Walker, at Nuklukayet, confessing the crime and giving all the details. When the Archbishop's body arrived at St. Michael's, Fuller presented himself to Mr. Henry Numann, the Agent of the Alaska Commercial Company, saying that he had brought the body of the Archbishop and that he had killed him, without showing any compunction at the foul deed. Numann was stunned by the news, as he had a warm regard for Monsignor Seghers. He had the body placed in a zinc coffin and laid in the old Greek Church at St. Michael's, awaiting its removal to Victoria. There the precious remains lay until July 6th, 1887, as the captains of the steamers that touch at St. Michael's refused to take them on board to convey them to San Francisco. "Then," Father Robaut says, "I was confident that Captain Healy, of the revenue cutter '*Bear*,' which was expected every day, being himself a Catholic, would surely do it. But even he, though most willing to do anything he could, said that it was not in his power to do it; for, according to the law, a permit from the Government must first be obtained. The only way left me then was to bury temporarily the remains of the Archbishop at St. Michael's. As soon, therefore, as I received this answer from Captain Healy, I made arrangements for the burial. I chose a corner of the Russian graveyard about 200 yards from the post just over the sea, as being the driest place. After the grave had been dug, six white men, who happened to be at St. Michael's, carried the coffin to the

cemetery. Among those who accompanied the sorrowful procession were two Presbyterian ministers. On arriving at the grave, I recited the prayers for the dead over the remains of the Archbishop, and blessed the grave. Mr. Romanoff made, at my suggestion, a large cross to be put over the grave, which will be surrounded by a fence. On the cross will be inscribed in Roman characters his Lordship's name and titles."

Happy Alaska, to possess even in death the body of him who had devoted his life to your evangelization! What a terrible shock awaited Father Tosi and Father Robaut when, according to appointment, they went down the Yukon in June to meet the Archbishop!

The main spring of the mission had snapped!

Father Tosi left on the steamer bound for San Francisco to inform his superiors of all that had happened; Father Robaut remained alone to labor among the Indians of the Yukon near Anvik.

The wretched murderer, after living for eight months in a cabin in a small village on the Yukon, isolated, shunned and detested by all, was arrested on July 8th, 1887, and carried a prisoner to Sitka by Captain Healy, of the revenue cutter, "*Bear*." There can be little doubt but that Fuller is at least a monomaniac. He is reported to have said that before being hanged he wanted the consolation of confessing to a Catholic priest—not to accuse himself of the murder of the Archbishop, for which he felt no remorse, but of his past sins. Judgment in his case has since been rendered,—he has been convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, a sentence whose leniency can hardly be in harmony with the feeling of the people of Sitka, who held Monsignor Seghers in the highest veneration.[1]

The administrator of Vancouver, the Very Rev. J. J. Jonckau, is determined that the mission, founded at so dear a cost, shall not languish. He accordingly begged Very Rev. Father Cataldo, S. J., Superior of the Jesuit missions of the Rocky mountains, to take charge of the mission. Already the intrepid Father Tosi has returned to Alaska with Father Ragaru and Brother Giordano, S. J., as companions. They had good reason to hope to meet Father

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1 By an unfortunate mistake Frank Fuller has been spoken of as a Jesuit Brother. This arose from the constant practice of the Archbishop in calling him Brother. Fathers Tosi and Robaut both frequently protested against the name, as they said truly that the man was in no way entitled to it, as he was not then, and never had been, a Brother in the Society of Jesus, and that the misused name might bring trouble. But his Grace persisted, saying in his charity that it would encourage Fuller, and that no harm could come from it, little foreseeing the damaging use that evil-disposed men would so soon make of it.

Robaut before the winter set in and rendered travelling impossible.

If the Catholics of America would erect a monument worthy of Charles John Seghers, let them build it of living stones—souls of the poor savages of Alaska, fashioned and verified by the transforming and life-giving word of God. Prayers are needed. Alms are needed. Apostles are needed. The soil has been fertilized by the precious blood of its first chief pastor; shall it lack husbandmen to sow and to reap? We cannot conclude better than by quoting the feeling words of Bishop Brondel, of Helena, M. T., to his flock: "Our great love towards this saintly prelate prevented us from realizing the truth of the report of his death until it was too truly confirmed. We have lost him who visited many missions in Montana, who was successful in obtaining from the Holy See the erection of this territory into a diocese, and who brought us to you. We have lost the Apostle of Alaska, sent by Leo from Rome to bring the Catholic faith to the utmost limits of the earth. We have lost the saint who, imitating St. Livinus, who stepped from the Episcopal See of Dublin to bring the faith to the savages of Flanders, in our own day stepped from the Archiepiscopal See of Oregon to wade as a travelling missionary through the snows of the Yukon and bring the faith to the Esquimaux. We have lost a life-long friend who, in the last act of his life, has taught us to die manfully in the service of God. His memory is held in benediction, and without anticipating the voice of authority, we will cherish the thought that he died a martyr's death."[1]

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[1] The writer is indebted to the Very Rev. J. J. Jonckau, administrator of the diocese of Vancouver Island, for much valuable information.

DOES THE END JUSTIFY THE MEANS?

Compendium Theologiæ Moralis, a Joanne Petro Gury, S.J., primo Exaratum, nunc vero ad Breviorem Formam Redactum. Ab ALOYSIO SABETTI, S.J. Ed. Tertia. Neo-Eboraci: Pustet. 1887.

Compendium Theol. Moralis S. Alphonsi M. de Ligorio. Sive Medulla Theol. Moralis HERMANNI BUSENBAUM, S.J., ab ipso Ligorio, Adjectis Nonnullis Animadversionibus. Probata. Ed. Altera Emendatior, Priori omnino Conformis. Iriæ:[1] Typis Cæsaris Giani. 1840. Two vols. 8vo.

Theologiæ Moralis in V. Libros Partitæ. Auctore PAULO LAYMANN, Soc. Jesu Theologo. Venetiis: Typis Antonii Tivani. 1691. Two vols. Folio.

Encyclopædia Britannica (American Reprint). Philadelphia: J. M. Stoddart & Co. 1881. Vol. xiii., *art.* JESUITS.

IN our last number we spoke of the popularity of F. Sabetti's abridgment of Gury's "Moral Theology" as evinced by the demand for a second edition, the first having been soon exhausted. Since then it has gained rather than lost in favor, and we are glad to see how well its merits are appreciated by professors and students. Every copy of the second edition was sold within six weeks from the date of publication, and a third has been prepared by the publishers, Pustet & Co.

Yet, in looking over these repeated editions one thing, and one only, has disturbed our equanimity. *Mihi unus scrupulus etiam restat*, as the comic poet says, *qui me male habet.* We have looked, and looked in vain, throughout F. Sabetti's volume for some trace of that "recognized maxim of the Society," as Dr. Littledale calls it: "The end justifies the means." How cruel of the good Father to take away from under Catholic heads that comfortable cushion, by the help of which, from the days of St. Ignatius to the present, his children have taught us to still any unpleasant murmur of conscience, and sin as we list, provided we decently veil it with a pious intention! What a pity that by his silence he has taken away from the Littledales, Coxes, and other Protestant divines, their rivals in zeal and honesty, all chance of quoting and denouncing him in company of the Busenbaums, Laymanns, Wagemanns, and other "leading Jesuit theologians" who "lay down the maxim"!

[1] Voghera, in Upper Italy.

But, seriously speaking, is such a maxim to be found in the works of Jesuit moralists? And if so, who first wrote it, and when and where? The latest writer to make the assertion on this side of the water is Bishop Coxe of Buffalo, who, though he cannot boast of profound scholarship or extensive reading, is a pleasing, versatile writer, and one who can pride himself on the protean facility which enables him to assume at will every shape and form of religious metamorphosis, Catholic, Protestant, High-Church, Low-Church, as may suit his purpose. The only thing in which he is consistent is his fierce, unscrupulous hatred of Rome, the Catholic Church and the Jesuits. We heard him give vent to it very lately in Washington, where he sat among the members of the Evangelical Alliance—a "Catholic" Bishop and successor of the Apostles (to take his own word for it) consorting with ministers whom he regards as laymen, and some of them religionists of very doubtful orthodoxy. No one would suspect him of such recondite erudition as to discover, what his betters have failed to do, where the impious maxim lies stowed away in the thousand and one folios written on moral theology by Jesuit divines. No doubt he had, in addition to the fables of the nursery and Sunday-school, read something of the sort in the infamous diatribes of the French atheist, Paul Bert, circulated with loving zeal in England and America by pious ministers and their religious newspapers; and further, in the writings of Rev. Dr. Littledale, with which he shows himself very familiar. But neither of these men stands so high in the critical world that his mere assertion will compel assent. Hence, when the "Anglo-Catholic" Bishop, in the course of his petty, dishonest warfare with the Catholic Church, thought fit to accuse the Jesuits of teaching that "the end justifies the means," he merely asserted it, adding nothing to prove his allegation. This was about a year ago. The foul charge was immediately denied by the Jesuit Faculty of Canisius College, Buffalo. To their indignant denial they added an offer of one thousand dollars to Bishop Coxe or any one else who could sustain the slanderous accusation by a single reference to the pages of even one Jesuit writer.

To maintain his credit Bishop Coxe had to make some show of offering proof. The atheistical witness could not decently be summoned. He had not only vanished, but as witness he was doubly dead; or rather, his testimony had expired only to rise again as testimony on the other side. Paul Bert had departed this life, a victim of the deadly fevers of Eastern Asia, whither he had gone to represent the interests of the French Republic in its commerce and conquests. His death was no misfortune, as his friends in France regarded it. It was a stroke of God's grace; a blessing

without stint or measure, and (humanly speaking) as undeserved as it was unexpected. Had he died at home, his last sighs for God's forgiveness would have been stifled by the importunate clamors of his infidel friends; his attempts at reconciliation with the Church would have been baffled by the vigilance of those foul fiends in human shape who, with blasphemous derision, style themselves Angel Guardians, and whose office it is to see that those over whom they watch die in their sins and unbelief. Thus died Voltaire, Victor Hugo, the poet Leopardi, and a host of others; and the loss of their souls was hailed with the plaudits of infidels, re-echoed by pious Protestants throughout the world. But it was in the wilds of Tonquin that God, in His infinite mercy, summoned Paul Bert first to repentance and then to judgment. He renounced his impiety and was reconciled to the Church. So notorious had been Bert's hostility to Revelation and the Catholic Church, which he logically identified with Christianity, that the news of his conversion startled all Europe. Infidels boldly denied it, and good Christians were afraid to believe it on higher ground than the poet's

Periculosum est credere et non credere.

But at last a letter from the French prelate under whose jurisdiction and ministry Paul Bert had died, dispelled all doubts.[1] Since, as all men know, no sinner can be reconciled to the Church without detesting and retracting all sins of impiety, calumny, and the like, it was plain enough that Paul Bert had ceased to be a witness on the infidel and Protestant side; and common prudence dictated that his testimony should be carefully suppressed, lest it should suggest to incautious Christian-minded Protestants that a man is more likely to tell the truth when he has before his face the solemn hour of death and the terrors of eternity.

Bishop Coxe, therefore, had to discard his recollections of Paul Bert and fall back on his other authority, Rev. Dr. Littledale. Consequently he brings him forward, or rather his article in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," as a witness, furnishing "textual quotations from three Jesuit writers, fully meeting the challenge." This much we learn from a recent letter of Bishop Coxe, addressed to the New York *Churchman*, and republished in the New York *Herald* of January 9th, 1888. It is said that the bishop's statements were refuted by F. Coleridge in the London *Month*, and by F.

[1] We are aware that, recently, some have revived these doubts, and hence, though seeing no reason to call in question the prelate's assertion, we are content to abstain from pressing the point, or give it up altogether. If Paul Bert died in his sins, making no sign, no effort to repair the wrong he did, so much the worse for him. The Littledales, the Coxes, and the Presbyterian papers that gloried, some months ago, in his abuse of Jesuit and Catholic morality, are welcome to their godless friend and witness.

Jones in a book entitled "Dishonest Criticism," but we have been unable to lay our hand on either work, or on the bishop's original letter of a year ago. We, therefore, thrust him aside and turn our attention to his principal.

Dr. Littledale's allegation may be found in an article written by him for the "Encyclopædia Britannica" under the heading JESUITS,[1] in which he gives as "the result of dispassionate examination" that "the three principles of probabilism, of mental reservation, and of justification of means by ends, which collectively make up what educated men intend by the term 'Jesuitry,' are recognized maxims of the Society. As the last of these three is at once the most odious in itself and the charge which is most anxiously repelled, it is well to cite three leading Jesuit theologians in proof. Busenbaum, whose 'Medulla Theologiæ' has been more than fifty times printed, and lately by the Propaganda itself, lays down the maxim in the following terms: 'Cum finis est licitus, etiam media sunt licita,' and 'Cui licitus est finis, etiam licent media;' Laymann, similarly, in his 'Theologia Moralis,' 'Cui concessus est finis, concessa etiam sunt media ad finem ordinata;' and Wagemann in his 'Synopsis Theol. Moralis,' yet more tersely, 'Finis determinat probitatem actus.'"

We begin with Busenbaum. One would think that in a learned article written for an Encyclopædia, especially where charges of the grossest immoral teaching are brought forward against a body or school whose theologians are almost innumerable, no thoughtful or honest man would consider he had discharged his duty by merely huddling together a few disjointed scraps of Latin. It is a *prima facie* evidence of intent to impose on his readers. Dr. Littledale could, had he wished, have quoted more accurately, and given us chapter and verse of his original; in other words, some clew to the context, instead of the miserable attempt at "textual quotations" of which Bishop Coxe is not ashamed to boast, as if quoting a bare text furnished also its context. The first passage is taken from the "Medulla," Book IV., Chap. III., Dub. III., Article II., § 3. Why was no indication of this set before the reader? The answer is very clear. It would have defeated Dr. L.'s purpose, which was to slander Busenbaum and prevent the public from finding it out. It is not pleasant to have to attribute evil motives to the reverend writer. But the stern necessity of law and logic will not allow us to deal otherwise with this habitual offender against the eighth commandment.

In the passage we have quoted, Busenbaum is not laying down the fundamental principles of morality. These are treated by most theologians in a preliminary treatise, "De Actibus Humanis,"

[1] Vol. xiii., p. 661.

which is not found in Busenbaum's work.[1] He is only examining a special moral question, viz.: Is it allowable for a prisoner condemned to death to escape from jail and thus save his life? The answer is in the affirmative, and the reason is added. Since by the natural law a man has a right to his life, he may pursue and secure that right, provided he do not infringe the rights of another. Hence he may break his chains, scale the prison-wall, or in any other way elude the vigilance of his keepers, because these means become legitimate when the end to be attained is legitimate. "*Cum finis est licitus, etiam media sunt licita.*"[2] This is not laying down any universal moral law, but an application of the law to a moral case, which may furnish matter for doubt. In fact, the section is called by this very name of DOUBT, "Dubium VII. de Reo," and Article II. has the caption, "*Quid liceat reo circa fugam pœnæ*—How far may a guilty man go in the matter of escaping punishment?" In his answer Busenbaum evidently supposes "means" innocent in themselves, not bad, sinful means that will become *good* because of the end proposed. For he distinctly lays down that in these means there must be no injustice, no invasion of the rights of others. Hence the escape must be effected without violence or wrong done to any one else (*præcisa vi et iujuria*).[3] But why should he take pains to maintain that in this particular case the lawful end renders the means lawful? Because here there is an apparent conflict of laws, natural law allowing what human law forbids; and it becomes necessary to decide which has the higher claim. Busenbaum decides in favor of the natural law. He may be right or wrong in his decision; but he lays down no immoral principle. If he is wrong, the wrong consists, not in any improper teaching, but in having mistaken the correct solution of the question.

But was he mistaken? He was not. All moral theologians, all who treat of natural ethics, give the same answer. Out of the thousands that might be quoted we give only two, Archbishop Kenrick in his "Moral Theology,"[4] and Bishop Jeremy Taylor,[5] a Protestant of the same sect ("branch" they would have us call it) as Drs. Coxe and Littledale. We can now understand why Dr. L. so carefully suppressed all reference to the place of his "textual quotation." He trusted that his readers would take his mere word for any anti-Catholic statement he might make, and

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[1] Hence in the edition of Voghera a brief summary of such treatise was added from the "Homo Apostolicus" of St. Alphonsus Liguori.

[2] Ed. Iriae, p. 269.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Theol. Moralis," ed. of Malines, Vol. I., p. 260.

[5] In his "Ductor Dubitantium," Lib. iii., ch. 2, apud Kenrick, loc. cit.

he has rewarded them, as they deserved, by abusing their confidence and deceiving them. Bishop Coxe, we take for granted, never saw the passage in the original, and erred, like the rest of that credulous crowd, in pinning his faith to the sleeve of his Anglican fellow-worker against the Church and the Jesuits. But the error is a serious one. "A teacher in Israel," as he claims to be, ought to have a little more discretion, and, it is no harm to add, a little more conscience. It might be well for him to take a lesson out of the moral theology taught by those wicked Jesuits, and endorsed by the Church. They say that it is a grievous sin not only to slander another, but also deliberately to expose oneself to the danger of slandering him by recklessly, and without due inquiry, accusing him of teaching what is blasphemous and subversive of the Ten Commandments. And the slander acquires a tenfold intensity when such wickedness is attributed not to one individual, but to thousands of men, consecrated to God, and in whose holy lives a hostile world, and the very slanderer himself, confesses that he can find no matter of reproach.[1]

Now, is Dr. Littledale a safe guide, an authority that an honest man could blindly follow? Eighteen or twenty years ago he would not have written as he writes now. He was then standing almost on the threshold of the Catholic Church and devising plans (it was said) for opening the doors of intercommunion between her and the Anglican clergy. These plans failed, whether by the framer's bungling or by opposition from within or without, we are unable to say. But from that day Dr. L. was a changed man; and there are not wanting, even in his own "branch," some who attribute the change to mortified vanity. It has driven him back to be once more, what he was originally, an Irish Orangeman. Not that he believes in "the glorious and immortal memory" of pious King William, or would swear to "wade knee-deep in Papists' blood";[2] but that he entertains once more for the Catholic Church that fierce, relentless hatred of which Orangemen are the worst type. He continues to be, however, a leader among the Ritualists, abhors the very name of Protestant, and denounces

[1] Dr. Littledale himself confesses that, while many of the secular and even parochial clergy did not live up to their holy state of life, "the Jesuits won back respect for the clerical calling by their personal culture and the unimpeachable purity of their lives. These are qualities which they have all along carefully maintained, and probably no body of men in the world has been so free from the reproach of discreditable members, or has kept up an equally high average level of intelligence and conduct." (Art. JESUITS, p. 658.) On the next page (660) he admits that one of the most serious blows that damaged their credit, viz., the publication of the "Monita Secreta," was a "forgery." Yet, with all this, he goes on so to explain, patronize, caress and fondle this idle story, that he shows evidently his regret that it was a forgery, and would prefer that people should believe it to be true.

[2] Amiable phrases of the Orangemen's oath.

the great "Reformers" as a pack of the most unmitigated rascals that were ever seen in the world. Yet, without having first made his peace with the "Reformers," he knows how to pander adroitly to the prejudices, and work himself into the favor, of their children. He has written lately a book[1] to dissuade Ritualists from seeking salvation in the One, True, Catholic Church. For wicked slander and venomous misrepresentation of all that Catholics look upon as true and holy, the book might have been written by an apostate priest such as William Hogan, by the Hoyts and other clerical friends of Maria Monk, or (barring the decency of style) by that unmitigated rascal (as Dr. L. loves to call him), Martin Luther himself.

The book contains about two hundred pages, and keen critics have proved that there are in it just that number of glaring mistakes, one to every page. And these mistakes are not of the kind that may be excused as having their origin in ignorance or negligence. They are deliberate misstatements, ranging from the *suppressio veri* to downright mendacity. But the most frequent of them all is habitual MISQUOTATION, giving words "textually," and deliberately suppressing the context, because it would furnish their true meaning. He himself has confessed the truth of these charges by making alterations in the second and third editions of his "Plain Reasons." But who could alter the spirit of his book? The changes he has introduced are made in a grudging, half-hearted way, that shows them to have been extorted by shame and fear, not by candor and love of the truth. In a passage vituperative of Catholic theologians, he has painted himself and his controversial habits in such accurate colors, that we must transcribe it:

"Things have come to this pass, that no statement whatever, however precise and circumstantial, no reference to authorities, however seemingly frank and clear, . . . can be taken on trust, without a rigorous search and verification. The thing may be true, but there is not so much as a presumption of its proving so when tested. The degree of guilt varies, no doubt, from deliberate and conscious falsehood with fraudulent intent, down through reckless disregard as to whether the thing be true or false, to mere overpowering bias causing misrepresentation; but truth, pure and simple, is almost never to be found, and the whole truth in no case whatever."

A capital picture, drawn from the inmost depths of self-consciousness! And is this the man, even though he speak through the pages of an encyclopædia, who is to be admitted as a witness against the Catholic Church and her religious orders?

The second quotation from Busenbaum we have been unable to

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[1] "Plain Reasons against joining the Church of Rome."

find, after an accurate search through his "Medulla." We feel almost certain that it is not to be found there at all. It is the former passage, substantial in the sense, but slightly varied in the form of words. Dr. Littledale seems to have picked it up at second hand from some of the many German pamphleteers who, during the late Kulturkampf, attacked the Jesuits and their teaching, and quoted the words from memory.

The third quotation from Laymann has been already virtually disposed of in what was said of Busenbaum. He, too, is treating of the question, whether a man condemned to death can lawfully escape by flight. He answers, yes; and quotes many theologians of great name in his favor, among them St. Thomas, Cajetan, Toletus, etc. "And to effect this (he adds), he may burst his bonds and break through the jail enclosure (*vincula et carceres perfringere*). For to one to whom the end is allowable, to him also the means necessary for that end are allowable. *Cui enim concessus est finis, huic etiam media ad finem necessaria concessa sunt.*"[1] Dr. Littledale's form of words does not exactly agree with the original. Are we to suppose that he has taken this quotation, too, at second hand, and from some German Protestant or infidel source? The fact that none but German Jesuits (Busenbaum, Laymann and Wagemann) are brought into play, would lend some color to the supposition. But our quarrel is not the mere change in form of the quotation. Why was the word *necessaria* changed into *ordinata?* NECESSARY means for a good end, must always be good; but bad means may be *suited* or adapted for that end. To propagate God's kingdom on earth, preaching and teaching are necessary and good means; to hate and persecute those who will not come in, or drag them in forcibly, may be *suited* to the accomplishment of that end, but does not make them good means or lawful. We fear that this change was not honest. *Latet anguis in herba.*

The last quotation is from Wagemann's[2] "Synopsis." We are unable to verify it, not having any copy of the book. To say that "the end determines the goodness of an action" is susceptible of a very good and true meaning. But it may also carry with it a bad and false meaning. Hence we have no hesitation in saying that the quotation has not been correctly given, and that its "terseness" consists in the excision of some words necessary to make it complete and unexceptionable. Dr. Littledale's notorious dishonesty in the matter of quotation forbids our taking his word

[1] Layman, Theol. Mor. Lib. i. Tract vi. cap. xv. p. 64 of the Venice edition, 1691.

[2] This author died in 1792. His book was published about 1765. See Hurter in "Nomenclator."

on trust without accurate search and verification. It is not the practice of our theologians to be loose or inaccurate in laying down principles in a text-book. It is not only the goodness, but also the wickedness of an action that flows from the end proposed; and none of our theologians has ever failed to state this distinctly, especially in the treatise "De Actibus Humanis," where the sources and fundamental principles of morality are laid down and vindicated. We gather at random a few examples.

Kenrick says: "Ex fine actus bonitas vel malitia etiam derivatur."[1] "From the end of an action flows its goodness, and likewise its wickedness." F. Sabetti: "Actus humanus veram moralitatem[2] a fine desumit." "Man's deliberate action takes its real moral character from the end." These, too, are the identical words of Gury.[3] F. Clement Marc[4] says: "Finis operantis tribuit veram moralitatem actui humano." "It is the end proposed by the agent that gives its true moral character to his deliberate action." And that very Laymann[5] who is triumphantly quoted by the Littledales, Coxes and other pious controversialists of their stamp, as a chief exponent of wicked Jesuit morality, says: "I maintain that this end (the end proposed by the agent) gives to an action a new specific character of goodness or wickedness." If Busenbaum had written a treatise "De Actibus Humanis," he would have said the same thing, for it is the doctrine of the Catholic Church.

But does any Jesuit expressly lay down the doctrine that good ends will NOT sanctify bad means? Yes; all of them, without exception. Laymann says: "Sixthly, the adjunct of a good end does not help an action that is bad in itself, but lets it remain in its simple and thorough wickedness (relinquit simpliciter et undequaque malum)."[6] Gury says clearly: "Omnis electio medii mali est mala."[7] "Every choice of evil means is wicked (even where the end is good)." But what is the use of multiplying quotations? Let one Jesuit be produced who has written a treatise "De Actibus Humanus," and has either deliberately suppressed or even innocently forgot to put down this teaching, and we will surrender our entire case.

These falsehoods about Jesuit teaching are not new, nor are they confined to the English-speaking countries of Protestantism. The bigot, whose anti-Catholic zeal urges him to misrepresentation and slander, is to be found everywhere. In Germany, the birthplace of

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1 Theol. Mor., vol. v., p. 16. Op. cit., p. 19.

2 *Moralitas* is not our English "morality." In theological works it has a technical sense, and means "moral relation or character," whether good or bad.

3 Compend. Theol. Mor., Romæ, 1874, vol. i., p. 26.

4 Institutiones morales Alphonsianæ. Romæ. 1885. Vol. i., p. 193.

5 Op. cit., Lib. i., Tract. ii., cap. ix., p. 23.

6 Ibid. "Sexto casu," etc.

7 Ibid. p. 27.

the "Reformation," they have never been wanting. From the day when the patient labor of the Jesuits, under Faber, Canisius and their disciples, first checked the spread of the new heresy, purged southern Germany of its leaven, and drove it back to its northern home, anti-Jesuit calumny became the fashion, and lasted for hundreds of years, until about a century ago, when the Lutheran clergy became skeptics and infidels, and cared as little for Luther as they did for the successor of St. Peter. After this lull, a revival of the no-Popery cry has revisited Germany, and the old, stale calumnies are republished as boldly as if they were new discoveries, and had not been a thousand times triumphantly refuted. What gave the first impulse was the partial freedom gained by the Church after the events of 1848, which aroused the anger of those who had long enjoyed the pleasure of seeing her placed under the yoke of State supervision, and who seemed to regard it as their own loss that she should emerge from the chains of bureaucratic tyranny.

To revenge their disappointment, the usual contrivance of attacking the Church through the Jesuits was resorted to. Their immoral principles, and, above all, the maxim, "The end justifies the means," were made the subject of unnumbered books and pamphlets. Of the bad faith and wicked motives of these writers there can be no question. It is enough to say that amongst the impugners of Jesuit morality we find the name of that holy! man, the notorious Joannes Ronge, the "second Luther," as his flatterers loved to call him.[1] These calumnies, however, were not allowed to go uncontradicted. Father Roh, a preacher of some eminence, at the close of a successful mission in Frankfort (1852), which Lutherans and infidels had tried to impair by disseminating in print the wicked maxim attributed to the Order, read from the pulpit a declaration, to which he begged his hearers, Catholic and Protestant, to give the widest circulation. The substance of it was this: If any witness could produce a Jesuit author who had uttered the maxim, "The end justifies the means," literally or in equivalent terms, he would pay him a thousand florins (Rhenish currency). The decision was to rest with the Protestant faculty of the University of Heidelberg, or with the mixed faculty (Protestant and Catholic) of Bonn. This offer he repeated in the Protestant cities of Halle, in 1862, and Bremen, in 1863. Ten years and more had passed, and no one had accepted the challenge. At last a theologian, Maurer by name, took it up and published a pamphlet in which he claimed that he had proved his point and was entitled to the reward. All he could allege was the passage of Busenbaum already discussed (about a condemned priso-

[1] He died a few weeks ago in obscurity, despised or forgotten, unrepentant and unshriven, as generally happens to apostate priests.

ner's right to escape): "Cum finis est licitus, etc." Of course, he furnished no context, to explain how or why Busenbaum had used such language. The faculty of Heidelberg would not allow his claim. Nor will it ever be allowed by any honest Protestant. One of them, Büchmann, calls the maxim a perversion or distortion of propositions found in Jesuit moralists.[1] The same is said by another, Wander, in his "Lexicon of Proverbs."[2] And a third, Hertslet,[3] positively affirms that the Jesuits never held or taught such a maxim, and attributes the hold it has on the popular mind to knavish romancers like Eugene Sue.

It is a proud distinction for the Jesuits that their enemies can find no valid weapons against them, and are compelled to resort to falsehood and slander. They are in this point faithful representatives of the Church of Christ at this day, as she is of the primitive Church of the Apostles. Are our Protestant friends aware that they are repeating against us the identical slanders that were hurled at the Church in the days of St. Paul? Then, too, wicked Jews and lying Pagans charged her with holding the blasphemous maxim, that evil may be done for a good purpose. (Rom. iii. 8.)

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[1] Geflügelte Worte, Berlin, 1882. "Eine Enstellung Jesuitischer Satze." This popular book has reached a thirteenth edition. Quoted in "Geschictslügen," Paderborn, 1885, p. 532, a valuable little book, which we hope to see translated some day into English.

[2] Leipzig, 1880, quoted, ibid.

[3] Ibid.

AN ENGLISH PUBLIC SCHOOL OF A PAST GENERATION.

WHY is it that we care so much for anything merely because we shall never see it again? Why do we recall the memories of places which have done little else than weary us, and of people who have done little else than worry us, with a regard almost amounting to tenderness, for no other reason than that the last time we encountered them was some thirty or forty years ago? Why, in especial, does such a lustre play about the remembrances of that most unsatisfying and unsatisfactory period, the time of youth? It cannot be because boyhood is the season of enjoyment, and manhood of care; for the cares of manhood, even of struggling manhood, are, except in very peculiar cases, the salt of life, while the cares of boyhood create only a feeling which is of all sensations the most miserable. Take the case of a broker out for a holiday, or a lawyer, or a physician, or a contractor, or any one engaged in any business whatsoever, except, perhaps, that of legislator or professor; and mark how happy they are when they can get hold of some one with whom to talk "shop," even if they cannot do real business; and how wearily goes the day for them when they have nothing to do except to enjoy themselves. On the other hand, if anybody wants to know what despair is like, let him take up a Hebrew or Sanskrit grammar and conjure up the sensations he would experience if his whole future fortune depended upon his appreciation of Hiphil and Hophal or his progress in the Bagho Behar or the Puranas. Shall we say that youth is the period when health and strength are at their zenith, and that no enjoyments of later years can compete with those of vigorous life and an elastic frame? Unfortunately the facts are all the other way. There may have been a time in former days when young people were strong, just as there may have been a time when May was a delightful month for others besides poets; but as matters go now, it is the young whom consumption and rheumatism seem to favor with their particular attention. Is it, then, to an early friendship that we look back with pleasure, as that romantic cynic, the late Lord Beaconsfield, was wont to maintain? It may be so, for one real diamond will redeem a vast quantity of paste, and one sprig of lavender will keep a whole wardrobe sweet for many a year; but for our own part, we are much more inclined to believe that our regret for the past is a kind of grateful reaction from the well-

grounded expectation of boredom, which under the present conditions of civilization appears to be the inevitable accompaniment of any anticipations for the future.

However this may be, we must confess to having detested the public school where we spent six or seven of the most formative years of life, with as perfect a detestation as our natural faculties would permit; nor would we even now for any earthly consideration again go through a single month of that ceaseless oppression and never-ending worry, where, term after term, year in and year out, we never had a moment to call one's own, nor a foot of ground where one could read or write or think in peace. And yet no sooner did we resign all right which we possessed or ever had possessed "in the College of St. Mary of Winchester, near Winchester," and stripping off our scholar's gown bid farewell to those venerable precincts, than a sense of loneliness fell upon us, even though we were still of Wykeham's sons and were but proceeding to the sister College at Oxford, and a love of the time-worn walls took possession of us, stronger than any affection we have ever felt for our own home, either in London or in the country; stronger than that love which came to us for Oxford, the Hesperides of the soul, "where the golden fruits for ever burn," stronger than for Australia with its glowing climate,

> "Where the bright Air pours high her living wine,"

stronger than for Italy, with those old-world associations, and for Jerusalem with its sacred localities.

> "Me nec tam patiens Lacedæmon
> Nec tam Larissæ percussit campus opimæ."

No scene that we have ever visited, and no experience we have ever undergone, has left upon us anything like the mark impressed during the years that we spent at the College of Our Blessed Lady of Winchester, near Winchester.

The town of Winchester, where, five hundred years ago, our founder, William of Wykeham, exercised the offices of bishop of the diocese and high chancellor of England, is one of those charming old-world places, the delight of such writers as Hawthorne and Anthony Trollope, and, in fact, is not, improbably, the original of the famous "Barchester." Nothing seems to move there, yet nothing exactly stagnates. Life flows along placidly, with a calm, lucid stream, like its own silvery Itchen, and centuries glide away with less rush and disturbance than is crowded elsewhere into as many years. The college, itself one of the most recent additions to the town, celebrated its quincentenary a few years ago, and

looks upon the days of Queen Elizabeth as an affair of yesterday. The cathedral, a shapeless mass without, but with an interior rivaling the stateliest edifices of Europe, dates back from the days of the Confessor, and contains a whole history in its mere architecture. From its doors was repelled the corpse of the infamous Rufus. Within its choir are preserved the cysts wherein once reposed the bones of Saxon monarchs. In the nave stands the chantry-tomb of the saintly bishop, still unmutilated in the midst of the havoc wrought by the zealous believers in the gospel of blasphemy and destruction, having owed its preservation to the interference of a Cromwellian soldier who had gained his education from the munificence of Wykeham.

At the top of the High street, the single great street of the town, is the ancient city gate; near the bottom, just at the entrance of the Cathedral Close, stands the beautiful Market cross, as in old Catholic times. On the side of the Close, remote from the street, lies the Deanery garden, a charming spot, with thickly foliaged trees shading delicious grass, and a pellucid trout-stream running through their midst. Within the precincts are the houses of the canons, the leaders of Wintonian society: a society, it may be remarked, pre-ëminently aristocratic, provincial and connubio-ecclesiastical. The dean of our day was a very old man and a widower; the bishop (with an official income of any number of thousands) lived in his palace some twenty miles off, and never dreamed of occupying his throne in the cathedral; so the canons had it all their own way, and a very dignified little way it was. Eloquence was their strongest point, especially in exposing the errors of "popery," and of denouncing those miserable men "who turn Reason (with a big R) into Rebellion (with another big R), and Faith into Faction" (capital letters again). Never shall we forget the thrill of horror which flooded our innocent souls, and the torrent of ecclesiastical invective that poured scathingly forth, when his late Holiness committed that terrible act of Papal aggression that restored the Catholic hierarchy of England. That a foreign ecclesiastic should dare to preach the Gospel in a way not by law established, and even repugnant to Act of Parliament, was bad enough; though, so long as merely spiritual matters were concerned, it might, perhaps, be borne; but that an Italian bishop should venture to confer titles upon English subjects, and those titles actually higher than the canons themselves; this, indeed, was an aggression which called forth the powers of offended majesty.

Leaving now the Cathedral Close, we come to an archway supporting the quaint and diminutive Church of S. Swithin, another celebrated (and canonized) bishop of Winchester, who, to the amazement of his clergy, insisted upon being buried under a water-

spout, and after his death caused unceasing rain to descend until the recalcitrant canons submitted to his will, and permitted his body to remain in the spot he had, through humility, chosen. Hence the saying still runs in Winchester, that if there be rain on S. Swithin's day, there will be rain for forty days after. Passing under the archway, and turning sharply to the left, we enter the short street leading down to the college where, facing the road, at the corner, stands the Porters' Lodge, or outer building of the structure. There were always two porters belonging to the college; and upon the lower of these, by one of the incomprehensible practices common to the school, was bestowed the name of one of the minor prophets conferred in reverse order. Joel was the title of the under-porter during our time; at what author of Scripture they may now have arrived, we are not aware. The head porter, who was also the principal carver at the boys' dinner, was a tall, somewhat saturnine personage; but he is recorded once to have been guilty of a smile. One of the college boys, finding the leg of mutton belonging to his own mess to be considerably reduced, ventured to ask the porter, Mr. Poole, for a cut off another. "Where's your own leg?" cried Mr. Poole, not over-graciously. "Here it is, Poole," said the boy, patting his own leg complacently, "but it isn't roasted quite enough." Then the grim features relaxed, and the cut of mutton quickly appeared. Jokes, however mild, were not plentiful at Winchester.

Within the gate was a kind of paved court, having on the left the warden's house, a fine old mansion with a beautiful garden behind, watered by the same stream as ran through the deanery grounds, and on the right a number of outbuildings, the chief of which was devoted to the blacking of shoes, and thence entitled Edom, because "over Edom will I cast out my shoe." In the same way the washing-place was called Moab, because "Moab is my washpot," and a small ruler a Benjamin, because "there is little Benjamin, their ruler." If we had had as much scripture in our morals as we had in our mouths, there would have been less repugnance between the design and the reality of the foundation.

Crossing the yard, we come to another gateway, called Middle Gate, with a chamber built over it, where the principal examinations of the year were conducted, and the election-rolls made out both for Winchester and for New College, of which the proper title was the College of B. Mary of Winchester near Oxford. Through Middle Gate we enter Middle or Chamber Court, where stood the chief buildings of the college. Around three sides were the boys' dormitories or "chambers," containing from eight to ten beds each. On the further side of the court was the chapel, a fine structure, though of rather a debased style of architecture, and with windows

of rich painted glass, having beneath each of them a scroll containing the neglected entreaty: "Orate pro anima Gulielmi de Wykeham." On the arch of Middle Gate, opposite the chapel, was a large effigy of our Blessed Lady, the patron of the college, with the archangel kneeling to her on one side, and the founder on the other. From time immemorial no boy, of whatever standing, had been permitted to have his head covered when crossing this court, even during the hours when the dormitories were open, or when we passed through on our way to the cathedral; but this was ingeniously attributed not to respect for the Mother of God, which would have been scandalous in Christian youth, but for the sacred Master's window, which overlooked the court, and we were, of course, too well trained in the extraordinary tenets of our creed not to be duly grieved by the shocking example of reverence set to us by the founder and the archangel.

Behind the chapel was the college burial-ground, surrounded by the cloisters, a secluded spot forbidden to the boys, because it was said the celebrated non-juror Ken had in his student days so often cut his name there, and scarcely ever entered by anyone (the library of the Fellows was situated in the centre of it), but presenting a lovely appearance on a moonlight night, when the tracery was thrown out on the floor in silvery arches. At the corner of Chamber Court, over the seventh or largest Chamber, was the dining hall, a fine building about 100 feet long and 40 feet high, rarely filled except for the great banquets at election time. All round the walls were pictures of Wykehamist prelates, some in the splendid vestments of Catholic divines, the founder himself amongst them, and some in that wonderful arrangement of bedgown and balloon surmounted by a bigwig, which Anglican bishops appear to have adopted with a view to connecting the idea of episcopacy with an utterly anomalous and irresistibly ridiculous image.

Considering the smallness of our body, the organization of the college was not a little elaborate. At the head was the warden or "custos," with an income of about $10,000 a year, derived from the college revenues, and nothing whatever apparently to do for it except to create "prefects" and to ask boys to dinner on leave-out days. Personally our old warden was one of the most kind-hearted and generous of men, always seeking and constantly finding occasion for doing some kindness to his neighbors; and his mere presence was like the shadow of a great rock in a weary land; but, unluckily, we boys had little or nothing to do with him in school affairs. Next to him came ten fellows (socii), receiving each about $2500 a year from the college chest for the term of their natural lives, married or unmarried, beneficed or at large, and

having positively no duties to perform in return, not even that of visiting the college once or twice in the course of a dozen years. Of the officials whom the glorious "Reformation" had not converted into sinecurists, the principal was the head-master, or informator, and under him the second master, or ostiarius. Then came ourselves, the seventy scholars, gratuitously boarded, lodged and taught out of the resources, though not, alas! according to the principles, of the munificent William of Wykeham. Three chaplains, who performed service about three times a year on an average (the daily service being conducted by the hardly-worked head-master), an organist of much celebrity and brilliant execution, and a choir of sixteen country boys with the most execrable voices conceivable and a corresponding vocalization, completed the staff of the college. For about a century or so back, however, it had been the custom for the head-master to receive pupils not belonging to the college, but paying a handsome sum (about $600 per annum) for the privilege of being educated at the famous school. These boys were called Commensales or Commoners, and associated with the collegians only during school hours. Their introduction necessitated an increase in the teaching staff, and various subordinate masters, or professors, as they would be called here, were paid accordingly out of the private speculation of the head-master.

Princely as was the institution of the college—and imitated afterwards by Henry VI. in his foundation of Eton—it formed by no means the whole, scarcely even the half of the munificence of the open-handed founder. A sister college at Oxford, consisting of a warden and seventy fellows (each drawing about $1500 a year), was annually recruited, as vacancies fell, by a few of the senior boys from Winchester, who were thus not only enabled to prosecute their studies as far as studies in those days could well be prosecuted, but also became endowed with a competence for the remainder of their days, which could only be taken away from them either by their accepting a college benefice or taking to themselves a wife or—having the good fortune to be converted to the faith of the founder. And all these enormous expenses were defrayed by the revenues of the vast landed estates secured to the two incorporated colleges by the will of William of Wykeham. Truly has it been said of that most cheerful giver:

> "Hic fundat dextrâ, fundat collegia lævâ;
> Nemo unam illius vicit utraque manu."

Of which distich we venture to offer the following attempt at translation:

> Left hand and right, the founder's work is done;
> Let others use both hands, they'll not surpass his one.

These advantages being the privilege, and for most the easily obtainable privilege of such as are fortunate enough to secure admission into Winchester College at an early age (for to Commoners New College was as much closed as to the rest of the world), it will be easily understood that to get a boy on the foundation at Winchester was not by any means a matter for every one to attain. Every summer, at the close of the academic or old ecclesiastical year, an examination was held by a committee of six electors, consisting of the two wardens and four other members of the two colleges chosen in rotation. This committee drew up the rolls of admission for the ensuing year, both for Winchester and for New College. In the former each elector possesses the right of nominating candidates according to seniority; while for the latter the examination was ostensibly competitive amongst the eighteen senior boys in the college, though their order was in reality rarely varied. As, therefore, admission to New College with all its privileges was ultimately to be obtained only through Winchester, and as at the very least education and board for several years were thereby obtained gratuitously, nominations for Winchester were highly valued, and frequently sought and obtained before the candidates were even born. That the gift and acceptance of these nominations was a scandal and abuse, that a charity so noble and a machinery so complex could never have been established simply for the purpose of relieving the friends of the members from the expense of educating some of their children, and for providing certain lucky individuals with the means of remaining idle bachelors for life, never occurred for a moment to parent or to pupil. And yet though we heard it not, the stone cried out from the wall, and the beam from the timber gave answer. New College was designed by the holy founder to be a community of learned priests and Winchester to be the seminary subserving it; and stifle it as they would, the irrepressible voice cried out. In our ordinary dress, the split cassock or college gown; in our surplices on Sundays when we formed what was virtually the white choir at High Mass; in the peal which woke us of a morning and summoned us to night prayers of an evening, and which was none other than the Angelus, although we recognized it not; in the name and dedication of the college itself; in the images already mentioned of Our Blessed Lady and her servants; in the hymns and versicles preserved from the Breviary and in countless details little observed at the time, but gathering strength by accumulation, the spirit of the founder enforced an unconscious hearing. But of all the voices which spoke so silently, yet so powerfully, to the ear once opened to receive them, none, we think, penetrated more deeply than that expressed in the collect on the day of commemoration.

We give Thee thanks," it ran in Latin, "Almighty God, for our founder William of Wykeham, and the rest by whose benefits we are here brought up to good morals and the study of literature, beseeching Thee that we may well use these thy gifts, *ad gloriam resurrectionis tuæ perducamur immortalem.*" There was something in this prayer that seemed to give utterance to the design of the founder, beyond the mere education of the scholars, beyond even the providing of a community of clergy, and to thrill with a personal and eternal love for every one of the spiritual sons that should be born to him. To him the notion of the priesthood was faint and indistinct; the idea of the Mass blurred and distorted beyond recognition; but each of us could realize what was meant by the immortal glory of the resurrection, and the thought that William of Wykeham had had that glory in view of us, lent a strange and indescribable interest to it, to himself and to our companions.

The ceremonies attendant upon election were of a highly elaborate kind, but it would take too long to tell of the receptions and the Latin orations, and the banquets, and of the final evening when some thousand guests assembled to hear the sweet Wykehamist song of "Domum" sung again and yet again in the soft summer air. And we must pass briefly over many points in our school life interesting and notable in themselves, if only for their singularity. College once entered, the grist was soon absorbed by the mill, and each boy was moulded unconsciously upon the same form. On whole school days, and there were three of them besides Saturday, we had nine hours of school work and half an hour at chapel, besides which the greater part of our lessons and compositions were done out of school. In the lower forms it was the custom to take places during repetition and to mark accordingly for every lesson; but this practice ceased in the higher classes, and the consequence was that as the chance of a provision for life at New College depended upon the position at eighteen years of age, and that position depended upon the place gained at about fourteen or fifteen, a boy was weighted with a very heavy responsibility at a much too early age. Moreover, there was a custom of learning Greek or Latin rules by heart and repeating some thousands of them in the course of a single week at midsummer, which greatly influenced the position at the crucial moment, and consequently added much to the burden of the place.

Prominent amongst the elements of school-life at Winchester was the institution of fagging, of which the college was the very stronghold. This practice is by no means to be confused with bullying, and it was systematized with us to a greater degree, probably, than anywhere else. Every hour of the day was parcelled

out; every scholar in the school had his appointed rank, not for school work only, but for fagging also, and the duties were as well-defined as they were multifarious. To prefects alone, namely, the eighteen senior boys, appertained the right to fag, to the ten seniors at any time or place, to the eight junior prefects only in the evenings when we lived in the dormitories, or rather "chambers." Amongst the fags the duties were assigned, not according to position in the school, but to seniority of entrance, the position on the roll being preserved, and in each of the seven chambers was a set of fags called "junior in chambers," "second junior in chambers," and so on, chosen by the prefects at the commencement of each half year. No boy could, therefore, escape going through the entire mill unless, which rarely happened, eight vacancies should occur at once, in which case the lucky senior would become a "second junior in chambers" immediately upon entering college. Amongst the duties, too various to specify, were for the junior in chambers the calling several times repeated of the other boys in the same chamber; the cleaning and care of the candlesticks, extinguishers and snuffers by each boy, a filthy task; the fetching of shoes in the morning from "Edom," where they had been cleaned by the servants; attention to the fire, which, being composed of fagots put on from time to time, involved a great deal of labor, and such-like matters. The second junior was required to sweep up the chamber floor, and act as "valet" to one of the prefects; the third junior only to act as valet to another, and the fourth or fifth junior, a rank probably not attained for three years or more after entrance, generally escaped chamber fagging. Besides this, every boy in order of juniority was liable to be required by any one of the ten senior prefects (or "prefects in full power") to fag for him at cricket for any time not exceeding altogether two hours in the day; and if a boy found out that one of his seniors was fagging out he was bound to go and "take him off." This two hours' exaction was one of the things which told hardest upon the life of a junior; for what between school and fagging, he had never an instant of his own. Another regulation of a most severe and absurd character was that none but prefects were permitted to wear any covering on the head, merely because the old birrettas were abandoned as a "popish" custom, and no one in the course of three centuries had thought of replacing them. Consequently, boys used to go about with their heads uncovered in the midst of a scorching sun or a pouring rain, even when they were ill and under the doctor's care; nor was it till late in my own time that occasionally on a very hot day a junior was permitted to wear a cap when fagging out at cricket. All this created a terrible slavery, but to avoid the grinding of the machine was impossible.

Prefects were armed by authority with the power of "bending" and ruthlessly did they exercise it. The flogging by a master was a flea-bite; but thirty or forty blows from a stout ground-ash stick was no joke at all. As for absolute disobedience, that meant expulsion, and expulsion from a public school in those days was little short of social ruin.

And what was the effect of this curious method of education, if method it could be called, where the only principle recognized was the denial of its own end and object upon the minds of those subjected to it? That is a question of no little interest, but it can be answered here only by personal analysis, and personal analysis, as Demosthenes observes, is always apt to be an invidious and ungrateful task. For one thing, it certainly taught us one Apostolic lesson, namely, "to obey at a word." An order once given, no matter whether by master or prefect, was performed without question or demur; and though to some persons this habit may appear to be slavish, it seems to us the very foundation of Catholic as of Apostolic discipline.

In positive attainments there was a fair proficiency in the subjects then considered to be proper to education, though how we acquired it we can hardly say, for we never received instruction, but had to find out everything for ourselves, in the "propria parte" system, as it was classically termed. Of science we knew just as much as we chose to read for ourselves in such leisure as we possessed; of geography and history, whatever we might have brought from former schools, or have picked up from reading novels. Mathematics made a great stride during the time that we were there, for when we went there indignation was expressed at the third book of Euclid having been introduced into the final examination for the highest class, while simple equations were about the limit of algebraic knowledge; but at the time of our leaving two or three of us were pretty well up, not only in the higher algebra, but also in trigonometry and analytical conics; nay, one of us had even dipped his nose into infinitesimal calculus, and vowed that the draught was delightful. Of French and German we were taught the rudiments, and some of us could read "Gil Blas" and "Wilhelm Tell" with the aid of a dictionary. That our own language contained a literature worthy of the deepest study was an idea which had not occurred at that time to any educationalist, however advanced; but, in some mysterious way, we picked up a sort of bowing acquaintance with Shakespeare and Tennyson and Pope and Byron, and read "Alton Locke," and "Sartor Resartus"; of Emerson, too, we had some knowledge, while Longfellow we regarded almost as a personal friend, and his poetry shared in familiarity with Macaulay's essays. Classical literature was, of course, the

real subject of our study, and as we spent eleven years of school life over it, of which six and a half were spent at Winchester, it was to be expected that some knowledge should be attained. Of Virgil and Horace we had not only read (with a few inconsiderable exceptions) the entire works, but had committed to memory large portions of each, especially of the "Odes" and the "Æneid." We had dipped into Lucretius, and were familiar with several writings of Cicero; nor were Livy and Juvenal forgotten. In Greek we had read pretty well the whole of the "Iliad," and some portion of the "Odyssey" (which we never could believe to be by the same hand), a book or two of Thucydides, and the same amount of Herodotus, some eight or ten Greek dramas, the idyls of Theocritus, the Pythian and Olympian odes of Pindar, and a few orations of Demosthenes; altogether a very respectable amount, sufficient to give one an insight into the true spirit of Greek literature. Original composition, also, both in Greek and Latin, not English, was constantly exacted from us; and every week we had to write a prose task of about forty lines, a verse task of about the same length, and three epigrams of exactly six lines invariably, sometimes Latin, sometimes Greek. Moreover, during one period of the year we had also to write Latin lyrics every week, and we remember sending up a long Greek ode, modelled upon one of Pindar's, and celebrating the birth of the young prince Napoleon, whereupon the headmaster politely requested that we would favor him with a Latin translation! Years afterwards, shortly before his untoward death, the young Prince Imperial honored us by a visit in our lodgings in London, and but for the sadness of the association we felt strongly inclined to tell him of our youthful effort in Pindaric verse.

Meanwhile, steadily if not speedily, the cup of time was filled to its surface. Term trod on term, and cricket was succeeded by election. The first years of fagging passed slowly away, and were succeeded by a period of somewhat less discomfort. Then came a couple of years of prefecture, and finally the last election was reached, the last examination passed, the last "Domum" sung, the last roll sent flying from the window, according to the extraordinary custom, borrowed apparently from the Cumæan Sibyl, into the hands of the expectant Prefect; and we can hear our school-fellow crying out, as he entered the chamber at midnight with the captured roll in his hand, "Bravo, Jack, you're second." So, "I got New College" after all. At this very moment, after the lapse of more than thirty years, after a life of vicissitudes sufficient to furnish an Odyssey, we can hardly believe but that we are still a scholar of Winchester, and that the changes since undergone are mere accidents to our Wykehamist identity. Now, as we write, the familiar scene is before our eyes, and it is hard to believe we

have no share in it. The Chamber Court is thronged again with eager faces, the scholars again "in the summer twilight sing their sweet song of home," the features live again which we shall see no more,

> "Till with the dawn the angel faces smile
> Whom I have loved long since, and lost awhile."

And so, with the undertone of that petition, "ut ad gloriam resurrectionis tuæ perducamur immortalem," ringing once more through the silence, the vision of Winchester fades solemnly out of view.

ANDOVER ORTHODOXY—WHITHER AWAY?

"*PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY*" is the title of a volume of essays comprising sundry papers contributed to the *Andover Review* by its learned editors, who are, at the same time, professors in the Andover Seminary. The purpose of their discussion of the subject matter, as boldly set forth in the introductory preface, the frank acknowledgment that they are seekers rather than dogmatizers, and the tone of respectful reverence for the divine problems treated of which pervades every page, offer unquestionable assurance of their honesty, sincerity, and earnest resolve to abide by the consequences of this their first blow struck for religious freedom.

There is a strength and directness in this blow that cannot fail to stagger the "orthodoxy" they have aimed at. It remains to be seen if they have courage and wind enough to follow up their advantage, and pluck enough to take the knock-backs they have so defiantly provoked and will be sure of getting.

The perusal of the writings of these gentlemen has awakened no little interest in many minds; as it is easy to perceive, from the very outset, that they have thrown down the gauntlet, and invited a contest which sounds the note of "No surrender but to the right."

But one is also very soon made aware that it is a home question with them, the settlement of which is of far greater vital interest to themselves than it could possibly be to others; for they stake the affirmation of their own faith, after due, prayerful, and courageous inquiry, upon the solution of a dilemma as yet, we

think, not clearly perceived by them, but which we propose to show is evidenced by their discussion; and which will force them to elect between Catholicity, which is the affirmation of divine order, or Nihilism, which is its atheistic denial.

This radical dilemma lies, indeed, at the bottom of all doubt; submitting the divine intent, plan, and outcome of the creation, redemption, and salvation of man to logical solution. The divine idea, its affirmation, expression, and final consummation, cannot be supposed to be other than positive, real, and infallibly and irreformably true; excluding all negation; and condemnatory of all other possible or supposable interests, means, or ends, however good they may appear to be in themselves.

The divine work is God's work, and whatever it is, it is, in its verity, as much out of the pale of discussion as the truth of His own being. The counsels of the Most High God are not only beyond all criticism of the creature, but the fact determined by them must be in its nature unique, all-comprehensive, and of universal application; intolerant of diminution; not a question of more or less, or of good and better, but of all or none, *the one* or none at all. God's own bond to man in His divine purpose and plan of salvation is, as these writers cogently prove, not only divinely logical, but divinely ethical as well. One need hardly affirm, therefore, that, as a necessary consequence, man's bond to God—his religion—must be no less divinely logical and ethical.

This is the dominant idea presented to us throughout the entire volume as a basis for discussion of the momentous questions involved. "We much prefer," say they, in the introductory essay, "to be recognized as disciples of Him *who is the Truth*, than to be credited to standards of belief of human construction. Human progress would be impossible if everything in belief were changeable. No man could hope for moral perfection, if in the power of choice itself there were not the possibility of a *permanent preference*, or, if liberty were not exercised in a *system of things which makes for stability*."

The whole of this very remarkable statement of their assumed standpoint, from which they prepare themselves to view the origin, the operations, and final cause of the creation, redemption, and salvation of mankind, and, especially the words we have italicized, prove that they have thrown aside all special pleading for this or that doctrine of religion, and have determined to get to the bottom of things, and inquire after the ultimate reason of God's dealings with man. He is the Truth. His expression of truth in creation must be as true as the original conception of His own divine idea. A system of religion, if worthy of God, who is the truth, should

therefore be worthy of permanent preference, a system which does not lie within the competency of human wisdom either to construct or reform, but must be an assured expression of the truth as it is in God. Also, unless the exercise of religion on the part of man be free, it is necessarily valueless, for religion is as essentially ethical as it is logical. But, liberty of the subject is the free, intelligent, and willing obedience to legitimate authority; and this connotes stability, order, the logical application of truth in the expression of authority, denominated "a system." As in every systematic selection of coördinate powers tending to a definite end, the synthesis of active and of passive, or resisting forces, is the equation, or harmonious expression of the unique idea affirmed by the originator or author of the system, it is evident that in a system of forces, intelligent and free, the authority or magisterium of the author demands and exacts a free, unfettered action, and submission of all the combined forces in the exercise of their correlative functions, or the idea would be deprived of its perfect expression, and the original design frustrated. Think of a wheel of a watch, if endowed with intelligence and volition, being unable to attain the knowledge of a definite position and order of movement, as a position and movement to be permanently preferred in order that the idea of the maker of the watch may result in the perfect expression of a time-piece; or, if the combination or system in which it was called upon to exercise its free, unclogged action were itself lacking in stability. Liberty supposes stability in the expression or exercise of authority, or it is a misnomer. All pretensions to liberty are vain if the system of government under which we live is so unstable as to offer no guarantee that the enjoyment of our rights will be either certain or secure. The history of the world is full of examples to prove that weakness or instability of government, in Church or State, has ever been the signal for the uprising of anarchical mobs, and the consequent obstruction or extinction of all social, political, or religious liberty.

These gentlemen have, therefore, enunciated a profound and irrefragable philosophical principle when they say that "human progress would be impossible if everything in belief were changeable, and that no man could hope for moral perfection if the choice of a permanent preference were impossible to him," there being no object of permanent preference to elect, and that, lacking a system which makes for stability, liberty would be exercised in vain. Most assuredly they have struck a blow which will make for their religious freedom, for they have enunciated a fundamental principle underlying freedom in every order of human life. "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

We are not surprised, therefore, to find our earnest essayists bringing the primary fundamental doctrines of religion, such as the Incarnation and the atonement, to the test of this pure, logical and ethical criterion. Whoso affirms the Incarnation affirms a synthesis. God, the thesis; man, the antithesis; and God-man, the synthetic unity. "The God-man" is an expression supremely logical and profoundly ethical, or it is nothing better than vaguely sentimental.

The first essay, on the Incarnation, is a fine specimen of popular theological exposition of doctrine. It is terse, clear, direct and persuasive, to the majority of non-Catholic readers; and even to many among those who lay claim to possess the requisite qualifications to be professors of Protestant theological science, there is much which will appear as new and original. One may be allowed to expect that the views are so presented as to leave the impression upon the general reader that they are, in the main, original. There is not one hint given, for instance, that the doctrine exposed in the third section of the first essay, and more distinctly affirmed in the second one, that the Incarnation is a primary divine decree of creation, and not consequent upon the decree of the redemption, has ever been more than suggested by theologians. "We do not claim," they say, "for this later thought upon the Incarnation any exclusive originality." They have no right to claim any originality at all, since we cannot suppose them to be ignorant of the fact that among Catholic theologians it is no new or unheard-of thing, but that it has been widely held and taught. The whole doctrine and its application was lately thoroughly elucidated by the Rev. Father Hewitt, C.S.P., in the pages of the *Catholic World*, under the title of "Problems of the Age," in which the Rev. author arrives by profound theological reasoning at the conclusion that "it is certain that God, in His eternal, creative purpose, determined the universe to an end metaphysically final, and that this end is attained in the Incarnation, or the union of created with uncreated nature in the person of the Word." (*Catholic World*, October, 1866.)

Although our essayists appear to be not so confidently sure of the truth of this doctrine as to warrant them in affirming their categorical adhesion to it, as when they write: "The opinion has, therefore, reason in it that there would have been the Incarnation even if there had been no sin," yet it is quite evident that this view of the Incarnation is really the keystone to the new theological arch they have so boldly set themselves to construct, or rather to measure and copy what is already constructed; having found, moreover, that without it the attempt to justify the creative act by a congruous reason for it has been far from

satisfactory; or as well, to present any complete, logical and ethical basis for the application of the atonement to the individuals of the human race. Back to this fundamental doctrine must be referred the ethical principles of the solidarity of Christ and His creation, through whom and for whom all things were made, and on which is based the universality of the Redemption—"as all in Adam die, so shall all in Christ be made alive."

The creation, redemption, and judgment at consummation of the universe and of man, its intelligent, concorporate representation, are not fancies of the divine mind seeking diversion, to be made and used as playthings, so to speak, at their own expense. They are the terms of a divine synthesis, apprehended and affirmed by the created mind, thus recognizing and, as it were, reaffirming the truth of the creative Word, and freely accepted and coöperated with by created volition as an objective, stable system; founded in the last analysis upon the divine immutability, or equilibrium of law, which is the *reason of the act of being*. God has created, has incarnated Himself with, and is redeeming, the universe; and will bring about the perfect consummation and final equilibrium of all things, not because of what He has done, but because He is God —the Being of whom and of whose acts only perfect truth, absolute freedom and unique goodness can be predicated. He creates because He is God. He becomes incarnate because He is God. He redeems the world to a like spirit and liberty with His own because He is God; and the divine end of all will be effected, because in the beginning He, who cannot fail of His purpose, was the original designer, and so affirmed it.

As the Logos, the Word, God affirming Himself as acting, is the principle to which creation must be referred, the creation is, as we may say, the out-spoken word of God, His created language, just as the acts of all created existences are, in some form, their word, and through which they can alone derive the "*glory*" or recognition of their acts.

"*Qui a semetipso loquitur propriam gloriam quærit.*" Only God has this right to speak *à semetipso*, and therefore He can alone seek His own glory. And unless creation does perfectly recognize its Author, and thus render adequate glory to its Creator, the end of its existence must be necessarily frustrated.

The whole Christian revelation has shown how perfectly and solely this can be realized by the Incarnation of the Word, and the whole and sole purpose of the Christian religion is to affirm and realize this recognition of the Creator through Christ. Hence the conclusion of every prayer and ascription of praise to God is thus framed, "*per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum.*" If the Incarna-

tion be the principle of the life of creation, *i.e.*, of its recognitive acts, it is because it is the principle of its created existence—"*Principium essendi est principium operandi.*"

As applicable to, and illustrative of, the true idea of redemption, our essayists have kept this in view when they penned the following forcible and beautiful passage: "The created universe and all rational beings are through Christ and in Christ. Therefore, He mediates or reveals God to any part of His universe, according to the condition or need which may exist in that part. If, at any point His world is sick, weary, guilty, hopeless, there Christ is touched and hurt, and there He appears to restore and comfort. This earth is, it may be, the sheep lost in the wilderness, while the ninety and nine are safe in the fold. Christ cannot be indifferent to the least of His creatures in its pain and wickedness, for His universe is not attached to Him externally, but vitally. He is not a governor set over it, but is its life everywhere. He feels its every movement; most of all, its spiritual life and spiritual feebleness or disease, and appears in his glorious power even at the remotest point. If there were but one sinner, Christ would seek him. If but one planet were invaded by sin, Christ would come to its relief."

The affirmation of the keystone which we have indicated, is evident in every line of this. That keystone is the solidarity of Christ and creation through humanity, exhibiting the perfect substantial sympathy between Christ and it. It affirms the principle of all existence and life, viz., diversity as the image or expression of unity, individual personal responsibility as the image or expression of a united common solidarity. And conversely, diversity affirms itself to *be* by affirming its origin from, and relation or re-ligion to, unity, as individual responsibility affirms itself by affirming a united solidarity in like manner; principles which may be regarded as the *ratio* of all stability in the family-society, in the state and in the Church.[1]

[1] We have lately had exhibited so striking a proof of this in the history of our own country, that we think we may be pardoned for its introduction here by way of illustration. Our national motto, "*E Pluribus Unum*," was supposed to be the expression of national solidarity, and the consequent formulæ of unity and strength. But no sooner did the separate interests of the many clash than the Union was at once threatened with dissolution. In the hour of peril the reigning power instinctively saw that contention under the old motto would be vain and illogical; and, by the virtual proclamation it made of the contrary principle, "*Ex uno, plures*," the Union was saved, and order restored. The history of the Christian religion and its struggles with all heresies and schisms, ought to show the impartial student the true secret of the order, stability and marvellous permanence of the Catholic Church contrasted with the disorder, instability and ephemeral character of all pretended forms of religious government, in which "the many" is made the principle of unity, a principle logically indefensible, and which, in the ethical order, must, sooner or later, prove the cause of dismemberment and annihilation of a union which, being illogical, cannot be other than fictitious.

It affords us a congruous reason why God should regenerate and redeem His own work by personally assuming the responsibility of its nature, in order that His word, into which He has breathed His divine spirit, may not return unto Him void. The creation may passively relate Him as its author, "the heavens may declare His glory and the firmament show forth His handiwork," but it cannot actively and personally recognize Him, and so return unto Him, unless a personal solidarity be established between Him and it. Let us see how this bond of solidarity is obtained between the Creator and the creature; both in the natural Adamic humanity and in the supernatural or Christian humanity; and we trust this little philosophical diversion may not prove wholly irrelevant.

Creation, as diversity, or the universe (*uni-diversi*), affirms itself as an "*istentia ex Deo*," an istence from God; or, as we combine it in one word, an *existence;* and it is impossible to make any affirmation of a being or of its acts as existence, unless the Perfect Istence or the Absolute Act is included explicitly or implicitly as a term; or, what is equivalent in form to an equation, one factor of which is the Perfect, the Absolute, the Implural. God, as the Perfect, or as the Absolute, is logically affirmed in every affirmation of anything that is or acts. Its istence or act is not affirmable, except as an ex-istence from God, or as an existence acting by His virtue. "In Him we live and move and have our being." Whatever we may say of anything is reducible, as the mind always does instinctively reduce the affirmative to—*it exists*, or it *is* (exists) acting, which are the only comprehensible expressions for the simpler forms—*it is*, *it acts*. We say, elliptically, "I am." But only God can so affirm Himself. He alone is "The Am." He only can logically affirm Himself, "I am who am." Theologically, we would be obliged to say, "I am who *is*." Is what? An existence; not *the* Istence, but a one of many ex-istences. But multiplicity, or diversity, can only affirm itself by affirming its relation to unity. Therefore, we must say, "I am a one of many istences or beings, who are from the One Istence or Being." In other words, the Relative or Conditioned can only affirm itself, *i. e.*, define its existence by affirming the Perfect or the Absolute as the reason or meaning of existence.

Conversely, as we said, unity images itself in and expresses multiplicity and diversity. All created existences are, therefore, the expressions of God's affirmations of the Divine ideals or examples. When we apprehend these expressions we *hear*, so to speak, the Divine spoken word. Our cognition of them and subsequent affirmation of them that they *are*, and are *what* they are, is, as is evident, logically reaffirming the word of God, the Creative or

Speaking Being, *ex quo sunt*, which is the act of the worship of adoration; and as well appreciating the Divine will, *per quem facta sunt*, which is the act of the worship of obedience; and admiring and dilecting the illuminative, informing beauty of God, the Light of light, *cujus lumen manifestant*, which is the act of the worship of Love.

These are the answers we give to ourselves for the what, the how, and the why of Creation, and the primary fundamental relation of the creature to the Creator.

As has been clearly reasoned, "Both ideas, the Divine and human, stand in this relation to each other that God realizes the one eternal idea of the world in the act of creation, while man has to acquire his idea of the world from reasoning and an experimental examination of the world as it exists after creation. As the idea, then, to God is the first, and the world last, so, on the contrary, to man the world is first and the idea last, as that, namely, which he has to gain for himself as the result of a scientific examination of the Divine work." (Staudenmaier. Die Christliche Dogmatik, vol. III., part i., p. 42.)

The free extrinsic affirmation of the ideal on the part of God is, therefore, creative. When God said, "Let there be light," He affirmed light to be, and it existed. All acts of man are also his word, or *quasi* word affirmations of his ideas, derived from the apprehension of created things. These acts are often styled his "creations"—the creations of his mind, of his genius or skill, because they are similar to the creative act on the part of God; but, of course, his affirmations do not possess creative power, because his ideas are not original or self-derived. But in this cognition of creation he recognizes the creative act of God; not affirming "Let it be," but "It is existence," it is from God. There is, therefore, no act, in speech or otherwise, possible to man which does not implicitly recognize, and, after man's manner, affirm God as the origin of his recognitions. It is the argument of St. Paul, when he wrote to the Romans, "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood" (recognized and affirmed) "by the things that are made, His eternal power also and His divinity."

The same reasoning is applicable to the ethical order. If we affirm an individual man to be a human person, we logically affirm the divine ideal of the solidarity of humanity, *i.e.*, the common united responsibility of human nature in its personal life to the Creator; a nature of which this particular man is an individual expression; and, conversely, the divine expression of humanity in multiple men, in their ethical relations of the family, society, the

nation, government, etc., supposes the unity or oneness of humanity, by affirming the divine ideal of a common nature subject to a common responsibility.

These principles enable us to understand more clearly that fundamental doctrine of Christianity—the oneness of humanity; how the nature of Adam is in us, and we in it, with all its consequences and reponsibilities. If we are not diverse expression of the one humanity of Adam, we are not human at all. We are, indeed, both logical and ethical expressions of it, since we cannot affirm ourselves without affirming the unity of human nature in Adam, and we cannot affirm Adam without at the same time affirming God. Conformable to this is the language of the genealogy of Christ given by St. Luke, who concludes it by saying: "Adam, who was of God."

But whence did God derive His idea of humanity and of its ethical relations? Surely, not from the created man; but we should rather say (if we may be allowed the apparently paradoxical term) from His own divine, perfect, absolute *humanness*. The ideal of what, so to speak, is *human* in a creature must be a divine ideal. Created humanity is to the divine ideal what our spoken or acted words are to our ideas, words which realize more or less perfectly what we call our "ideal." The essence of the doctrine of the Incarnation would, therefore, consist in this, that the most perfectly logical and ethical expression of the personal humanness of the Creator of humanity would be the personal incarnation of that divine humanness to which the creative act terminating in humanity is to be referred as origin. Hence the introduction of a new, positive element in the solidarity of the Adamic humanity introduced by the divine personality of the humanity of which Jesus Christ is the perfect expression, as the Word of God, the Head and Principle of the Creation. "By whom all things were made, and without whom was made nothing that was made." The personal reponsibility of human nature in Christ was therefore divine.

Our readers will, of course, have understood the sense in which we use the term divine humanness to express the divine ideal of which humanity is the image. The divine ideals are not separable from the divine essence, but are identical with it. If there were no divine *beautifulness*, for example, in God, there could be no actual beauty expressed in creatures. If there were no divine will or love in God, there could be nothing of the sort in us. If there were no divine humanness in God, there could be no actual humanity expressed in man. What the expressions of these divine ideals are in creation, is, indeed, only imperfectly cognoscible by

us. What the original divine ideals are in God must be necessarily incomprehensible to us. For the Word of God, being original and creative, must be in its nature incommunicable to what is created.

In Jesus Christ the humanness of God is not simply imaged as an expressed existence, as it is in the humanity of Adam. It is *personally* expressed in Him. In Him the divine ideal receives its most perfect expression possible.

We refer our readers, without quoting, to St. Paul's language confirmatory of this in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Colossians, from the 15th to the 20th verses. And, although, as is evident, this does not destroy the original principle of the solidarity of the Adamic humanity, it does re-create its ethical expression, and inform it with a divine life. It has introduced the principles of re-generation, re-creation, and reversibility The humanity of Jesus Christ, of which we become members, is therefore a new humanity, not in the sense of a new race possessing a new, separate solidarity proceeding *from* God, but new in the sense of the divine restoration, reversion, religion of humanity *to* God. Perfect religion, according to the principles adduced, would, therefore, be perfect recognition. Perfect recognition of the divine act of creation would be to render its perfect praise to the Creator. This we know can only be perfectly done *per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum.*

The Personal humanness of God in the Word Incarnate becomes then the principle of the reversibility of humanity, *i.e.*, it is the divine principle of the bond or espousals of the creature to the Creator, and of the religion or responsibility of our humanity as we receive it by regeneration from Jesus Christ, the second Adam. The evident consequence is that the religion of Jesus Christ is a divine religion, and our association with him renders all our acts of worship divine; because we, through Christ, enter into a divine solidarity which St. Peter calls "a participation of the divine nature."

But now, what is another important fact? It is that God comes personally to regenerate and revert to Himself a humanity which is debarred from that sublime destiny by its own act, its rejection of the proffered love of its Divine Author, and its refusal to recognize Him as such, and ascribe to Him the entire glory of its being and life. This is what is meant by the fall of humanity in Adam; and its reversion and restoration by and through Jesus Christ is what we call the redemption. As Adam sinned for all, so Christ died for all. The affirmation of the person Adam at the fall was, in effect—"I am not of God, I am, and act of my own self, and by

my own will,"—the proud self assertion of all who participate in his prevaricated nature. It is the denial of religion and of all responsibility to God. The affirmation of Christ, the Redeemer, is, on the contrary, the humble adoration of the intellect and sacrificial worship of the will, prompted by, and tending to, union of perfect love. "I am come not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent Me." "If I do not the works of my father, believe Me not." "The son cannot do anything of himself but what he seeth the father doing." "As the father hath loved Me, I also have loved you; abide in My love."

This principle of redemption plainly shows the ethical consistency of the Catholic doctrine of voluntary sacrifice and suffering, of self-denial, the life expression of the divinely regenerated and revivified intellect, will, and affections of man, whose acts are no longer human inquiry, expectation and beneficence, but divine faith, hope and charity. God, and not self, is now affirmed and recognized as the supreme object of glory and praise. Humanity, being averted from God and degenerate, cannot in thought, word, or deed make this affirmation and recognition without an act of self-renunciation, a reversal of the act of humanity in Adam. The divine expression, therefore, of the life of Jesus Christ, Redeemer, and of all who are in the solidarity of that regenerated humanity, is necessarily manifested in all things as a life of self-denial, of self-abnegation and of self-sacrifice. Even religion is, as it always was, a yoke and a burden to fallen nature, but the self-denial required to endure the one and bear the other, has been made easy and light by the grace of Christ. Our worthy essayists of Andover have distinctly enunciated this ethical principle of Christianity precisely as it is affirmed, taught and lived by the Catholic Church; and it is not a little astonishing that they have failed to deduce the inevitable practical consequences of this true ideal plan of Christianity, whose keystone, as we have already said, affirms the whole arch and gives it unity and cohesion, as every true keystone does for a logically planned structure. One must, at least, give them credit for honesty and sincerity in thus boldly accepting and acknowledging an irrefutable fundamental principle of a real Christianity, a Christianity which we trust they will not be slow to perceive must be categorical and positive; effective in the formation of divine character, and of universal application.

That we have not misinterpreted them is plainly evidenced by the statement of their postulate as given in the introductory essay: "For the most part," say they, "a single line of inquiry has been followed, under the guidance of a central and vital principle of Christianity, namely, the reality of Christ's personal relation to

the human race *as a whole and to every member of it*,—the principles of the universality of Christianity." Again and again they assert this universality of Christianity, which their logic should clearly prove implies also its organic unity and divine solidarity.

Protestantism, by its revolt against these principles, was obliged to reaffirm this principle of the original fall, and to do as Adam did—proclaim the sovereignty of private self-judgment, and deny the universality and organic unity of Christianity. It was a reaffirmation of original sin, and its consequences, so unhappily disastrous, have repeated themselves in a second Babel. Man does not reach heaven by building a tower of human dimensions and strength upon the earth, but he ascends thither because God has come down to take him, purified for that ascent by man's own self-death on the cross; by a life of willing suffering and free oblation of self for the sake of God's love, so that to Him alone may be all the glory, who is all in all.

Every now and then we meet upon the pages of these writers good evidence that they have attempted to seize upon the idea of a positive, organic Christianity, which finds its origin not in man, but in God. As, for instance, "The race is reconstituted in Christ." "The race of men with Christ in it is essentially different in fact, and therefore in the sight of God, from the race without Christ in it. . . . . Different in fact and in the sight of God, because containing powers for repentance and holiness, of which, without Christ, it would be hopelessly destitute." "Likewise, the individual in Christ takes the place of the individual without Christ, is looked on as one whom Christ can bring to repentance and obedience, and so is justified even before faith develops into character."

We have quoted this last passage as one most fully exemplifying the truth of the exposition we have offered of their logical position.

It affirms, as the Catholic Church affirms, the organic solidarity of the Christiam humanity into which the individual is regenerated, receiving the principles of a new life. His birth into that new life gives him justifying faith, hope and charity, the capacity of receiving a divinely spiritual growth. As they say again, "God does not become propitious because man repents and amends, for that is beyond man's power. He becomes propitious because Christ laying down His life makes the race to its worst individual *capable* of repenting, obeying, trusting." That one has a right to conclude from their views of the Incarnation and Redemption that they argue from the postulate of a Christian humanity, such as we have shown to be a logical necessity, we think no one will dispute.

For what is a Christian humanity without a solidarity of that humanity? What would be the natural, Adamic humanity without it? And without solidarity how could the doctrine of the inheritance of original sin be affirmed, and how could the individual "participate" in the supernatural "divine nature" and be generated by the Spirit of God and personally appropriate the personal merits of the first born son of the humanity?

The Adamic humanity deprived of its solidarity would result in a severance of man from man. Destroy the doctrine of the natural brotherhood of mankind and proclaim the nihilistic gospel of which Proudhon was the Satanic apostle when he wrote in his book upon "*Economic Contradictions*," "Do you speak to me of fraternity? Yes, I am willing to admit that we are all brethren, with the understanding that I shall be the elder brother and you the younger; and that society (sic), our common mother, shall honor my right of primogeniture and my services by granting me a double portion." In his "*Confessions of a Revolutionist*" he explains what he means by "all men being born free and equal," when he concludes that "order results from the *free* (anarchical) action of all, from which must proceed the absolute negation of all government. Therefore, he who attempts to govern me is a tyrant and usurper, and I declare him to be my enemy." Hobbes forcibly expressed the same doctrine, when he declared universal, incessant, and simultaneous war to be the natural and primitive state of man.

Equally, if the doctrine of its solidarity be denied, there is no possible brotherhood with Christ, and with those who are His, in the supernatural humanity. Christianity would be the religion of anarchy; or, at best, nothing more than a sentimental admiration for, and imitation without intrinsic value of, Christ. Responsibility in view of a divine destiny could neither be assumed by mankind nor imposed upon it. Where would be the concrete, organic, stable system affirming and exacting conformity to the principles and duties of the Christian life, and producing what our essayists call *character*, as the result of the divinely ethical nature of Christianity *with* Christ? Solidarity denotes system, order, authority, relative obedience and duty in view of law. A so-called Christian humanity, lacking the supernatural order and law of a divine solidarity, could not constitute divinely ethical relations, and is a fiction of the imagination, resulting, as it has done with those who have denied such a humanity or failed to realize it, in a jumble of sentimental, incoherent, self-conceited, contradictory opinions and practices, devoid of all pretension to assume the supreme magisterium of truth, or of the divine right to enforce obedience to truth.

By the doctrine of solidarity, as will be well understood from the preceding arguments, is meant the substantial unity of humanity in a common and also an individual personal responsibility. Not that humanity is an organic unity which absorbs all men who, instead of constituting it, are only its instruments, which is the solidarity dreamed of by Socialism, but the vast association of the individuals of one race, united because they have one and the same nature.

This sublime and beautiful expression of Catholic dogma not only confers nobility upon man, but dignity upon human nature, even when viewed only as affecting the natural order; and it also accounts for what otherwise would be inexplicable—that sense of nobility, of divine race, and of personal worthiness of respect with which even the most ignorant and lowest-born Catholic is inspired on account of his Christian faith, and which the most exalted sovereign and most learned men instinctively recognize and treat with reverential courtesy in whomsoever is observed that stamp of the divine humanity with which Christ has ennobled him; and be he prince or peasant, king or beggar, has made him to be of one divine blood with them. It gives a rational meaning to the motive for action expressed in the appeal so universal with all Catholics, —"Do this or that, I pray you, *for God's sake;*" an expression which presupposes the capacity in the Christian of acting from a divine motive, which, without the solidarity recreated by the Incarnation of God, would be impossible and absurd. The foregoing illustration, simple as it may appear, deserves more than a passing notice; since it affords signal proof of the practical faith of Catholics in the doctrine of regeneration through Christ as taught by the Church. A humanity without Christ would never be touched by such an appeal, since man has placed himself by his prevarication and arrogance of supreme sovereignty in such a position, relative to his fellows, as to preclude the reasonableness of any appeal being made to an authority higher than himself, or to any motive for action more desirable than for "his own sake."

That the "universal Christianity," as proclaimed by the writers of these essays, in so far as they have attempted to give it a concrete expression, is, despite their doctrine, devoid of the vivifying power of organic life, and can produce nothing better than a sentimental Christianity, is plainly evidenced whenever its practical application is the topic for discussion, particularly in their critical examination of missions and of their results. What is a missionary? would be a difficult question for them to answer. The very title itself implies that he is an accredited agent, representing the might, dignity and authority of a superior, central and original power.

Where is the superior, central and original power of their universal Christianity which must affirm itself, and be able to accredit him as an *alter Christus*, another Christ? He is, or ought to be, one sent—a Messias. Who or what universal entity sends him? Where are his credentials to show that have been issued by this universal Christianity, conferring the requisite plenipotentiary powers couched in the commission, "He that heareth you, heareth Me"? Knowing, as they must, that Protestant missionaries have never yet been able to convert any one heathen nation to the faith of Christ, one would naturally think they would seek for the principle of fecundity which enables the Catholic Church to convert all the nations that are now Christians from their former heathenism, and finding that, would discover the cause of the disheartening unfruitfulness of Protestant missions, despite their numbers, their gigantic efforts and lavish outlay of means, but whose achievements, it must be acknowledged, have produced anything but a universal Christianity, or given promise of such. It would have been wiser in the writer of the essay on "Christianity and Missions" not to have ventured to moralize upon the supposed lack of missionary spirit in the mediæval mystics. Evidently, he has not made the "Lives of the Saints" his daily reading, and has but small acquaintance with those who are the Catholic missionaries of to-day.

That our theologians of Andover have not yet realized the inevitable and logical consequences of the doctrines they have enunciated, is seen in their failure to recognize the necessity of a *living* Church. For, as by the same necessity that human life is impossible unless constituted by virtue of its solidarity in elective, deliberative, judicial, decretive and executive government, so, by virtue of its divine solidarity, the Christian life is impossible, unless similarly constituted; one in its organic principle, but diverse in its human organizations. Christianity is universal (uni-diverse), not only because it is diverse, but because it is also one. The Christian, therefore, cannot affirm himself to be an individual expression of the Christian humanity, unless he affirms the one solidarity of that humanity of which he is an existence, affirmed as a diverse expression of it, as the creature is an existence from God because affirmed by Him. As the responsibility of the Adamic humanity as a unit makes the individual man responsible, and not the converse, so the individual Christian derives the principle of his responsibility from that of the Christian humanity as a unity.

The possibility of the well-being, the progress, and even the very subsistence of human life, exact this vital expression of solidarity in the natural order, and the divine life of man in the religious order plainly exacts it no less; and for the reason that, as our

essayists have in this so far agreed with Catholic teaching, Christ, the Incarnate Word, is the *first*, as He is also the *final*, cause of both.

To this divine body, itself the Body of Christ, of which He is the personal vivifying, directing, teaching, decretory, and judicial power, must be referred the question of what constitutes the right of prerogative to be incorporated into her body; in other words, what constitutes the material act of regeneration. To her must be referred no less the imparting of that new life, and the right and duty of its nourishment unto perfection. When a child is brought for baptism, the first question put to it is: "What dost thou ask of the Church of God?" and the answer is not, "Baptism," but, "Faith." And what immediately follows, "If thou wouldst enter into eternal life, keep the commandments," exhibits her assumption of the power to proclaim authoritatively, under commandment, the responsibilities and duties incurred by the life of faith which she is about to impart in order that the one thus re-born of her as this Christian mother may secure that degree of perfection in it to which he is called.

Our essayists put it thus: "The individual in Christ is one whom Christ can bring to repentance and obedience, and so is justified even before faith develops into character." Assuredly. Faith developed into character, enlightening the intellect, strengthening and reforming the will, and purifying the affections, perfects, indeed, the one who is made a Christain, and becomes meritorious, because his new life is made reversible to its divine origin in Christ; but his justification is not referable to character developed, any more than the value of Christain merit by the exercise of his regenerated faculties is commensurate with the development of his natural intellect, will and affections. Else the learned theologian might claim, as a right, a closer union with God on account of his superior knowledge and experience. He might say: "Oh, my God, I have made deep and scientific study of Thee and of all Thy works, and I see many new and many more reasons than that illiterate and inexperienced Christian brother can possibly know of for adoring Thee with my intellect, worshipping Thee with my will, and loving Thee with all my heart as the Supreme Truth, Goodness and Love." And God would reply: "All that is well; but did you, by chance, discover or make those reasons or those truths yourself? What is your knowledge or experience to Me? Is My truth any more true for your knowing of it? It does not teach Me, nor direct Me in anything. It is not knowledge which is blessed, but humility; and this illiterate, inexperienced Christian brother, who only knows that I am God, and humbly adores,

worships and loves me *for My own sake*, and not because he has good reasons for it, has more merit and is dearer to Me than thou. Thou art not more of a Christian for thy superior knowledge and experience." "Because thou hast seen me, Thomas," said our Lord, "thou hast believed. *Blessed* are they who have not seen, and have believed."

Perhaps this illustration may prove to be not unserviceable to our worthy Andover brethren who are seeking in probation after death a solution of one of their difficulties in enabling them to comprehend how any illiterate man, be he a heathen in our own land or one in an Australian jungle, who cannot read the Biblical account of the historic Christ, nor even knows that there ever was a Bible or a Christ, may, nevertheless, not be excluded *on account of his ignorance* from fulfilling that degree of perfection to which he is called, by the merits of Christ who died for him.

A universal Christianity, then, a Christianity for all men, because Christ died for all, cannot be affirmed, unless it be one, original, positive, systematic and stable; characteristics which suppose the solidarity of the re-created humanity in Christ, from whose regenerative powers men must derive the new life. Well do Catholics call the Church of Christ their Mother. And her maternity is as universal as the merits of Him who is her Spouse. *Extra Ecclesiam, nulla salus.* Deny these principles and there is no alternative but the anarchical universality dreamed of by Socialism, whose last and logical outcome is Nihilism; whose universal humanity is without solidarity; the denial of all order, law and system; the denial of religion, and of government; the denial of the parental, as of all social and personal responsibility. Freedom would be impossible, for Nihilism is the denial of law, and that is the denial of God. Well may we ask of our earnest seekers at Andover: Men and brethren, in the name of God and of His Christ, whither away?

Scientific Chronicle.

THE BRITISH ASSOCIATION.

In the October chronicles of the past two years we touched briefly on the labors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the work accomplished in the preceding Summer meetings. If we except the National Academy of Science, a society of a higher order, although more restricted in its sphere of action, no other scientific body in this country has done so much towards diffusing scientific knowledge among the people as the American Association. The society was formed on the model of the British Association: the general scope of the two societies is the same, and in all essential particulars they agree perfectly. In view, therefore, of this fact, it may not be amiss to give here a brief account of the last meeting of the British Association, which took place in Manchester last September. Previously two of the annual meetings, namely, that of 1842 and that of 1861, had been held at Manchester.

The meeting of 1887 showed the largest attendance ever recorded, the number of actual members being nearly four thousand, more than four times the largest number ever gathered at the meetings of the American Association. This large number, we dare say, is due, not only to the high esteem enjoyed by the Association in England, but also to the fact that members *only* may be present at the meetings. As in our country the meetings are open to all, it follows that very many, while enjoying all the benefits of full membership, give very little help to the material well-being of the American Association.

The presence of many well-known foreign scientists lent additional lustre to the late Manchester meeting. Invitations had been extended by the local committee to nearly every eminent scientist in other lands. Over one hundred of these invited guests attended, among whom we were pleased to find not a few Americans. The presence of so many well-known savants, coming from all parts of the world, naturally gave zest to the proceedings and induced the English members to put forth their best efforts towards making the meeting all that could be desired. The success attained clearly shows that the steps taken by the Manchester committee on this occasion are the only practical means of forming something like an International Association, while it is believed that any attempt to formally constitute such an association would prove impracticable.

However, the large attendance at the Manchester meeting was not the principal cause of its success. Strong in numbers, the meeting chiefly signalized itself for the work it actually performed. Important papers read and discussed; special investigations of different committees and

the action taken on their reports by the whole association—these and like proceedings have given the meeting an importance greater than that attained by any previous gathering of scientists. Worthy of note and greatly aiding the success of the meeting was the opening (in Owen's College, where the meeting was held) of the "Anthropometric Laboratory" for the use of the members. An exposition of scientific instruments showed great care in every department and elicited considerable interest. Among the many scientific novelties displayed, several recent inventions of Sir William Thomson and an ingenious working model of the Manchester Ship Canal attracted much attention.

The opening address of the President, Sir H. E. Roscoe, dwelt at some length on the "Recent Progress of Chemistry," and was in keeping with his high reputation. The addresses of the vice-presidents, reported fully in *Nature*, while worthy of the assembly to which they were addressed, were, at the same time, of interest to a general audience. All bear testimony to the thoroughness which characterized the meeting. To discuss these papers in detail would bring us beyond the limits we have set ourselves. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with a few passing words on two of them.

Mr. Robert Griffin, President of the Section of Economic Science and Statistics, chose for his subject the "Recent Rate of Material Progress in England." It is a matter of interest for Americans to compare the progress of England with that of their own land, a land where so many vast and varied resources are at their command. The substance of Mr. Griffin's remarks may be summed up in the following statement: "In the last thirty years the income-tax assessment, the production of coal and of pig-iron have all more than doubled, while the clearance of shipping in foreign trade has become three times as large. This rate of progress has gone on through these thirty years with almost uniform regularity, except that from 1865 to 1875 it was greater than in the first and last decades.

In another paper the contemplated tunnel under the channel between England and the Continent was treated with great ability. The reading of this paper led to a discussion, the conclusions of which we subjoin.

It was argued that from a technical point of view the work is comparatively easy and not over-expensive. In answer to objections, taken from a military standpoint, objections which, our readers may remember, put a stop to this undertaking, it was shown that arrangements could be made to flood the tunnel in a few moments by establishing connection between it and the fort of Dover, from which sea-water could be passed into the tunnel at the rate of 100,000 cubic feet per minute. Considering it, in the third place, in its probable effects upon commerce, and setting aside the fears of a possible French invasion, it was made manifest that although it might injure the trade of vessels plying between England and the Continent, the carrying out of the project would, in the long run, prove of incalculable advantage to the trade and wealth of the United Kingdom.

INDUCTION TELEGRAPHY.

THE term, electric induction, designates the influence exercised by an insulated electrified body in disturbing the electrical equilibrium of surrounding conductors. If the electricity of the acting body be quiescent, it exerts *statical* induction; if in motion, traversing the body in currents, it exerts *dynamical* induction. Both forms of induction have long been known to scientists, and, while there are certain characteristics by which statical may be distinguished from dynamical induction, the general manifestations of both are so much alike that it is still an open question whether the forms are essentially different from one another.

In ordinary telegraphy, and in telephone service, the induction is found to be a great inconvenience. For instance: Cable messages require more time for transmission than do such as are sent over land; because, owing to the greater *inducing* influence in the cable, the interruptions of the currents cannot be made as quickly as in overland lines. For the same reason despatches cannot be so speedily sent in underground wires as in wires above the surface. In telephone service, the induction occurring between telegraph and telephone wires is a well-known source of annoyance, as it produces in the receiving telephone discordant sounds which sometimes seriously interfere with the spoken message.

Hitherto electric induction was utilized especially in dynamos and in electro-dynamic machines. Now that it begins to figure in telegraphy, we are inclined to think that the prediction made some years since by an eminent electrician, that, "for the future progress of electric science we must look to induction," is about to be fulfilled.

During the past five years, various trials have been made of this new system of telegraphy, in which, as the name implies, messages are sent by means of electric induction. The system allows of telegraphic communication between trains while both are in motion, even in opposite directions, or, while one is moving and the other is stationary, or, while both are at rest; and it has so far been perfected as to be of practical service to the managers and patrons of the Lehigh Valley Railroad. Duplex and even quadruplex telegraphy have been proved possible in the new system, and it is hoped that, by the aid of the telephone, conversation may be carried on between parties in different trains on the same or on different tracks. Should it ever be found possible (as many confidently expect it will) to make the system serviceable in ocean travel, it would not be easy to overestimate the advantages which would thus be secured to the world of traffic.

It is our purpose here to explain, as briefly and clearly as the subject may admit, the scientific principles involved in this new system of telegraphy. Our remarks are based chiefly on the system adopted by the Lehigh Valley Railway Company. On October 6th, 1887, at the invitation of the Consolidated Railway Telegraph Company, two hundred and fifty scientists, desirous of testing the efficiency of the system, made

the trip from New York to Easton, Pa., in a special excursion train placed at their disposal. The system is the outcome of inventions and improvements made by skilled scientists (and especially by Edison, Phelps, and Wiley Smith, to whom the science of electricity is so deeply indebted), and its workings on this occasion gave general satisfaction to the scientific party.

About three years ago, when the first trials were made on the Harlem River Railroad, dynamical induction was utilized. A coil of copper wire surrounding the car was connected with a battery within. The current passing through this wire acted by induction on an insulated wire laid along the road-bed between the rails. But in the trip made on October 6th, 1887, the experiments were made by employing statical induction. It is a well-known fact that in all electric condensers (as, for instance, in Leyden jars), when one armature is suddenly electrified, or suddenly deprived of its electricity, a similar action takes place in the other armature, so long as it is in connection with the earth. Now, in this system of inductive telegraphy, the action is comparable to that of a great Leyden jar, one of whose armatures is the line-wire along the road, the other the metallic roofs of the railway cars united by a copper wire, one end of which is connected with a "double-contact" Morse key in one of the cars. When this key is pressed down, an ordinary battery placed in the train discharges the current on the roofs of the cars. The metallic roofs, thus electrified act by induction on the line-wire. In the circuit of this line-wire, at one of the stations, is a telephone, from which, as from a *sounder*, may be heard the signals of the operator on the train, the dots and dashes of the Morse alphabet being faithfully transmitted as he manipulates the key.

When the key is not pressed down, it closes a telephone circuit in the car and thus, by an operation exactly the reverse of the one just described, messages may be received on the train from the operator at the station. The line-wire acts as the electrifying body; induction is exerted by it on the roof of the train, and as the line current is interrupted the signals are sounded in the telephone in the car.

Thus, despatches can be sent equally well, whether the train be at rest or in motion, and all trains along the route receive the signals, so that, by a single message instructions, warnings of danger, etc., may be sent to all for whom they are intended. The system has, since its adoption, been variously modified and improved. No doubt, continued experience will suggest new improvements, especially as regards the details of instruments, of which our limited space will not allow us to give a minute description.

ALUMINIUM BRONZE AS A GUN-METAL.

About two years ago, we called attention in this *Chronicle* to the electrical furnace, then recently invented by the Cowles Brothers, for metallurgical purposes. By their new method, mechanical power,

whether stored up by nature in water-falls, or produced by steam-engines, is made use of to move large dynamos, thus developing great electrical energy. The current is conducted to the furnace, where it passes between two electrodes which offer great resistance to its passage. Thus the electric force is transformed into calorific energy, and so much heat is concentrated in a small space that many of the most refractory substances can be melted. We have already spoken of the great success which has attended the employment of this furnace for the production of aluminium alloys, especially aluminium bronze. These alloys are beginning to play an important part in the industrial pursuits both of this country and of Europe. Quite recently, the Cowles Brothers received from Germany an order for five tons of the strongest of all the aluminium alloys, containing nine parts of iron to one of aluminium.

In our own country, the aluminium bronze will probably be employed for a new purpose. Mr. Alfred H. Cowles proposes to make use of it for the manufacture of large guns. Mr. Cowles explained his views in a lecture which he gave at Annapolis, on the 27th of October. The lecture was delivered before the Naval Institute, but there were present many of the gun manufacturers of this country, and several Europeans who were interested in the matter. The lecturer claimed that, with the new metal, guns could be made superior to those of steel. They would have greater toughness and elasticity, so that it would be impossible to burst them with four times the charge of powder allowed in steel guns of the same dimensions. There would be no danger of crystallization. Moreover, the aluminium guns would retain the color and brightness of gold, since neither rust nor verdigris forms on the metal, and salt water has no effect on it. The new guns, made by the Rodman or Deane process, would be twenty per cent. cheaper than the steel guns. The cheapness is largely due to the fact that the plant necessary for casting such guns would cost comparatively little. A great part of the cost of a steel cannon is expended in the process of casting, while most of the expense of an aluminium gun is due to the material itself, which can be remelted and recast as often as necessary. Finally, it must not be supposed that there would be any scarcity of the aluminium itself, since the amount of ore in the country is practically inexhaustible.

These were the chief points of the lecture. From the animated discussion which followed it would appear that the gentlemen present had great confidence in the qualities of the new gun-metal. The Naval authorities have not yet (at the time of writing) come to any decision in the matter. It is to be hoped, however, that since Congress has made an appropriation for the defence of the sea-coast, and since there are several means of defence under consideration, the new guns may, in their turn, receive a fair trial. The application of aluminium bronze to this new purpose so soon after the complete success of Lieutenant Zalinski's pneumatic dynamite gun, would be a great honor for the United States. But if the authorities of this country take no steps in the matter, it seems probable that some European power will bring the question of the new gun-metal to a successful issue.

TWO INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC MEETINGS.

YEARS ago, the press helped to bring in contact the scientists scattered through the world. Each specialist began to hear of the work that others were doing in the same line as himself. Thus mutual co-operation and good-fellowship sprang up among them. But besides the help that the press has afforded, we must not forget that our modern conveniences for comfortable and rapid travel have had their share in producing the unity of action so beneficial to the cause of science. There are local scientific societies in every civilized land; international meetings are now quite frequent, while great world conferences are not of rare occurrence. We wish to speak of two of these which took place recently.

The first is the International Medical Congress, that convened in Washington on September 5th, 1887. It was a splendid gathering of about four thousand physicians. The best medical talent of our own country was brought into intimate acquaintance with the views of famous specialists from the continent of Europe, from England and Ireland.

President Cleveland having formally opened the session, the Secretary of State followed with an eloquent address of welcome. Dr. Davis, of Chicago, spoke for the American profession, and then the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy responded in turn. The sessions lasted about a week, and before adjournment *sine die* Berlin was selected for the next Congress in 1890. By those members best qualified to judge, the Washington meeting has been pronounced a great success. The high rank that many of the representatives hold in their profession, and the general importance of the numerous papers that were read, would seem to justify this opinion. Of course, most of the papers were of a very technical character, and so had no very great interest for the general public. We may mention among the many contributions the papers on "Fevers and their Rational Treatment," "Laparatomy," "Pasteur's Treatment of Hydrophobia," and lastly that on the "Milk Supply of our Large Cities," to which Dr. Edson, of the New York Board of Health, attributed the dissemination of many epidemics, such as scarlet fever, diphtheria, and the like.

The International Hygienic Congress met at Vienna on October 2d. The specific purpose of this body was to discover the best sanitary precautions to be taken, especially in our large cities, against the spread of epidemics. The subject of inoculation and vaccination was discussed at great length. The Congress strongly recommended that all governments should make vaccination compulsory. The value of inoculation in cases of typhus was also debated. But the most interesting and animated discussion of the whole congress was on cholera. Professor Max Gruber, of Vienna, said that, as far as he could discover, the plague in 1885–1886 had not been propagated by the water-supply; and that, ordinarily, water did not propagate the germs. To this Professor Spatuzzi, of Naples, replied that many places, previously ravaged by every outbreak of cholera, during the past few years—and since the improvement in the purity of their water supply, were comparatively free from the fatal epidemic. Professor Pettenhofer, after years of experience in

India, came to the conclusion that the geographical position, the climate, and especially the habits of the people, had a great deal to do with the spread of any epidemic. The work of the Congress may be summed up briefly as insisting on these well-known sanitary principles: give the people, especially the poor, pure air and water, wholesome food and proper dwellings; avoid the overcrowding of tenement-houses; in fact, do away with them, if possible; in time of epidemic, remove all patients as quickly as possible to well-ventilated hospitals, isolated as perfectly as may be from all communication with our cities.

MINOR ITEMS.

1. In scientific papers we find the announcement of two new inventions which will prove to be of great usefulness, should the promises advanced by their owners be realized. At present we can merely allude to their object, as the methods employed and the principles involved in them are, at the moment of writing (December 12th) held in secrecy. One is a new phonograph by Edison. As is well known, the one invented by him ten years ago has not had, nor can it have, a practical application of any worth. It is said that, during the month of January, 1888, Mr. Edison will make known the new one, which, according to report, is very simple. The message, spoken into it, can be repeated as often as desired, either in the same instrument or in one at a distance. The announcement of the other invention comes from the Patent Office, and regards a new electric type-writer. It seems to resemble the ordinary type-writer now in use. When put in connection with a telegraph line, words can be printed at a distant station with the same ease as with the ordinary type-writer in the presence of the manipulator. It is said that two instruments, one at each end of the line, can be worked on the same wire at the same time. The message is printed at the receiving office in the form of a letter, whether there is a person near the apparatus or not. If true, this would be of great convenience. The instrument is called a dynamograph. Were we to indulge in surmises, we should say that it is a modification of the Multiplex System, which was shown to the public at the Electric Exhibition of 1884 at Philadelphia, and described by us at the time. As to the new phonograph, it does not seem improbable that in the same manner as in the old one or in the telephone, the voice puts in vibration a diaphragm, which causes small holes to be punctured in a sheet, metallic or otherwise, in a way similar to those made by an electric pen. A current of air passed through these holes successively can reproduce the voice of the sender. We advance this explanation merely as a surmise, not intending to accept Mr. Edison's challenge of making known the nature of his new appliance.

2. A new proof of the interest taken in solar physics has been afforded in the reports of the preparations made for observing the total eclipse of the sun which occurred on the 19th of August. For the first time, to our knowledge, balloons were brought into requisition for the purpose

of observing the phenomenon. The scientific world looked forward with interest expecting great results, for the places at which observations might be made were numerous and comparatively easy of access. The path traced by the moon's shadow was, for the greater part, overland, extending from Germany, through Russia and Siberia, to Japan. Unhappily, few of the astronomers were successful. Among those who were disappointed we regret to find the name of Fr. Gaspar Ferrari, S.J., who had charge of the Papal expedition sent to Moscow, with the consent of the Russian government. There were some few places in Siberia where observations were made with partial success, but we have been unable to learn whether any important result will be derived therefrom. The desire of seeing the grand spectacle must have been very great, to have suggested to some the bold project of observing it from balloons in case of cloudy weather. However, observations thus taken, cannot be very accurate. The trial was made near Moscow by two parties. More than ordinary courage was displayed by the astronomer of one of the parties. At the very moment of ascending, it was noticed that through a mistake of the aeronaut, the balloon chosen was not large enough to carry two persons. The astronomer, Professor Mendeleieff, then decided to make the ascent alone, and though he had never been in a balloon before, he was successful throughout, making the observation and landing safely after the eclipse was over. He certainly merited the medal which has since been presented to him by the Academy of "Aerostation" of France, "in recognition of the courage displayed by him at Klin on August 19th."

3. Beyond all doubt great progress has been made in electric storage batteries. They begin to answer the hopes which electricians conceived of them when first discovered. Though the principle on which they rest is undoubted, still many practical difficulties prevented for a long time their profitable use. Now these difficulties have been overcome in great part, and in many cases the batteries are applied in connection with electromotors which, especially in street cars, are bound to replace the use of horses. Even greater progress can be expected. From Connecticut comes the report that a new and successful installation has been effected in Birmingham, to light incandescent lamps by storage batteries. This new plant is attracting the close attention of electricians, because others have been tried before with but partial success.

A small dynamo can be worked by water-power all day for charging the storage batteries, or, when the mills are not working, dynamos may be employed to store energy for lighting during the working-hours of the mill, or for any other purpose. Storage batteries are also used for furnishing the motive power in a new submarine boat recently tried at Havre, France. The motor is a new dynamo, invented by Captain Krebs, famous for his "dirigible" balloon, and is capable of developing 12-horse power. With this motor fed by a storage battery, the boat has made six and a half knots an hour for five consecutive hours. Scientific men, visiting the Havre Maritime Exhibition, seem to consider the trial a success, and believe the boat a great rival to the "Peacemaker" and the "Nautilus."

Book Notices.

WEALTH AND PROGRESS. A Critical Examination of the Labor Problem. By *George Gunton*. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1887.

Wealth and Progress is an important contribution to modern political economy. By none could such a work have been written but by a master of the economic science, a thorough reader of statistics, a lucid and comprehensive thinker. At the outset the author disposes of two fallacies; the one accepted by many a workingman, the other often leaving its impress on the mind of the capitalist. Is it true that labor, *i.e.*, direct and unaided human exertion, creates *all wealth*, and that, as a consequence, *all wealth* rightfully belongs to the laborer? This statement, if defensible, is only verified in the savage state. As soon as capital has conjured up the hidden forces of nature, its share in the product far exceeds that of human effort, to which it imparts a hundredfold efficiency. Capital is not, in a literal sense, *stored up labor*, but *the effect* of human energy *harnessing to production* the forces of nature.

The average employer assumes that the employment of capital and the use of machinery are due solely to his self-denial and sagacity. Under this erroneous impression he regards the laborer as an ungrateful wretch when the latter asks for higher wages. The author justly observes that if the capitalist devotes his wealth to production, it is because by so doing he expects to gain something. The employer forgets that the real incentive to production is consumption, and that the consumers are the great mass of the people, consisting chiefly of wage workers. This explains at once why *high wages* do not mean *small profits;* for high wages mean increased consumption, and greater consumption means higher returns. "In short, it is a universal law in the world of economics that the use of machinery ultimately depends on the consumption, and consequently can only be successfully extended as the general rate of wages is permanently advanced."

The conclusion of part first makes it imperative to consider the law of wages, and it becomes the subject matter of part second. Three popular theories at once confront the author: *the wages-fund theory, Mr. Walker's theory, and Mr. George's theory.*

The wages-fund theory may be summed up as follows: At any moment there is a fixed amount of capital to be divided among the workmen, so that the standard of wages can be found by dividing that amount into the number of workmen. This pretended law, advocated at first by Mr. Mill, then given up to the tender mercies of Mr. Thornton, received from Professor Cavines a few modifications and a new lease of life. Mr. Gunton handles it without gloves. In his opinion, it is but a specious argument for low wages. The theory supposes: first, that wages must be paid out of actually accumulated capital; secondly, that wages are regulated by the relative demand and supply of laborers. To the first assumption the author objects that, if a certain amount of capital is usually needed to supply the means of production, in many employments, and especially in new countries, the wages fund, *i.e.*, the amount of capital then and there available for the payment of wages—is seldom sufficient to pay the wages of the laborers employed, for a month, a week,

or even a day in advance. If the second or regulative phase of the wages-fund theory were justified by facts, then wages would never rise or fall except as the demand is in excess of the supply, or vice versa. But since the close of the fourteenth century, there has never been a time in England when the supply of labor has not been in excess of the demand, and yet during that period, wages, instead of falling, have risen from five pence to five shillings per day. Never were the wages so low as during the time when over one-third of the people had been stricken down by the *black death.* Moreover, if the theory were true, enforced idleness would be impossible, because as soon as the supply of laborers would be in excess of the demand, wages would fall to meet the contingency.

The theory of Mr. Francis A. Walker may briefly be stated in his own words: "The employer purchases labor with a view to the product of labor; and the kind and amount of that product determine what wages he can afford to pay. . . . Thus it is not production, not capital, which furnishes the motive for employment and the measure of wages." And in his *Political Economy*: "Wages equal the whole product *minus* rent, interest, and profits." This theory assumes that rent, interest, and profits are taken out of the product, before the wages are paid, but Mr. Walker himself has conclusively shown that the reverse is true. It is because what he calls no-rent land will only yield enough to pay wages and profit, that rent cannot be obtained from it. Do profits come out of wages? Not at all. The *entrepreneurs* of the lowest grade, the no-profit employers must pay wages sufficient to hire laborers; those wages must be paid before the employers can realize any profit for themselves. Moreover, if production were the measure of wages, when production is greatest a business depression would be impossible. "For as soon as the warehouses began to get overstocked, wages would begin to rise, and the stock would soon be carried off. But it is precisely when the warehouses begin to fill that wages fall, and hard times, with all their social evils, overtake us." (*Progress*, page 59.)

According to Mr. George, wages depend on the margin of cultivation, or upon the produce which labor can obtain at the highest point of natural productiveness open to it without the payment of rent. The only way real wages can be increased is by reducing or abolishing rent, or better, by abolishing the private ownership of land. This theory assumes that real wages (*i.e.*, the income of the laboring classes) are the highest where land is not subject to private ownership, and where no rent is paid for its use. Is this true? The facts on this point are too obvious to need recounting. Witness the tribal communities of Australia, India, and Africa, etc. It is a notorious fact that the nearer we find man to communal ownership, the nearer he is to savagery and starvation. Mr. Gunton does not say that communal ownership is the cause of this barbarism, but manifestly it does not prevent it. Besides, industrial data show that where rents are the highest, as in large cities, there also wages reach their maximum. Moreover, wages are not fixed by what men could make if laboring for themselves, for it is precisely because the employer can afford to give them more than they could make for themselves that they consent to work for another man. Lastly, the theory of Mr. George fails to account for the rise and fall of wages, for the unequal price paid for agricultural and industrial labor, for the rise of wages where rents are highest. Not only is it inadequate to explain the facts, but everywhere it is directly controverted by them.

After his telling criticism of other systems, Mr. Gunton states his own. Limiting the sense of the word wages, which in political economy de-

notes all the rewards of human exertion, to its popular meaning, viz., *the value or price of labor or service as such*, he defines real wages: *The actual amount of wealth (social well-being) obtainable for a day's work;* and nominal wages: *The amount of money obtainable for a day's labor.* The author likens the law of wages to the law of prices, and states it as follows: first, value in economics refers exclusively to the domain of exchange, and includes both commodities and services; it expresses the ratio in which quantities, whether of commodities or services or of both, will exchange for each other. Secondly, the ratio in which quantities of different commodities will exchange for one another is not determined by supply and demand, as popularly taught, but under normal conditions the price of commodities always tends towards the cost of production. Applied to labor, this law is, that the price of labor (wages) constantly tends towards the cost of producing labor, or service, *i.e.*, what labor costs its owner, or the price of his living. Therefore: "The chief determining influence in the general rate of wages in any country, class or industry is the standard of living of the most expensive families furnishing a necessary part of the supply of labor in that country, class, or industry." Hence if you raise the mental, moral, and physical standard of living among the workingmen, consumption must increase, increased consumption will stimulate production, and wages must needs keep pace with both in their upward movement. We cannot follow the writer through all the arguments, economic and historical, which he has brought to the support of his position; many economists may dissent, but none will deny the ability which has marshalled them together.

The third part of *Progress and Wealth* is devoted to an examination of the reforms which could be accomplished. Mr. Gunton practically reduces them to one. Raise the social standard! In order to effect this essential improvement, give the workingman more opportunities to improve himself, give him more leisure hours, and save him from enforced idleness. Gradually, not by a sudden jerk, reduce the working hours to eight for grown men, and for children to half a working day, leaving to the latter four hours to be spent in the school-room. The chief argument of the author we shall give in his own words: "The first and immediate effect of the general adoption of this system would be to reduce the working time of the 8,353,803 adult laborers three hours a day, or about twenty-seven per cent., and that of the 1,118,356 children seven hours per day, or sixty-four per cent. This would withdraw 25,061,409 hours of adult labor, and 7,828,492 hours of child-labor from the market, without discharging a single laborer. . . . Besides creating a demand for 1,118,356 children under sixteen years of age to work the other half day with those already employed, it would create employment for 3,552,029 new laborers." It is perfectly clear that such a measure would distribute wages and lessen the evil of enforced idleness; but unless it increased either the volume or the value of production, it is not easy to see how it could raise the price of labor, at least for the present. Doubtless there is a moment when human energy begins to yield diminishing returns, but foremen and medical doctors should be summoned to tell us whether eight hours is the limit of the period during which human activity brings out its utmost efficiency.

Mr. Gunton is too practical an economist to claim that this reform would prove an infallible panacea. He simply advocates it as highly beneficial morally, socially, and economically. He appeals to the successful experiments made in England to prove that it promotes rather than prevents the production of wealth. His historical sketches of the factory legislation from 1800 to 1840 will well repay a careful perusal.

To our mind, he has proved, beyond any manner of doubt, that production does not always increase directly with the number of hours which an employer may wring from the weary workers. Had he done but this, he would be entitled to our grateful acknowledgment.

But precisely because we consider the work as highly useful, we feel bound to point out a feature which might mar its usefulness. The author evidently overrates the efficiency of wealth. He tells us, page 205 and again page 378, that political freedom is the effect of industrial progress, and that wealth, intelligence, and morality give freedom; that the progress is from *the material* to the *moral*, making economics the basis of ethics. If those formulas mean that wealth is the *cause* of liberty and free political institutions, we beg leave to say that history will not bear out this assertion. Sparta was free when poor; pelf killed freedom. When Cincinnatus held the plough, Rome was glorious and free; when Cæsar could spend six millions in one election, Rome was enthralled. Venice and Genoa reached the acme of power and wealth under republican institutions, Spain and Portugal under powerful monarchs. To bring home the argument, the wealth of this republic has grown beyond the most sanguine expectations; are we more free than our forefathers? If so, how can it be said that *the social character must rise, or the Republic will fall?* Wealth may be *a means* to obtain or maintain liberty, but it may also prove *its bane;* it never can properly be called *the cause* of liberty.

Much less do we admit that economics is the basis of ethics, in other words, that wealth is the cause of virtue. With regard to this assertion, an appeal to statistics of crime and pauperism is unavailing. The statistics of pauperism show how many human beings have received public assistance, not how many have felt the pangs of hunger. Criminal statistics give the sum of trials and convictions, not the aggregate of moral delinquencies. Such documents point out the faults of the poor, which are already glaring enough, but they ignore the crimes of the rich, which are glossed over, and elude the clutches of the law. But if we would draw a lesson from the figures, however incomplete may be the data which they supply, let us take into account all the vices and crimes which are found recorded in statistics. For instance, with regard to suicide, divorce, illegitimacy, how does proud and wealthy England stand in comparison with poor, starving Ireland? Communing with the poor is no less necessary than reading statistics, it unveils at once a new picture, and reveals to our admiration deeds of unconscious heroism, which do not spring from wealth or the refinements of modern life, but from poverty nobly borne, and from the examples of Him who had not where to lay His head.

Ecclesiastical History of Newfoundland. By the *Very Rev. M. F. Howley, D.D.*, Prefect Apostolic of St. George's, West Newfoundland. Boston: Doyle & Whittle, Publishers. 1888.

This work is much more than its very modest title indicates. Without being a general history (as it professes not to be) of Newfoundland, it yet contains a vast amount of valuable information respecting the early discoveries of that island and its rediscoveries by European navigators, its early settlement, and its political and other changes during the wars between England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and also during the Great Rebellion in England. Equally if not still more valuable, are the treasures of antiquarian and bibliographical lore respecting other parts of North America as well as New-

foundland, which are stored up in the introductory chapters of this volume. It is furthermore enriched with numerous fac-similes of ancient maps, letters, and other documents, coins, towns, ruins, etc.; with portraits of Sebastian Cabot, Jacques Cartier, the first and the second Lords Baltimore, the Right Rev. Dr. Michael Anthony Fleming, fourth Bishop of Newfoundland (with the title of Vicar Apostolic), and of the Right Rev. John T. Mullock, O.S.F., first Coadjutor to Bishop Fleming, and after his death his successor, under whom, in 1848, Newfoundland was erected into a regular diocese and annexed to the Province of Quebec. Additional to these illustrations are excellent engravings of the Cathedral at Harbor Grace, with the adjacent grounds and ecclesiastical edifices, of the city and harbor of St. Johns and of the Cathedral towering above all other edifices.

The work was prepared and published as a jubilee offering to our Holy Father, Pope Leo XIII., and a most worthy offering it is. Upon its first pages there are a highly appropriate dedication to His Holiness in elegant Latin, and a beautiful invocation (in Italian, and translated into English): "To Leo XIII., P.M., Indefatigable Restorer of Christian Philosophy and Theology."

While for the reasons above given the introductory chapters of the work are of rare interest and value, the following chapters, treating of the earlier and more modern ecclesiastical history of Newfoundland, are also very interesting. The foundations of the Church in Newfoundland were laid amidst difficult circumstances and frequent and violent changes of temporal rulers. For more than a century its secular history consists of a series of alternating conquests and defeats by the French and the English. The island was torn and harassed by petty warfare and depredation, being sometimes in the possession of the one power and sometimes of the other. The crews of piratical vessels also landed upon the coast and plundered wherever they could, and frequently murdered or carried away such of the colonists as they could capture. This state of things could not but be most unfavorable to both the temporal and the religious interests of the colonists.

In 1713 France, by the treaty of Utrecht, gave up all claim to Newfoundland, and since then it has remained under English dominion, though up to 1763 some of its ports and harbors were attacked and occupied at times by French fleets. After the English obtained possession systematic efforts were made by the English Governors to stamp out the Catholic religion, and also to prevent Catholic settlers establishing themselves on the island. The efforts to prevent the growth of a powerful settlement were so effectual that in 1763 the whole population was only 13,112, and of them only 7500 were permanent residents. But the efforts to stamp out the Catholic religion were, happily, less successful, for 4795, or more than one-half of the fixed population, were Catholics. Yet, large as was the proportion of Roman Catholics to the whole population, "their existence was only manifested by a series of persecuting enactments and proclamations levelled against them."

A few instances will show how rigidly these persecuting prohibitions were enforced: In 1755 an order was sent to Harbor Grace to arrest a priest who was said to have been seen there and send him to St. John's. The priest, however, got notice of this and escaped. About this time, also, Mass was reported to have been said in a certain house, whereupon the house was burned. A proclamation was sent forth prohibiting all persons from bringing Roman Catholic servants into the island, and strict orders were given that those that had been brought in during the summer should be sent home before the winter. A man named

George was fined £10 for "informing Catholics against Protestants," and a ship's captain was fined the same amount for "hoisting the Irish colors!" It became known that the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass was offered up in the fish-house of a man named Keating, at Harbor Maine, a town which now is entirely Catholic. Keating was condemned to pay a fine of £50, and his fishing stage was hauled into the middle of the harbor and there set on fire. All the Catholic servants at this harbor were also fined, and the proceeds of the fines, after deducting fees and charges, were employed in building a jail. A man named Kennedy, having confessed that he had been married by a priest, was fined £10, his house was burned and he himself was banished. It was found out that Mass had been said in a house owned by a Protestant but occupied by two Catholic tenants; the tenants were fined £40, the house was burned, and £30 of the fine was paid to the Protestant owner as compensation. About this same time Governor Dorril ordered that the houses of Catholics be demolished, their land taken from them, and as many as possible be sent out of the country. Obnoxious oaths were also imposed on Catholics, debarring them from all civil offices. One of these oaths was: "We . . . . do declare that there is not any *Transubstantiation* in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, at or after the consecration thereof by any person whatever." In 1762 Govenor Polliser added the following new persecuting enactments.

"Popish servants are not to be permitted to remain in any place but where they served previously."

"No more than two Papists are allowed to live in one house, unless in the house of a Protestant."

"*All* children [those of Catholics included] born in the country *must be baptized according to law;*" that is, by Episcopalian ministers, and according to the Episcopalian ritual.

"All huts inhabited by Catholics who induce people to stay in the island are to be pulled down."

Governor Duff in 1775 "renewed all the [previous] regulations against Papists."

In 1779 Edwards was appointed Governor, and the war of the Thirteen United Colonies for Independence was then raging. He issued no proclamations against Papists, but each magistrate in Newfoundland was a petty tyrant, and there are many traditions of the flogging of Papists and burning of their houses.

At last, on the 24th of October, 1784 (closely following upon Great Britain's acknowledgment of the Independence of the United Colonies), "liberty of conscience" was allowed to the people of Newfoundland. By that time, despite the persecutions to which they were subjected, Catholics formed three-fourths of the whole population, which then was about 25,000.

To show how systematically the British Government endeavored to prevent Newfoundland from being peopled, it is enough to mention the Polliser Act of 1775, which was supplementary to previous Acts on the same subject and which decreed that in order to prevent fishermen remaining on the island during winter, the masters of vessels should retain forty shillings of the men's wages to pay their passage home. Still more effective was the prohibition to bring women into the island, so that at that time only about one-seventh of the population were females.

Of the lives and hardships of the priests who kept the faith alive in Newfoundland during the earlier times the records and traditions are meagre. They had to contend with almost insurmountable difficulties.

They came and went as opportunities occurred, resorting to various disguises and taking refuge in fishing vessels or hiding in cellars and caves or in the woods to escape from those who were searching for them. There was no mercy for priests or for those who sheltered them or allowed them to say Mass in their houses. Hence the priests were often compelled to omit the celebration of the Most Holy Sacrifice and to be content to recite for the people the Rosary amid the rocks and woods.

Yet, while the occasional visits of these early priests were able to keep the Light of Faith from entirely dying out of the hearts and minds of the persecuted Catholic laity, they, along with non-Catholic residents, were almost destitute of practical religion. "The absence of all fixed spiritual guidance," says Dr. Howley, "the prevalence of drunkenness, the lawless character of many who came to the country, and the abundance of money in the hands of persons who knew not how to use it, unless as a means of low, sensual gratification, induced a deplorable laxity of morals and even weakened the faith of many. French infidelity, then so fashionable, was the boast of those who pretended to enlightenment, and indifference to all religion was common to all classes."

Such was the state of things in 1784, when Dr. O'Donnell, the Prefect Apostolic and first Bishop for Newfoundland, reached the island. Open persecution had ceased, but Catholics were still excluded from all civil offices, and secret indirect persecution and opposition to the Catholic religion still survived. But from this time the Newfoundland Church was organized and took its place among the provinces of Christianity.

At this point of time the ecclesiastical history, more strictly speaking, of Newfoundland commences. The situation which Bishop O'Donnell had to confront is well described by Dr. Mullock, the fifth Bishop of Newfoundland. "It is difficult," he says, "now even to conceive the obstacles a Bishop had to encounter during the period of Dr. O'Donnell's prelacy in Newfoundland. The sullen and unwilling protection offered him by the government, availing itself of his influence and still hating and insulting its benefactor; the tyrannical conduct of the petty officials to Catholics, which he was frequently obliged to overlook in silence; the rampant bigotry of many uneducated Protestants, who knew nothing of Catholicity but what they learned from 5th of November sermons; the difficulties of communication, for the whole island was then an impassable wilderness, without a single mile of road; the ignorance of the so-called 'better class,' so that a man like the Bishop, used to refined society, was completely isolated among them; the paucity of missioners and the impossibility of that close surveillance which a Bishop is bound to exercise over his clergy and people—such were a few of the difficulties the pioneer of Catholicity had to encounter in this country. Well and nobly was the duty performed by Dr. O'Donnell. . . . . He put his hand to the plough and never looked back till the good seed was sown, now, thank God! so abundantly fructifying, and which has made Newfoundland one of the most flourishing portions of God's vineyard."

Up to this time five bishops have succeeded Bishop O'Donnell in what was then the only Episcopal See in Newfoundland. Like him, they have labored with Apostolic faith and zeal, and abundantly have their labors and those of their devoted priests been rewarded. Newfoundland is now divided into two Episcopal Dioceses and a Prefecture Apostolic. According to the statistics we have been able to obtain there are in Newfoundland at the present time 54 priests, 140 churches, about 100 chapels and stations, and upwards of 100 Catholic schools.

The work before us narrates the trials and heroic labors of those who wrought in this glorious work up to the year 1850.

THE PURITAN COLONIES IN AMERICA. In two volumes. By *J. A. Doyle, M.A.*, Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1887.

The two volumes on the Puritan Colonies in America are the second and third volumes of a larger work entitled the "English Colonies of America." The first volume of this larger work is occupied with Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas. The fourth and fifth volumes are not yet published. The fourth is intended to include New York and the Quaker Colonies, and the fifth is intended to include all the Colonies during the reigns of the first and second Georges.

The material from which to reconstruct the life of New England in Colonial times is abundant, but there is great danger of misinterpreting it. This danger the writer describes at some length. The New England Puritan, he says, had an exaggerated and morbid sense of his responsibilities as a citizen and an enthusiastic conviction of the greatness that was in store for his new country. He never ceased to regard himself as one of a peculiar people, the chosen and predestined heirs to the new Canaan. Thus the provincial spirit of exaggeration which is so frequently found in young communities was intensified in the New England Colonies. The Puritan colonists saw a Latimer or a Calvin in every pulpit, and in reading their chronicles and biographies we are constantly in danger of being misled by the spirit of unintentional exaggeration and enthusiasm which pervades them.

Another danger lies in the nature of the subject and our own mental attitude towards it. The men of the seventeenth century are so closely akin to ourselves in their political ideas and aspirations that it is scarcely possible to judge them with impartiality. Even more difficult is it wholly to avoid partisanship in dealing with those theological disputes which are so inextricably blended with New England politics. "The feelings and antecedents of every Englishman must, in some measure, either incline him to sympathize with the Puritan in his moral earnestness, ... his boundless and unswerving confidence in the ever-present guidance and protection of God, or else be repelled by his narrow aversion to all that lay beyond his own sphere of vision, the blind self-confidence with which he interpreted the divine decrees and the ruthless severity with which he enforced them."

"In another way, too, we must beware lest we import the ideas of the nineteenth century into our judgment of the seventeenth. In all questions of toleration, whether we are dealing with Churchman or Puritan, with Laud or Endicott, we must remember that the whole standard of public morality is altered. To speak of the Puritan, whether in England or America, as the champion of spiritual freedom, is a proof of ignorance or worse. Toleration was abhorrent to him. . . . . He would have scorned those pleas of expediency which modern apologists have urged in his behalf. . . . . He had possession of the truth, and it was his bounden duty, by whatever means, to promote the extension of that truth and to restrain and extirpate error."

"The difficulties which thus beset the history of the Puritan colonies are not to be avoided by refusing to consider the religious aspect of the question. In New England we cannot even temporarily or in thought sever religion from the other elements of national life. The word of

God as revealed in the Bible and as taught by certain authorized interpreters, served as a standard by which every act of individual or national life must be measured."

Thus the author seems to approach his subject in a spirit of candor and impartiality, but when we follow him into the body of his work we frequently fail to perceive it at times when it is most needed. A favorite apology of his is to attribute potent defects in the character of the Puritans, and glaring inconsistencies to the spirit of the age or the circumstances in which they were placed, without inquiring as to whether those defects and inconsistencies, were not the direct outgrowth of their false religious and political ideas. In a like way and by like special pleading he seeks to relieve them from the odium that justly attaches to them and relieve them from just responsibility for the many acts of treacherous double-dealing, fraud, cruelty and persecution, which darken the history of the Puritan colonies. Where no apology is possible, the facts are curtly stated, the details that show their peculiar atrocity being suppressed or thrown into the background, while such details as can be so framed as to impute blame to the victims of Puritan cruelty or hatred are carefully gathered up.

This may seem too sweeping an indictment. It is not. As evidence of how the author is disposed to condone and excuse deliberate insincerity and double-dealing on the part of the Puritans, we refer to his comments on the seven articles which the intending emigrants to America drew up and presented to James II. These articles are of such historic value, as showing under what false pretences, from the very start, the Puritan colonists left England, that we give them here in full:

1. "To the confession of faith published in the name of the Church of England, and to every article thereof, we do with the reformed churches where we live, and also elsewhere, wholly assent."

2. "As we do acknowledge the doctrine of faith there taught, so do we the fruits and effects of the same doctrine to the begetting of saving faith in thousands in the land (conformists and reformists as they are called), with whom also, as with our brethren we do desire to keep spiritual communion in peace, and will practice in our parts all lawful things."

3. "The King's majesty we acknowledge for supreme governor in his dominion in all causes and over all persons, and that none may decline or appeal from his authority or judgment in any cause whatsoever, but that in all things obedience is due unto him, either active, if the thing commanded be not against God's word, or passive, if it be, except pardon can be obtained."

4. "We judge it lawful for his Majesty to appoint bishops, civil overseers, or officers in authority under him, in the several provinces, dioceses, congregations, or parishes, to oversee the churches and govern them civilly according to the laws of the land, and by them to be ordered according to godliness."

5. "The authority of the present bishops in the land we do acknowledge, so far forth as the same is indeed derived from his Majesty unto them and as they proceed in his name, whom we will also honor in all things and him in them."

6. "We believe that no synod, class, convocation, or assembly of ecclesiastical officers has any power or authority at all, but as the same by the magistrate is given unto them."

7. "Lastly, we desire to give unto all superiors due honor, to preserve the unity of the spirit with all that fear God, to have peace with all men what in us lieth, and wherein we are to be instructed by any."

These articles (signed by Robertson and Brewster for the would-be emigrants) are utterly at variance with the doctrinal tenets of Puritanism. The author of the work before us, after suggesting several other palliations of their acts plainly irreconcilable with the essential points of Puritan belief, endeavors to explain away this irreconcilability by suggesting that we should look on these seven articles, not so much as an exposition of faith, but rather as conditions of agreement. But this attempted explanation is lame in both its legs. In the first place, the articles are clearly a declaration of the religious belief of the Puritan intending emigrants, as regards certain points which the king and the High Church party regarded as of primary importance. Looking at them from this point of view, they furnish incontestable proof of the profound duplicity of the Puritan emigrants and their leaders. On the other hand, if these articles be regarded as "conditions of agreement" between the king and the emigrating Puritans, they evince the utmost insincerity and bad faith on the part of the latter, and were drawn up and signed for the purpose of deceiving the king and High Church party, and of violating their agreement the moment they landed in America. Inded, the author himself impliedly acknowledges this, suggesting that "the followers of Robinson might feel that, though the king's hands are long, they could hardly reach an insignificant settlement," and that, therefore, the emigrating Puritans might, with *safety*, assent to doctrines which they did not believe.

We find a like disposition, on the part of the author, to apologize for the needless wars which the Puritans of Massachusetts and Connecticut waged against the Indians, and the horrible cruelties they inflicted upon them. He urges the plea of necessity; but that there is not even the slightest ground for this plea is evident from the fact that the few and comparatively feeble colonists of Rhode Island succeeded with difficulty in living on terms of peace and amity with the very Indians whom the colonists of Massachusetts and Rhode Island were shooting and burning by wholesale, and hanging, and selling as slaves. The truth is, and it cannot be concealed, that the Puritan colonists regarded the Indians as accursed of God, because they were heathens, and as deserving no better treatment than that which the ancient Jews inflicted on the inhabitants of Palestine. As for their land, they considered it to be "the Lord's waste," which they, the Lord's "elect," might freely appropriate. They provoked and fomented wars with the Indians, and between the different tribes of Indians, and then made those wars a pretext for mercilessly slaughtering them.

The scourging and banishment of Baptists, and the whipping, banishment and hanging of Quakers and Papists are treated by the author in like apologetic manner. The facts are stated as curtly as possible, and then the subject is dismissed with a statement of the plea of necessity, which the less fanatical and bigoted of the colonists put forth.

We have already overrun our intended limits, and cannot follow the author through his explanations of constant internal jealousies and contentions, and constant quarreling with and encroachments upon the territories of other colonies. Nor can we follow him through the still more interesting subject of the gradual growth among the Puritans of ideas of political freedom. The author attributes this growth to their religious principles, but it is perfectly plain to every logical thinker that this growth was not because of those principles, but in direct opposition to them.

THE CHURCH AND THE AGE. An Exposition of the Catholic Church in View of the Needs and Aspirations of the Present Age. By *Very Rev. I. T. Hecker.* New York: Office of the Catholic World. 1887.

This is a very opportune work. For though Christianity is unchangeable, and the Church which is its embodiment and exponent is likewise unchangeable, yet the prevailing ideas and aspirations of men change, and with them their intellectual wants and leading thoughts also change; and in correspondence with these changes it becomes necessary for those who devote themselves to the exhibition and defence of the truths which the Catholic Church believes and teaches should present those truths in new ways and under new aspects corresponding with the needs and aspirations of each succeeding age.

The clear perception of this truth by Father Hecker was evidently the impelling motive that urged him to compose this book. For, though it consists of papers prepared at different times, and published separately in the *Catholic World*, yet they form a complete organic whole, the same guiding purpose running through them all.

A thoughtful perusal of the work will be profitable to two entirely distinct and different classes of readers. To Catholics it will be interesting and profitable by showing them how thoroughly prepared and competent the Catholic Church is to satisfy all that is really and truly desirable in the needs and aspirations of our present age; needs and wants that, in one way, are common to all humanity and to every age, but which, in another way, differ in different nations, and races, and ages; and, also, how completely and thoroughly the Church is prepared to meet and answer all the new objections, or rather old objections under new forms, which modern non-Catholic thought brings against Catholicity, or, in other words, against Christianity as embodied, actualized, and exhibited in its living reality in the Catholic Church.

For very similar reasons, the book will be interesting and profitable to all honest and sincere non-Catholic thinkers. For, with keen discrimination it dissects and analyzes their leading ideas, doing full justice to whatever is true in them, while clearly but kindly pointing out what is erroneous. It lucidly shows, also, how far such truths as are comprehended in those ideas can conduct man towards an apprehension of the truths of Divine Revelation; with what other truths they must be correlated, and how, when held separately and apart from those truths, they fall short and lead to pernicious errors.

The work is particularly well adapted to interest and profit American readers; for it deals especially with those phases of modern non-Catholic thought, both Protestant and rationalistic, that are peculiarly American. And for this task Father Hecker is especially well prepared, owing to his former experience and studies. He is personally familiar with the leading schools of New England rationalism and transcendentalism, having passed through those schools, sitting at the feet of their greatest masters, and thoroughly familiarizing himself with their ideas, during his onward journeying towards the truth. Whilst so doing, he was also a careful investigator of "Orthodox" Protestantism, of which rationalism is at once both the legitimate offspring and the irreconcilable opponent. Of these schools of thought, therefore, he might with especial propriety say, "I write whereof I do know, and wherein I was once an active participant."

But we will let Father Hecker explain, in his own words, the main purpose of his book. That purpose, he says in his Preface, "Is to show that the liberty enjoyed in modern society, in so far as it is true, and the

intelligence of modern society, in so far as it is guileless, are inestimable helps to the spread of Catholicity, and the deepening of that interior spirit which is the best result of true religion."

The office of divine external authority in religious affairs, in providing a safeguard to the individual soul, and assisting it to a freer and more instinctive coöperation with the Holy Spirit's interior inspirations, is often treated of, and the false liberty of pride and error is plainly pointed out.

The logical order would, perhaps, place the articles on old-fashioned Protestantism first, then those on Unitarianism, etc. But, whatever the logical order may claim, the order of actual facts relegates our disputes with genuine Protestantism mostly to out-of-the-way neighborhoods, where the currents of intellectual thought have stagnated; hence such articles have been relegated to places other than the most conspicuous. The main question of the hour is, "How can religion be made compatible with a high degree of liberty and intelligence?"

In treating of the respective relations of Catholicity and Protestantism to civil liberty, Father Hecker shows that the fundamental doctrines of Protestantism are irreconcilable with civil liberty and republican governments, and particularly with the formative principles of the American republic, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. The Protestant doctrine that the natural man is totally depraved, corrupt and enslaved, both as to his reason and his will, cuts off, root and branch, personal, civil, intellectual, moral, and religious liberty; and so Luther and Calvin and Knox and their followers believed and taught. As a legitimate consequence of this, Protestantism holds that the unregenerate man is entirely unable to do any good, and is inclined to all evil.

This Protestant doctrine, when applied to the political order, excludes unregenerate men from all part in the organization of the State, and all participation in the rights and privileges of citizenship. It cuts away the very foundations of all liberty, personal, political, civil, intellectual, moral, religious. The natural man has no rights whatever. As regards civil and political relations, all power and all rights belong exclusively to the regenerate, the "elect."

Hence the New England Puritans, where they shaped the State to suit their creed, granted political citizenship only to members of their sect. So, too, it was in Europe. And wherever Protestants did not do this, it was not because of their religious creed, but in contradiction to it. The descendants of the Puritans, in signing the Declaration of Independence, signed the death-warrant of their own fundamental religious dogma. For the Protestant dogma holds that human nature is totally corrupt; the Declaration of Independence regards human nature as essentially good. The former maintains that man, by Adam's fall, forfeited all his natural rights; the latter declares that the rights of man by nature are inalienable. The Declaration of Independence is the antithesis of Martin Luther's work on the *Slave-will* and of John Calvin's *Institutes*.

And as Calvinism logically excludes republicanism in politics, so too, republicanism logically excludes Calvinism in religion. The proof of this is simple and easy. The natural influence of the American political system, based on universal suffrage, is an incitement to the intelligence and conscience of the people under the conviction that the choice of the ballot-box will be, in the main, on the side of good government. For what is a vote? It is a recognition of man's intelligence, of his

free will, of his liberty and responsibility. It is the admission that man, as man, is and ought to be considered a factor in political society; that he has the right to shape, and in bounden duty ought to shape, so far as his ability extends, the course of the destiny of his country. It is the practical application of the truth that all men have an equal right, as men, to "life," to "liberty" and the "pursuit of happiness." Now all these truths Protestantism, by its dogma of total depravity, denies. But the force of these truths, by virtue of their practical recognition in American republicanism, have effaced from the minds of Protestants of our day the dogmas which are taught in their catechism. It is not too much to say that not one Protestant in a hundred, perhaps not one in five hundred, can make an act of faith without important mental reservations in his Protestant creed.

But there is no such antagonism between the Catholic faith and American republicanism. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, reason is the organ of truth, and acts upon the truth which lies within its own domain with infallible certitude. The action of reason implicitly or explicitly precedes faith. Man is by nature in the possession of his free will; therefore, freedom is a birthright, and he holds it in trust from his Creator, and is responsible for its right use. Man has lost none of his original faculties, and has forfeited none of his natural rights by Adam's fall. Therefore he is, by nature, in the possession of his natural rights—"among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." With regard to these rights, "God has created all men equal." Therefore, all political authority in individuals may justly be said to be derived, under God, from the consent of the collective people who are governed; and the people, under God, associated together in a body politic, are the source of the sovereign political power in the civil order.

These statements are in perfect accordance with the authoritative teaching of the Catholic Church. In view of them it is easy to see that there is no antagonism, express or implied, between the fundamental principles of the Declaration of Independence, or of the Constitution of the United States, and the doctrines of the Catholic religion; on the contrary, they harmonize and agree. A citizen of the American republic, who understands himself, is all the more loyal to the American republic because he is a Catholic; and he is all the better Catholic because he is a republican. For it is the doctrines of the Catholic Church which alone furnish him with the principles which enable him to make a synthesis between republicanism and Christianity.

So, too, true republicanism furnishes the most favorable field for the action of the Church in promoting true religion. For, to use the words of Cardinal Gibbons, the Church "has lived under absolute empires, constitutional monarchies, and in free republics, and everywhere she grows and expands. She has often, indeed, been hampered in her divine mission. She has often been forced to struggle for existence wherever despotism casts its dark shadow, like a plant shut out from the blessed sunlight of heaven. But in the genial atmosphere of liberty she blossoms as the rose."

These thoughts and arguments Father Hecker elucidates and enforces. It would be well if every honest politician and thoughtful statesman, and every intelligent American citizen, whether Catholic or non Catholic, would procure a copy of his book and read it carefully.

A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages. By *Henry Charles Lea*, Author of "An Historical Sketch of Sacerdotal Celibacy," "Superstition and Force," "Studies in Church History." In Three Volumes. Volumes I. and II. New York: Harper & Bros. 1888.

It is not easy to give an adequate appreciation of these somewhat pretentious volumes, which are appearing at short intervals, as this number of the Review goes to press. The work itself, when completed, will demand a thoroughgoing examination, though it has hardly the importance claimed for it by the publishers. It is true, "no comprehensive history of the Inquisition, based on the results of modern scholarship, has yet been attempted," and much might be expected from the work of an author who "for fifteen years has been collecting material for it—material which has grown enormously," etc. But the publication of no amount of material gives true and comprehensive history, unless there be a competent historian to set it forth.

The secular papers have welcomed the volumes so far published with uniform applause, but with singularly contradictory appreciations. Some find in them almost a vindication, at least a strong weakening of the indictment, of the Church for the part taken by her during the ages in question. Others discover the confirmation of their worst prejudices. The Catholic student of history will read with some weariness this ponderous work, which does not differ materially from many other books on the subject, except in the crowded citations from recent research. He will also soon discover that the author is not competent to deal with this "material which has grown enormously."

First, Mr. Lea has to deal with several centuries of the Church's greatest activity through her officials—Popes, bishops, priests, and friars—in relation with the faithful and with those who for the first time were breaking away from the faith into heresy. There is question at every step of the Catholic faith; *and Mr. Lea does not even understand the Catholic faith of his own time.* He is guilty of such formulas as, "the theory of justification by works," "religion deprived of all spiritual vitality," "a dry and meaningless formalism," "the magical sacrament of penitence," "the internal condition of the soul was a matter of virtual indifference," "the modern theory of indulgences, as distinguished from that of the middle ages," etc. (I., pp. 46–47). In fact, the whole book proves the truth of the author's candid prefatory statement—"Doctrines are beyond my province."

But Mr. Lea has not even made himself acquainted with the monuments of the popular faith of the Middle Ages, of which, however, he treats so confidently. These monuments are perfectly accessible in collections often reprinted. They are contemporary lives of the saints, treatises of devotion, sermons, and spiritual writings, in which the times were rich. Many of these influence the Catholic piety of our own day. No one could make acquaintance with them and say, honestly: "The believer did not deal directly with his Creator—scarce even with the Virgin or hosts of intercessory saints. The supernatural powers claimed for the priest interposed him as the mediator between God and man." (I., p. 47.) Even garrulous Cæsar of Heisterbach might have taught the author that this judgment is as false as it would be if pronounced of the Catholics of to-day. But Mr. Lea quotes rather from his pages the more than dubious story of the massacre at Béziers. Cæsar told it on hearsay, in a distant country, years after the event, and none of the contemporary historians speak of the atrocious command supposed to have been given by the Pope's legate. Mr. Lea quietly inserts it in his text with, "a fervent Cistercian contemporary informs us," etc. (I. p. 154).

In a note to the entire paragraph (he does not usually assign his authority for each fact separately) he cites eight authorities, beginning with Pope Innocent III., and winding up with Cæsar of Heisterbach!

Perhaps his foreign correspondents indexed only the salacious chronicles in their archives. Certainly Mr. Lea's pages are painfully congested with accounts of the immoralities of the time, though he seems to know little of its faith and morals.

Secondly, Mr. Lea, through all these extensive volumes, is treating of the Church in her action as a compact and well-organized society. He recognizes the moral personality of the Church,—this is the common testimony she extorts from her bitterest enemies,—but he seems to have no clear idea of the nature of action by such a society. Hence the strangest contradictions are found. He begins by trying to show that "the Church by sundering itself completely from the laity . . . . had thereby created an antagonism between itself and the people." (I. p. 5.) A few pages later he speaks of "the incongruous union of feudal noble and Christian prelate, ... to be seen everywhere." It is natural that an author who has not understood the faith of the people of the Middle Ages—that inner principle which gave the unity of minds necessary to any society—should also miss comprehending the exterior principle—the authority which gave the unity of action that is also necessary. Mr. Lea is quite capable of quoting in the same breath a General Council and an anonymous *Libellus*. His former works have made known his incompetence in interpreting the canon law. In the present volumes, a more skilful manipulation of his material would have rendered tenfold stronger the antithesis he has rather naïvely chosen as the central point of his book—sacerdotalism and anti-sacerdotalism.

In fact, Mr. Lea is not a philosophic historian. He seems never to have resolved the notion of a society into its elements, and consequently his investigations are not complete and his judgment on any disputed point is worthless. If his method of presenting his material is any index to his own mastery over it, then this, too, is as fallacious as the result is exasperating to the reader. The second volume, it is true,—something after the old plan of universal histories,—takes country by country. But the first, which contains the fundamental principles, has neither order of time nor of place. There is a certain order of subject-matter, such as might be indexed in a library. Thus, under the caption, "Causes of Antagonism with the Laity,"—is massed together all the scandalous material possible against the clergy, carefully pigeon-holed by titles. Doubtless this might be valuable as raw-material (essentially one-sided and incomplete, be it remembered), but so far we are denied even a bibliographical index of it.

Finally, Mr. Lea takes apparently no notice of the works of modern philosophic historians. While he is grouping these painful and misleading details into what he, perhaps, imagines are irresistible masses, it seems never to occur to him that the judgment of unwearied students, of undoubted competence, might be of use in the interest of truth. Even his material is rendered defective in this way, notably in whatever concerns the decrees of Councils, and the official action of the Church as distinct from the individual activity, good or evil, of members of the clergy. Thus, among contemporary authors, Hergenroether, Hefele, Gams, Bickell, find no place in Mr. Lea's jumble of citations; nor, from the times of which he writes, the principal dogmatists and moralists, who stood behind the canonists in all their writings and furnished the final judgment on principles of right and wrong.

In sum, Mr. Lea's book, so far, shows that he has been a diligent scav-

enger, and he has peeped through a great many historic keyholes of the Middle Ages. This is the impression left by the greater number of his pages. His "examination of the jurisprudence" of the period in question will hardly bear the fruit he anticipates; for, neither temperament nor training, nor even acquired learning, had fitted him for such an undertaking. Even the literary qualities of the book show little power beyond that of grouping details—raising the dust of centuries in clouds which are fit only to obscure all clear vision, when they do not perturb minds.

LIFE AND DEATH OF REV. EDMUND GENNINGS. By his Brother, *John Gennings*. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co.

This account of the sufferings and death of the venerable Gennings is taken from a very rare and curious quarto volume, composed by his brother, Rev. John Gennings, and published at St. Omer's by Charles Roscord in 1614. Its title was the "Life and Death of Mr. Edmund Gennings, Priest, crowned with martyrdom at London, the 10th day of November, in the year MDXCI. Preciosa in conspectu Dei Mors Sanctorum ejus. Psal. 115." It has a frontispiece, a portrait of the martyr, engraved after the rude and quaint manner of engraving at that time, and also several other illustrative scenes, which are reproduced in the volume before us.

Rev. John Gennings, the author of the original work, was brought up in the Protestant religion. By a singular or rather a miraculous intervention of Divine Providence he was made acquainted with his brother, Edmund Gennings, but wished to have nothing to do with him, telling him that he was a "traitor, both to God and his country," and a "discredit to himself and all his friends." Subsequently, hearing of his brother Edmund's arrest and execution, "he rather rejoiced than in any way bewailed the untimely end of his nearest kinsman, hoping thereby to be rid of all persuasions which he suspected he should receive from him touching the Catholic religion. But his martyred brother's prayers for him prevailed before the throne of God, and about ten days after the execution of his brother he was converted in a wonderful manner. "Once a Protestant, he became a Catholic, without persuasion or conference with any man in the world," furnishing another instance that "the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church of Christ." He became afterwards a student at the College of Douay, where he was ordained priest in 1607, and the following year went back to England. Subsequently he entered the Franciscan Order, which by his instrumentality was set up again in England and of which he was appointed the first Provincial.

In the preface to his account of the life and death of his brother he makes this declaration: "I protest that I will make mention of no one thing which I have not either known to be true myself or heard from his mouth whose life and martyrdom I write, or have not received as true from very honest, virtuous and sufficient persons, whose tender and catholic consciences (as may justly be thought) could not bear the burden of uttering such untruths."

Edmund Gennings, the martyred priest, was of Protestant parentage, and, like his brother John, was brought up in the Protestant religion until he was about thirteen years of age. But he was a boy of "so great virtue and obedience to his mother, of modest behaviour towards all, of reverence towards his elders and betters and profited so much in his learning, that he was not only worthily admired and beloved of many,

but especially of his schoolmaster." God marked him for His own and caused that he should enter into the service of a Catholic gentleman, Mr. Sherwood, who, being "very much persecuted for his religion in his temporal fortunes, seldom made any long abode in one place, for the better preservation of his life." Mr. Sherwood "from the first day kept a watchful eye upon his new servant in all his actions, because he knew all his friends to be earnest Protestants, but in a short time he found him so trusty, so secret, and so diligent in all his business and affairs that he began to speak to him of religion and the salvation of his soul; and perceiving him to be tractable, capable and willing to learn, he so far instructed him that the youth . . . . earnestly desired to be reconciled and made a member of the Catholic Church. . . . . His pious request was not long denied him, to his exceeding comfort and consolation."

By subsequent providences he was placed in the college at Rheims, under the care of its then President, Dr. Allen, afterwards Cardinal. There he applied himself with all diligence to his studies, "but above all to the study of the science of the saints." One of his superiors has thus written of him: "Edmund Gennings was prudent and wise in counsel, humble in obedience, devout in Christ, strong in faith, prompt in good works, most true in his words, remarkable in goodness, excellent in charity." . . . . The superiors of the College, "considering his fervor, procured a dispensation from Rome that he might be made a Priest before his time, he being but twenty-three years of age." He was ordained at Soissons, March 18th, 1590, together with Mr. Alexander Rawlins, who suffered at York in 1595.

Father Edmund Gennings had not long been ordained before apostolic faculties were granted to him, and he was sent upon the English Mission by Dr. Barrett, then President of the College at Rheims. After some time they found a vessel in Normandy whose master consented to take him and four other priests to England. After encountering great dangers, both on sea and land, they separated and made their ways to different parts of England. In England Father Edmund Gennings labored devoutly and faithfully among the scattered and persecuted members of the flock of Christ. After saying Mass at the house of a Mr. Wells, he was arrested, along with another priest and several of the laity. He was cast into a dungeon without food, and two days afterwards was tortured and most brutally mangled and put to death.

All the others excepting Mrs. Wells were also executed. She died in prison. After the blessed martyr, Father Gennings, had been hanged and cut down, dismembered and disemboweled, and his heart was in the hand of the hangman, he in the distinct hearing of the spectators and of the hangman uttered the words, "Holy Gregory, pray for me!" upon which the hangman swore a most wicked oath and cried out: "Zounds! see! see! his heart is in my hand, and yet Gregory is in his mouth. Oh, egregious Papist!"

Thus we have endeavored to outline the scope of this work; but it is impossible for us to do justice to the simplicity and edifying character of the narrative. Those who imagine that the persecution of Catholics in England was owing mainly to political motives, and those who desire to realize in their own minds the Christian heroism both of the missionary priests and of the hunted, persecuted, faithful laity, on the one hand, and the demoniac hatred and malice of the English Protestants of those times, on the other hand, should procure a copy of this little book and read it.

TACTICS OF INFIDELS. By the *Rev. L. A. Lambert*, author of "Notes on Ingersoll," "Handbook of Scripture References," etc. Buffalo: Peter Paul & Brother. 1887.

This work, as its title page says, is by the author of "Notes on Ingersoll," which, it is not too much to say, has received universal recognition and commendation as the most thorough, trenchant, and masterly exposure of the fallacies of that noted infidel's arguments and statements that has been published. The work before us is of equally great merit. In it its learned author follows up the subject and adopts a very similar method to that which he employs in his "Notes,"—that of quotation and comment. Instead, however, of there being only two parties as in the "Notes," there are four in this work—Ingersoll, Notes, Lacy and Lambert.

The reason for this is found in circumstances which Father Lambert briefly states in the introduction to his work. These were as follows: Ingersoll did not attempt to reply to Father Lambert, but "maintained a studied silence, though urged by the press and interviewers in a way that must have been annoying to him. Two years after the appearance of the "Notes," one of his disciples, urged by "multiple requests and challenges," published a "Reply to Rev. L. A. Lambert's Notes on Ingersoll." From these "multiple requests" it is natural to infer that some response was considered necessary and that Mr. W. B. Lacy was the man competent to give it. Notwithstanding the title of his book, it is in fact nothing more than an essay towards a defense of Ingersoll.

This "reply" of Mr. Lacy's Father Lambert takes up and, as in his "Notes" lets Lacy and Ingersoll and the "Notes" speak each for himself or itself, and then adds his own comments.

The fallacies of so-called "*modern*" skepticism (for all its leading notions are simply a rehash of ancient infidelity) are seized hold of, held with tenacious grasp, dissected and analyzed and held up to the "white light of reason and common sense, so that their self-contradictions become evident." The fundamental falsehood of false theories and notions is chased into and out of all its lurking places, followed up through the various disguises and metamorphoses it assumes, until it is run down and destroyed by the unsparing, unerring logic of Father Lambert's method.

Almost every question raised by "modern" skeptics and infidels is searchingly examined and clearly answered. Among these are the alleged eternity of matter, the existence of God, the possibility of His existence being known to and proved by the natural reason of man, the Holy Trinity, the creation, the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, infinite wisdom, justice, and mercy (against all of which infidels attempt to raise objections), the freedom of the human will, the nature of sin, polygamy, war, slavery, the killing of the heathen by the Jews, the relation of the Old and the New Testaments, the authenticity and genuineness and credibility and inspiration of written Divine revelation, miracles, the morals of the Jews, Christian morality, human liberty, demoniac possessions, Papal infallibility—the objections raised by Ingersoll and Lacy against Christianity on all these points, are fairly stated in their own language and thoroughly refuted.

Father Lambert brings to his task admirable qualifications for its successful performance, extensive learning, familiar acquaintance with the sophistical theories and notions of skeptics and their methods of argumentation, keen discrimination, remarkable power of logical analysis and synthesis, and an inexhaustible fund of wit and sarcasm. He knows, too, exactly what instruments to select for the different parts of his work, and uses them with extraordinary good judgment. He never

employs a razor to chop wood nor an axe to crush a fly. Wit, pungent humor, irony, scathing sarcasm, merciless exposure of falsehoods, thorough dissection of sophisms, lucid statements of the real points of disputed questions, and irrefragable logic in serious argumentation, are all by turns resorted to, just at the right times and places, and employed with telling effect.

The style, too, adopted by Father Lambert as to the forms both of thought and language is admirably suited to the work. All rhetorical embellishments are discarded, and all superfluity of words. The language is strong, vigorous Anglo-Saxon, clear and simple, and the method of statement and argument (even where acutely metaphysical or severely logical) is direct, clear and plain, so that any reader possessed of common sense can follow without difficulty the line of reasoning.

The work ought to be in the hands of every lay-Catholic, and of every non-Catholic also who wishes to acquaint himself with the easiest and quickest and most direct way to meet and refute the stock objections which skeptics and infidels are constantly raising against the Christian religion—objections which are as old as written history records and have been refuted a thousand times, but are reiterated and will be reiterated as long as there are men who prefer darkness to light and evil to good.

HERODIAS. A Dramatic Poem. By *J. C. Heywood*. New edition. Revised. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

ANTONIUS. A Dramatic Poem. By *J. C. Heywood*. New Edition. Revised. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

SALOME. A Dramatic Poem. By *J. C. Heywood*. New Edition. Revised. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

Each of these three dramas, published in as many separate volumes, is complete in itself. Yet the second is a sequel to the first, and the third is a conclusion to the other two, and, taken together, they form a perfect whole.

Herodias is based upon the narrative of St. Matthew respecting the beheading of St. John the Baptist by the order of Herod. Around this are gathered other incidents and scenes based upon history or the statements of St. Matthew, tradition, or evolved from the writer's own imagination.

The scene is laid at Jerusalem. The time is the night when Salome danced before King Herod and his court at a banquet given in commemoration of his birthday, and St. John the Baptist was beheaded by order of Herod, in accordance with Salome's request made at the suggestion of Herodias, her mother. The chief characters are St. John the Baptist, Herodias, Salome, Antonius—the father of Salome, and first and real husband of Herodias, whom Herodias deserted, first for Philip, the half-brother of Herod, whom she then deserted to take up with Herod—and Sextus, a Roman noble and officer, and lover of Salome. Subsidiary to these are an aged Jew predicting woes that would come upon his people, exulting voices of demons, and voices of angels declaring the vengeance of Almighty God.

The pleadings of Salome with her vile mother that she will not compel her to ask for the head of St. John the Baptist, her struggles against her mother's overpowering will, her contrition and lamentations over her own weakness in yielding to her mother's wicked demand, and her tearful persistence in dismissing her lover and forever refusing to marry him because her conscience tells her that she is a murderer, are pathetically depicted. Seldom have the passion of revenge and the terrific

tortures of remorse and despair been more profoundly analyzed and presented with more power. Few passages in modern dramatic poetry can compare with the vividness and force of the scene in which Herodias, with demoniac shamelessness, lays bare to her daughter the vile passions which possess her will and heart, or the scene in which she gloats in vengeance over the head of St. John the Baptist, and then, seized with remorse, declares herself tormented by demons, and becomes the victim of despair.

Antonius is the sequel to Herodias. The scene is the Isle of Mona, now Anglesey. The time is that of an invasion of Great Britain under Aulus Plautius. The personages are Antonius, father of Salome; Sextus, lover of Salome; Kaliphilus, the Wandering Jew; Caractacus, King of a British tribe; Druids and Druidesses; Salome; Berenice, formerly Salome's maid of honor; and Roman and British soldiers.

This drama abounds in passages of rare beauty and strength, and the interest of the former poem is fully sustained. It is even more powerful and dramatic in some respects than is "Herodias." It has an undertone which is sad beyond expression, and reminds us of some of the masterpieces of ancient Greek tragedy. The scene in which Kaliphilus, while vainly pleading for Salome's love, declares his awful crimes and terrible doom, is a magnificent effort of genius. And beautiful and true is the manner in which Salome describes how she, by contrition and faith, was led from darkness to light, and from wretchedness to peace.

"Salome" is the concluding drama of the series. It is full of another and a higher purpose, and is superior to both the others in dramatic intensity. The scene is laid within and without the walls of Jerusalem; the time is that when Jerusalem was taken by the soldiers of Titus.

All three of these dramas are lofty in conception and abound in passages of very great beauty and strength.

L'Eglise et L'Etat en Angleterre depuis la Conquete des Normands jusqu'a nos Jours. Par *Albert du Boys*. Paris: Delhomme et Briguet. 1887.

M. du Boys's reputation as a careful, conscientious and impartial historian was established before he gave this book to the world, he having already published two excellent works that at once won popular favor and had an extensive circulation—one on the "Civil Constitution of the Clergy of France of 1790," and the other a biography of Catharine of Aragon.

This third volume from his pen is on a kindred subject to that of the first, another argument against the subordination of the Church to the State, a proof that the secular power should leave religion free and untrammeled by any civil restrictions, a free Church in a free State being the best guarantee of the preservation of order and the observance of decorum. In other countries besides France, he says, the attempt has often been made to have the Church organization exist as a tool of the State, leaving to it only the semblance of independence; but in every instance in which such a course has been adopted, whether under a parliamentary form of government or under an absolute monarchy, the Church has been impeded and trammeled in her civilizing mission, and not only she herself, but the State even more so, has suffered great injury in consequence, in many cases dragging the people away from their allegiance to the central spiritual authority placed over them by Christ Himself. The task which M. du Boys has imposed upon himself in writing the book now before us, is to show by what means this sad result was brought about in England. By the simple narration of events,

as they occurred from the time of the Norman Conquest, he makes it clear to every reader how the "Reformation" of the sixteenth century was the natural and, humanly speaking, almost unavoidable consequence of the system of State usurpation of Church rights inaugurated in the eleventh.

After making some introductory remarks concerning the condition of the Church in the beginning of the eleventh century, he discusses, in succession, the relations of archbishops Lanfranc, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Becket with the early Norman kings of England; then, having taken a cursory view of the intervening period, he narrates the history of Cardinal Fisher, and discusses the position of Anglicanism as a state religion. In the early part of the volume three grand figures stand out prominently. During the episcopate of the three early archbishops of Canterbury named above, the most burning questions bearing on the relations of the Church with the State are discussed. It is literally true, says our author, that Becket's martyrdom purchased liberty for the Church, as well as a revulsion of feeling in her favor, which that apologist of despotism, the Protestant historian Froude, is pleased to qualify as a domineering and tyrannical reaction, but which, in reality, was only a release from slavery. Nor was this reaction accompanied by the continuation of violence which we read of in the works of so many pretentious, but systematically lying historians.

Want of space prevents us from dwelling any longer on this most interesting topic, or on M. du Boys's account of the Great Charter, which, though coming rather late to change the scene of battle, yet placed all classes of society under the protection of the Common Law, and by which the clergy, through the influence of another archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, secured guarantees against regal despotism. Then follow alternations of success in the struggle between the two powers, which are lost sight and sound of by the dust and clamor of the almost incessant civil and foreign wars. Under weak prelates the Church loses her prestige, and unwarranted and unjust encroachments are made by the civil power, which, for its own selfish ends, protects turbulent and rebellious churchmen and heretics. How the way is thus prepared for the final catastrophe wrought by Henry VIII., the reader will best learn from the pages of M. du Boys's absorbingly interesting book.

THE GLORIES OF MARY. By *St. Alphonsus de Liguori*, Doctor of the Church. Edited by Rev. Eugene Grimm, Priest of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Vol. I. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1887.

The fundamental thought and motive of this work are stated by St. Alphonsus himself in his brief address "to the reader," and in his equally brief "Introduction." He says that "it was, properly speaking, on Mount Calvary that Jesus formed His Church, and that it is evident that the Blessed Virgin coöperated in a most excellent and special manner in the accomplishment of that work. And in the same way it can be said that though she brought forth the Head of the Church, Jesus Christ, without pain, she did not bring forth the body of this Head without very great suffering; and so it was on Mount Calvary that Mary began in an especial manner to be the Mother of the whole Church. And now, to say all in a few words, God, to glorify the Mother of the Redeemer, has so determined and disposed that of her great charity she should intercede in behalf of all those for whom His divine Son paid and offered the superabundant price of His precious blood, in which alone "is our salvation, life, and resurrection."

The work—"The Glories of Mary"— forms part of "The Centennial Edition" of the complete works of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, which is in process of translation into English and publication by Messrs. Benziger Brothers. The volume before us is the seventh volume of the series.

"The Glories of Mary" was first published in the year 1750, at Naples. St. Alphonsus was then fifty-four years old, and believed that, his bodily health having become exhausted by austerities and excessive labor, the end of his earthly existence was approaching, not suspecting that he had yet to live nearly forty years more in the service of God.

Had St Alphonsus published no other book than the above, it would have been sufficient to render his name immortal. It is not only a source of great glory to its author, but it has been productive of incalculable good to others, and doubtless will continue to be thus productive in the future. It has been translated into all languages, and printed and reprinted in almost every country in the world. By souls that hunger and thirst after justice, or need consolation and encouragement, it has always been heartily welcomed, and been profitable to countless readers for instruction, correction, edification, and perseverance in the Christian life and in efforts to attain perfection. It is, like all the Saint has written, a summary, as it were, of Catholic tradition on the subject that he treats. Thus, it is not simply Saint Alphonsus, as an individual author, who speaks, but rather the Church herself who speaks through him, by the voice of her pontiffs, saints, fathers, and doctors, of all ages, whose treasures of wisdom, piety, and devotion he has collected.

The editor says, in his preface, that in order that full reliance may be placed on the authenticity of the quotations, he has carefully verified them all, and can vouch for their exact correctness. He has done this also with regard to the texts of Sacred Scripture that are quoted, and where errors have crept in has carefully corrected them, and has exercised like care with regard to other parts of the work.

The volume before us contains the first and second parts of the work. The first part is an explanation of the *Salve Regina*, and is divided into ten chapters or discourses, each followed by a most appropriate, fervent, and devout prayer. After this comes a collection of exceedingly beautiful and fervent prayers, addressed by various saints to the Holy Mother of God. Following these are translations of a number of hymns to her by St. Alphonsus. Part second consists of discourses on each of the feasts of the Blessed Virgin, each discourse being followed by an appropriate prayer. Then there are a number of hymns, and after them a few brief meditations.

THE BAD CHRISTIAN; Or, Sermons on the Seven Deadly Sins, and the different Sins against God and our Neighbor which flow therefrom. In Seventy-six Sermons, adapted to all the Sunday and Holy Days of the Year. By *Rev. Francis Hunolt, S.J.* Translated by Rev. J. Allen, D.D. 2 vols., 8vo. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago: Benziger Bros. 1888.

We have here the third and fourth volumes of the sermons of Father Hunolt, S.J., and it is hardly enough praise of them to say that they fully deserve at least as much popularity as their predecessors. The subjects are clearly and satisfactorily treated in a simple and almost charming style. We may also state that their value is greatly enhanced by the use of copious marginal notes and a very full alphabetical index of the matters discussed.

The first of these two volumes of sermons on the bad Christian con-

tains thirty-seven discourses, and the second thirty-nine. All his evil ways are thoroughly discussed, from the incredulity of the unfaithful children who turn against their mother, the Church, to the most daring presumption which, to some extent, is characteristic of every sinner. Sermons, bearing on the various classes of sins, are grouped according to the class to which they may respectively belong. Thus, for instance, under the head of the seven deadly sins, we are first warned of the vain labor and folly of those guilty of pride, and then told of the means of attaining the opposite virtue of humility. The preacher again proves how easily carelessness in religious matters leads the avaricious man to neglect God, and exposes him to the almost certain danger of an unhappy death. Injustice is a natural effect of avarice, and unless restituiton and full satisfaction be made by him who takes what lawfully belongs to another, it will go hard with him on the last day. Such is also the case with those indulging in unlawful sensual pleasures, the habit of which, especially of the degrading vice of impurity, so easily enslaves its victims. In connection with the treatment of the sin of gluttony and drunkenness, we are given an admirable, though too brief, exposition of the end and object of fasting; and, following the sermons on anger and vindictiveness, is one on sloth in the service of God.

The discourses on the deadly sins fill about three-fourths of Volume I., the remainder of which, as well as nearly all of Volume II., has a treatment of the sins known distinctively as those against God, such as superstition, disrespect of holy things, ingratitude, neglect and abuse of divine grace and of the hearing of the word of God in sermons. As showing how, even in minor matters, the truth is the same in all ages and countries, we need only point to a sermon on fortune-tellers in this collection, which is as well adapted to the present day in America as to the Germany of a century and a half ago. Such also may be said of remarks about disgraceful scenes at Shrovetide; nor did the preacher neglect to give due castigation to the sin of human respect, its meanness and injustice; and to unlawful social fashions and customs.

A considerable portion of space, but not too much, unfortunately, even for these enlightened days of ours, is given to sins against the person and character of our neighbor, the scandal of wicked tongues, fault-finding, interpreting others' actions in a bad sense, cursing and swearing, impure language, boasting of sin, and other cognate topics.

These volumes cannot fail to serve as a valuable aid to missionary priests, especially those having little time left for the preparation of sermons. Most valuable material, methodically arranged, and couched in simple and forcible language, is here ready at hand.

Songs of a Lifetime. By *Eliza Allen Starr*, Author of "Patron Saints," and "Pilgrims and Shrines." Published by the Author, Saint Joseph's Cottage, No. 299 Huron Street, Chicago, Illinois. 1887.

There are some writers' names always linked in our minds with delicate, beautiful, chaste images, and whenever we find them upon cover and title page we are sure of a certain high and pure atmosphere of thought within. We take up such a volume with a feeling of relief and innocent enjoyment. There will be nothing to grate upon the best part of us, nothing to awaken an evil spirit within us by even a remote association during the hour it is our companion. We are sure of growing a little better in spite of ourselves, and of carrying away from the quiet season some bright or tender or noble memory, that shall again and again recur at an opportune moment. Such a name is that of Eliza

Allen Starr. *Patron Saints* and *Pilgrims and Shrines* have been long enough upon the library shelves of the Catholic public to familiarize it with her prose, and the Catholic press has presented many of her poems to that public during the last twenty years, yet the volume now offered comes to us with something of the pleasure of a surprise. So modestly has she proffered her claim as a poet that we had not realized the importance of her work. The volume is quite large and very beautiful. It is new and original in its dress, and there is a daintiness and dignity about its type, paper and finish which are the fitting exponent of its merit. The poems are not the rhyme and jingle of a shallow mind, but the expression of a thinker. They began long ago, and have grown with the years. So many things have served to make life beautiful with "the beauty of holiness" for Miss Starr, that it is impossible to give an idea of them from selections. The topics are domestic, yet not personal —every-day, yet not common-place. The purest affections, the familiar haunts of a gentle life, the refining touch of pain and sorrow, the voices of nature, the inner life of a deeply religious woman—one by one, as the chords of the heart were stirred, songs have arisen and echoed through the world God made, and always to His glory. Serene, sweet, peaceful, fervent, is the spirit of the whole, with such beautiful word-pictures, such steadfast faith, such deep piety, as forbids the marring of it by one frivolous ill mated verse. Miss Starr is an easy writer, and a casual reader will glean a portion of her meaning with every glance, but the finished beauty of expression, the exquisite delicacy of many of the thoughts will repay more careful and exacting students. About half the poems were published in 1867,—ten years ago,—but the other half are gathered for the first time from the waysides and by-paths where they have been scattered for the few who have the time and the taste to read in busy moments the "poet's corner" of daily and weekly issues. A portrait of Miss Starr really *adorns* the opening volume. Those who have the mild and benevolent countenance in their mind's eye will gladly welcome this shadow-reproduction of it, while those to whom it is unknown may here make its acquaintance. There are few who will not be able to trace in the fine yet strong lines the very nature finding its expression in musical words and exactly cultured phrases which define a clean, clear, conscientious thinker. Of these pages may be truthfully repeated the well-worn commendation of an older writer, and of many who are far from deserving its high praise. Miss Starr has surely never framed a word in her poems—far less "a line"—which, "dying, she would wish to blot."

Ownership and Natural Right. By *Rev R. I. Holaind, S.J.*, Professor of Ethics, Woodstock College, Maryland. Baltimore and New York: Hill & Harvey, Publishers. 1887. 12mo. Pp. 176.

Tenure of Land and Eminent Domain. A Lecture delivered before the Leonine Union of Indianapolis, October 3d, 1887. Indianapolis: Carlon & Hollenbeck. 1887. 8vo. Pp. 22.

The little book of Rev. Father Holaind is small in size, but is of great value in its substance. For argument it is admirable, and for manner written in the proper spirit. His position as Professor of Ethics has laid open to him all the specious modern theories, however varied, on this subject, and his keen intellect has enabled him to weigh them duly in the balance of reason and natural right. He is master, likewise, of an agreeable, entertaining style, which makes his book no less interesting to the ordinary reader than to the learned student.

Its appearance is very opportune, as it may be justly called a "Tract for the Times." We have fallen upon the evil days foretold by St. Paul, which began with Wickliffe, Huss, and Luther. They, with their novelties, "reformed" the Church (as they boasted), and her doctrines, as revealed by Christ and made known by His apostles. Their successors pursue the same course, but go farther in their "reforming" spirit. They see no reason why the decalogue of Sinai and the natural law should not be altered and improved, as was done with Christian creeds and forms of worship. And against these new "reformers" it is as necessary for us to strive now as it was for the Ecks, Bellarmins, Gretzer's, and others, of three hundred years ago. And in our country it becomes doubly necessary to discuss and refute what modern heresy, in its latest development, has put forward in the shape of land and labor theories. For these are things which now fill the thoughts and words of men, and are perplexing and disturbing human society, menacing its peaceful existence, and doing their best to bring about in every State internal strife and perpetual anarchy. As Catholics form a considerable portion of those who are indebted to labor for a livelihood, and might be tempted and led astray (since they do not enjoy the Protestant privilege of taking up any theory that commends itself to their REASON, in other words, flatters their pride, and ministers to their greed), it is highly expedient that they be admonished and warned to hear the Church, and keep within the lines of strict duty and natural right.

Pastors of souls ought to read this little book and commend it to their flocks.

Bishop Chatard's excellent lecture is also full of instruction, which a priest may use to great advantage in explaining these matters to his people. What he says of eminent domain is worthy of general attention, for it meets completely the false claim of Communist and Socialist that the State can have ownership, properly so-called, in private property, whether of land or of capital.

EXPLANATION OF THE PSALMS AND CANTICLES IN THE DIVINE OFFICE. By *S. Alphonsus Liguori*, Doctor of the Church. Translated by the Rev. T. Livius, C.SS.R., with a preface by his Eminence Cardinal Manning. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company.

Though perhaps among the least known of the many works written by St. Alphonsus de Liguori, this one is by no means the least important. Composed, as we are told in the preface, under the pressure of heavy episcopal cares, old age, and much bodily infirmity, yet it displays with marked distinctness all the well-known characteristics of the great saint and doctor's most popular writings, among which we hope to see it in its new English dress—which, by the way, is fully and faultlessly becoming to it—take the prominent and permanent place which its high merits entitle it to. It is not an exhaustive volume for learned students in Biblical science, but simply intended for the benefit of such as are the most in need of instruction in this matter; and its great utility to such persons, whether they be ecclesiastics, members of religious communities, or belonging to the great body of the laity, is enhanced by its spirit of piety as well as by its wide and solid erudition. As indicating the scope and value of the book, we append a few words from Cardinal Manning's preface:

"St. Augustine says that all the history and the prophecy of the Old Testament is to be found in the book of Psalms. It contains, also, the theology which, from Adam to Abraham, and from Abraham to the In-

carnation, was the inheritance of all who lived by faith. . . . . For all who are bound to the daily recital of the Divine Office, it is of vital interest that they should be able to give not only a material, but also an intellectual attention to the Psalms. . . . . It is, with all, a question of degree. The most learned will not apprehend all, and the least learned will apprehend much of the inspired words."

No reader needs further assurance that this book is a great aid to intellectual attention in reciting the Office, and a "source of light and sweetness in various measures both to the simple and to the learned."

THE STORY OF IRELAND. By the *Hon. Emily Lawless.* With some additions by Mrs. Arthur Bronson. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1888 ("The Story of the Nations" Series).

Not having closely examined all the volumes of the series in which this book appears, we cannot say whether it is the worst among them; we hope it is not the best, for then it would not be worth anybody's while to read them. A better illustration could not be had of the folly and futility of choosing writers at hap-hazard to get up a work to order for the purpose of filling a gap in a series. But the evil may soon bring its own remedy, as the series business is being very much overdone, and we know of nothing more loathing to good taste than a surfeit of such reading.

The author of "Hurrish; A Study," as Miss Lawless announces herself on the title page of her "Story of Ireland," has certainly not made a thorough study of Irish history, else she would not complain of finding so "many blind alleys," "sudden turnings," and "unaccountably crooked portions" in what she is pleased to call its "long dark road." She is not the "genuine explorer" that she speaks of, but rather "the less well-equipped traveller." The story is not an interesting one as she presents it; and that it can be made most interesting every reader of the late A. M. Sullivan's "Story of Ireland" well knows. Her presentation of it is not by any means as pleasing, as full or as accurate as is Walpole's "History of the Kingdom of Ireland," whose publication, by the way, removed the necessity for any other book of the same compass. So much of general comment. By way of particular stricture we need only say that Miss Lawless' references to the early Irish Church are entirely misleading and erroneous. Nor is she reliable on other points. But while "of writing books there is no end," her enemies will rejoice that she has written this one.

L'INDIANA: SUITE D'UNE FEMME APOTRE. Par *Mme. Clementine de la Corbinière.* Paris: Victor Lecoffre.

Few of the many stories of pioneer religious life in America are more interesting than that of the establishment and early history of the Sisters of Providence in Indiana. The annals of St. Mary's of the Woods would furnish enough material for a voluminous narrative. But a portion only of these records have, as yet, been given to the public; those, however, that have been printed for general circulation afford us a sufficiently clear insight into the institute to enable us to judge of the magnitude of the good work that has been accomplished. For what she has done, though prompted, it may be, chiefly by a sister's love, Madame de la Corbinière deserves the lasting and warmest gratitude of the Catholics of the United States, in giving us so much information about the good work in which two members of her own family took so prominent a part. A few years ago, she published the Life and Letters of Sister St.

Francis Xavier (Mlle. Irma le Fer de la Motte), which gave us, incidentally, biographical details of many other distinguished personages, who were active agents in the western missions. Recently, she supplemented this work with a volume of sketches of the ecclesiastical history of Indiana, beginning with the biography of Bishop Bruté and ending with that of his latest and still living successor, Bishop Chatard. We have also here a summary of Indiana history, sketches of Bishop Flaget, the Abbé Dujarié, Mothers du Roscoat and Lecor, Mother Theodora, the Superioress-General of the Indiana Sisters of Providence, Bishop Hailandière, Elvira le Fer de la Motte (Irma's sister), Bishop Saint-Palais, and a good account of the Little Sisters of the Poor in Indiana. Among other pieces of valuable information given in an appendix, is a list of nineteen missionaries secured for work in America, by Bishop Bruté on the occasion of his third journey to France.

INDIFFERENTISM; or, Is One Religion as Good as Another? By the *Rev. John McLaughlin*. London: Burns & Oates. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company. 1887.

A most timely and admirable work is this little volume given to the world by a missionary priest of Glasgow, Scotland. As it is calculated to do immense service to the Church, and in her to the cause of religion and civilization, we hope it will find its way into the hands of every honest seeker after truth, and especially of every Catholic who may be in danger of being tainted with the most pernicious evil of religious indifferentism, so prevalent in these days and sapping the foundations of orthodoxy in so many weak minds.

In a brief space the author reviews the whole subject and refutes the theory of indifferentism both from reason and Revelation. Then he explains the chief marks of the Church, her unity and universality or Catholicity. In conclusion, he cleverly and forcibly explains how indifferentism may be turned to great profit in the search after the True Faith, how the disagreements of its advocates may enable us to find out where the only infallible Voice speaks.

ANCIENT HISTORY; From the Dispersion of the Sons of Noe to the Battle of Actium and the Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire. With Questions adapted to the Use of Schools. By *Peter Fredet, D.D.* New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1887.

Rev. Dr. Fredet's Histories were popular among Catholic students from their first appearance, and have, especially the volume dealing with modern times, retained that popularity to our own day. The shortcoming recently found in the "Ancient History" was one that could not be foreseen by the author, for of comparatively recent date are the archæological discoveries that have revolutionized our knowledge of the greater part of Eastern ancient history. It was a thoughtful and a grateful task, therefore, to revise and remodel his work on the line of these discoveries. The stories of Assyria, Babylonia and Egypt are almost entirely rewritten in this new edition, as are also the earlier portions of those of Greece and Rome. We have here, besides, the added features of accurate colored maps and distinctive headings of paragraphs. A close examination of the work fully assures us that the publishers do not exaggerate in their statement that they have "spared neither pains nor expense in making such improvements as were best calculated to enhance its value."

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